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Abstract
This dissertation explores the relationship between observed incidents and perceptions of value
violation or confirmation among Israeli soldiers. Through content analysis of 900 testimonies, the work
explores the intersection of social identity, military ethics and nonviolent movements. The data show
that many soldiers do not see their tasks as supporting the overall mission of keeping their country and
nation safe, leading to a decline in motivation and sense of purpose. Further, deeper reflections on
whether actions on the ground are in line with proposed national values result in incidents of role
conflict and individual cognitive dissonance and vicarious dissonance.
Findings from this research project increase the understanding of witnessing and confession as a
form of nonviolent dissent. They also confirm claims from previous studies and highlight the need for
military leaders to intentionally create cohesion in peacetime, for example through simulations and
exercises. Further, this study illustrates how soldiers’ sense of representation, also known as sense of
mission, is undermined when troops see themselves confronted with tasks that are inconsistent with
their own moral values. This is particularly true when soldiers do not feel trained for a task or situation
but arises even when tasks are simply repetitive and “boring”.
While much training is aimed at reducing and, ideally, completely preventing conduct violations
in the field, findings show a vital need to foster a culture in which those witnessing ethical violations
report them without fear of retaliation. Leadership plays the paramount role in this endeavor by clearly
communicating and consistently emphasizing these expectations. The data also points to an increase in
incidence of moral dilemmas and identity tension when soldiers interact with civilians. IDF soldiers
interact with two civilian populations: the enemy civilian populations – Palestinian civilians – and Israeli
settlers in the West Bank. A lack of training on how to engage with either group is evident in the data. A
lack of authority over Israeli settlers also led to frustrations. Interactions with both populations caused
the testifiers significant stress and led them to reflect on their national identity and sense of mission.
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Several studies point to the significant differences between training soldiers for engagement with
civilians and for engagement in traditional military-on-military missions. This dissertation confirms the
presence of this gap between soldiers' tactical training and operational experiences.

Key words
Military Ethics, Nonviolence, Opposition Movements, Confession and Witnessing, Social Identity Theory,
Dissent, Breaking the Silence, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Code of Conduct
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Chapter 1: Introduction
On February 21, 2017, a military court in Tel Aviv-Yafo sentenced a young Israeli soldier to 18
months in prison for shooting a wounded and incapacitated Palestinian in the head. Almost a year prior,
Elor Azaria was serving his mandatory duty in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as an army medic close to
Hebron, in the West Bank, when two Palestinians stabbed another soldier, Azaria’s friend. One of the
attackers was immediately shot dead by other soldiers; when Azaria arrived more than ten minutes
later, the second attacker had already been immobilized. In a video of the incident, taken by civil rights
group B’Tselem, Azaria is seen shooting the Palestinian in the head seconds after his arrival at the scene
(Amichay, 2017). He later claimed that he felt the wounded Palestinian was reaching for a weapon.
A soldier on trial for questionable ethical decision making in the line of duty is a rare occurrence
in Israel – and most parts of the world – and attracted public attention from both supporters and critics
of Azaria’s actions. Some see him as a hero who defended the State of Israel; others claim he violated
military and common ethics by shooting a Palestinian who no longer presented an immediate threat
(Ahronheim, 2017). The public response highlights the political polarization of Israeli society and
illustrates how different pockets of this society interpret not only the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict but also the implications of the military occupation of the West Bank, which obliges generations
of young Israelis to serve mandatory military duty.
While attitudes within Israeli society toward the occupation itself, the question of a two-state
solution and the rights and treatment of Palestinian civilians are wide ranging, performing military duty
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)1 inherently produces anxiety. The IDF bolsters the notion of

1

Occupied Palestinian Territories refers to the two geographically separate areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A
detailed description of the two areas, including a map, can be found in Chapter 3.
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“no soldier left behind” with its own missing persons unit 2 to assure soldiers and parents that everything
will be done to keep them and their children safe. This notion has been put to the test several times in
Israeli history. One notable example was the Israeli exchange of 1,027 Palestinian prisoners for a single
IDF soldier, Gilad Shalit, who was kidnapped in 2006 by Hamas (Israel Defense Forces, n.d. a). The
Palestinians’ sympathetic quest for self-determination and prosperity under occupation is juxtaposed
with horror over episodes of rocket and suicide attacks by Palestinian extremists against Israeli civilians.
Even the most “peacenik” IDF soldier may experience anxiety and periodically wrestle with questions of
proportionate and just measures and responses.
For some soldiers, the experiences and activities they participate in and witness in the OPT
during their military service raise more questions than they answer, leading to reflections on personal
and collective ethics related to incidents that are seemingly incongruent with collective national and
military values. Protesting and voicing dissent has a long tradition in Israel, and a vibrant protest culture
exists on all sides of the political spectrum. Thus, it is not surprising that groups associated with the
Israeli Peace Camp (see Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence) regularly protest the occupation and
treatment of Palestinian civilians by the IDF. In 2004, the group Breaking the Silence (Shovrim Shtika in
Hebrew) joined the Israeli protest landscape by collecting and publishing testimonies of current and
former soldiers, most often anonymized, who share their experiences serving in the OPT. Many
testimonies paint a picture of ethical violations, boredom and a repeated question: “What am I doing
here?” In the testimonies, they raise questions about whether or not the military code of conduct, the
Spirit of the IDF, is upheld and allege actions they participated in or witnessed during their military
service are not supported by – and in fact contradict – collective national values. It is this disconnect

2 https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/our-soldiers/no-soldier-left-behind-the-idf-s-missing-persons-unit/
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between values and actions that Breaking the Silence tries to make visible to Israeli society. Their stated
aim is to
“…expose the Israeli public to the reality of everyday life in the Occupied Territories. We endeavor
to stimulate public debate about the price paid for a reality in which young soldiers face a civilian
population on a daily basis, and are engaged in the control of that population’s everyday life”
(Breaking the Silence, n.d., para. 1).
Israeli and international human rights groups alike have long criticized the IDF for perceived
unnecessarily violent treatment of Palestinian civilians that violates their human rights and dignity alike
and point to the misconduct of some soldiers. While Breaking the Silence’s assertions are not new per
se, the organized and formalized way they collect and publish first-person accounts by former and
current soldiers represents a new approach. Their collected testimonies and other activities have
increasingly gained attention in Israeli society, garnering both support and criticism. Testifiers share
their experiences and explain the difficult decisions they had to make or observe others making and the
moral dilemmas they wrestled with. They also highlight that these lived experiences do not always align
with national collective values and narratives, resulting in value and role conflicts for some testifiers. The
very number of testimonies, more than 1,000 to date, increases the weight of their accusations and
makes claims of value violations harder to dismiss. Like many anti-occupation groups in Israel, one of the
group’s goals is to end the occupation of the West Bank territory. In contrast to most of those other
groups, Breaking the Silence focuses on the impact of military service in the OPT on IDF soldiers and, by
extension, Israeli society.
Breaking the Silence presents the public with yet another dilemma: all publicly known
employees and volunteers as well as all testifiers served or serve in the IDF. As will be shown in Chapter
3: Israel and Breaking the Silence, military and national identities are closely linked in Israel. Through
their military service, testifiers contributed to the safeguarding of the country. Having proven
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themselves to be part of the collective in-group, they have gained social capital through military service.
Their accounts are thus more difficult to ignore or discount as “unknowing peaceniks.”
There has been occasional opposition from within the IDF in the past. For example, in 2003,
reserve and active-duty pilots issued the “Pilot’s letter” in which they decried attacks on Palestinian
civilians and drew a direct connection between those attacks and detrimental effects on the moral
character of Israel (see for example Hirschfeld, 2005). Breaking the Silence has been active since 2004;
rather than protesting in response to a specific operation, their work has provided constant reminders
about the misalignment of values and military actions in the OPT.
Whether testifiers speak out against personal value conflicts or actions they have witnessed that
they believe illustrate misconduct, their testimonies are important applications of concepts and
arguments presented in the literature on non-violent activism, military ethics and social/military
identity. Critics of Breaking the Silence accuse the group of anonymously airing dirty laundry in a public
forum instead of properly addressing these issues within their chain of command. Fears of retaliation, a
desire not to be seen as weak, and lack of belief in the military justice/command system may be reasons
why individuals hesitate to address these issues within the military. In addition, the issues discussed in
the testimonies may speak to conceptions of values and value violations rather than constituting illegal
action or misconduct.
The case of Elor Azaria and the testimonies shared with Breaking the Silence illustrate the
complexity of upholding military values in polarized societies Both examples highlight different lived
experiences and perceptions of national identity and military service in the OPT. In both examples, the
Israeli public is sharply divided; on one hand there are the nation’s values – for example the notion of
the “most moral army in the world” – and on the other there are frequent complaints about violence
against Palestinian civilians.

5

In the spring of 2021, yet another iteration of violence arises in the conflict. Following ten days
of violence that resulted in 248 Palestinians and 12 Israelis dead, the parties agreed to a cease fire on
May 21, 2021 (Al-Mughrabi et al., 2021). Whether the ceasefire holds remains to be seen, but this most
recent violent period further underlines the need to understand the conflict dynamics at play.
Research Questions
This research project explores the relationship between observed incidents and perceptions of
value violation or confirmation by Breaking the Silence testifiers during military service in the IDF. What
kinds of incidents prompt the perception of value violations? What values and identities are expressed
most frequently, and under what circumstances? Answering these questions will further the
understanding of mechanisms that lead to perceived value violations or confirmations in the military
context. Examining identity tensions and their impact on soldier-testifiers’ behavior and perception can
inform recommendations for military training, specifically regarding the code of ethics. Through a
content analysis of Breaking the Silence’s testimonies, this dissertation aims to answer the following
core questions:
1. What relationship exists between perceived confirmation of values and incidents witnessed
during military service in the Occupied Palestinian Territories?
and
2. What relationship exists between perceived violation of values and incidents witnessed during
military service in the Occupied Palestinian Territories?
Exploring several themes related to these two questions will ground my answers in theories
related to social identity, military ethics and nonviolent activism. First, through content analysis, this
research explores whether the majority of testimonies do in fact describe incidents of extreme physical
violence or clear conduct violations. Critics of Breaking the Silence claim that the group focuses on
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unusual and extreme case of violence (see Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence), and a careful
analysis of testimonies’ content will reveal whether this claim is true.
The second theme explores soldiers’ reflections on national and political values as prompted by
their military experience. Do certain experiences increase value tensions? What are the circumstances
that increase reflection on national and political values during military service?
Third, the literature identifies a strong military identity as a crucial component for military
success (see Chapter 2: Military Identity and Opposition Movements). Unit cohesion is of particular
importance as it is thought to create a bond that motivates soldiers to continue fighting and assume
risks they normally would not. Examining claims in the literature that unit cohesion increases in
dangerous situations, an analysis comparing testimonies from Gaza and the West Bank explores the
differences in threat perceptions in these two areas and their effect on unit cohesion.
Fourth, the literature identifies contact with civilians as a complicating dimension of military
service, both in warfare and peacetime missions. In the case of soldiers performing duty in the West
Bank, where they frequently interact with Palestinian civilians, the situation might be further
complicated by the presence of Israeli settlers. The IDF is tasked with protecting Israeli settlements in
the West Bank. At the same time, human rights groups frequently report settler violence against
Palestinian civilians and property. Exploring soldiers’ responses to witnessing violence by a group they
are tasked with protecting and the impact this has on their motivation and perception on assigned tasks
is the fourth theme.
Fifth, the notion of ethical behavior, particularly of not harming civilians and protecting their
dignity is one of the tenets of the Spirit of the IDF. Examining whether witnessing violations of these
principles stimulates reflections on national and political values to a greater extent than witnessing
other violations is the focus of this final theme.

7

Data & Analysis Approach
The data for this research project consists of 900 testimonies, available in English as of June
2019 on Breaking the Silence’s website, describing events from 1999 to 2017.3 Analyzing these
testimonies with a coding software, this research uses a mixed methods approach. Content analysis of
secondary data, in this case the testimonies, comes with several benefits. For one, the data are already
available, avoiding many common challenges to data collection, including access and time constraints
and ethical challenges when collecting sensitive data on vulnerable populations.
In addition to textual analysis of coded sections, simple word counts, and other quantitative
tools help identify relationships between codes. For example, whether specific types of reported
incidents correlate more or less than other types with perceived violation of sense of representation will
help identify those testimonies that warrant a closer textual analysis. In addition, most testimonies
identify the location and year of the described incident as well as the testifier’s rank and unit. These four
characteristics present the opportunity for additional analysis, for example between type of reported
incident and location.
Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2: Military Identity and Opposition
Movements summarizes the literature on military identity and focuses on how military identity is
created, its relationship to national identity, its assumed building blocks, and one crucial component of
military identity: unit cohesion. The chapter then discusses differences in the creation of military
identity between conscripts and non-conscripts – often called all-volunteer forces – and explores the
concept of professional identity to show assumed differences between these types of forces and
between military ranks. Finally, the chapter discusses theories of nonviolent opposition, first more

3

https://www.breakingthesilence.org.il/testimonies/database
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generally and then specifically related to activism in response to military action. Key notions and
difficulties in opposing military action are presented along with different approaches to non-violent
activism.
Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence introduces the case of this study: Israel and Breaking
the Silence. Tracing the formation of the IDF from pre-statehood militias to today’s modern military, this
chapter reveals how Israel, from its early statehood years, has used military service in an attempt to
generate a sense of national belonging. The chapter then explores the unique military–civilian
connection in Israel before turning to the emergence and activities of the Israeli peace camp and protest
culture. Outlining movements opposing military action in Israel, the chapter finally introduces Breaking
the Silence, providing a description of the group’s founding history, their activities and reception among
the Israeli and international public, and their method to testimony collection.
Chapter 4: Research Design & Methods outlines the methods selected for this research project,
discusses the research questions and introduces hypotheses derived from the literature discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3. Next, the chapter discusses the research design for this study with an explanation of
the content analysis approach along with the benefits and limitations of using secondary data for
content analysis. The chapter further describes quantitative and qualitative aspects of this study and
details the codes developed for the analysis. Finally, an introduction to the data and limitations of the
study are discussed before the chapter concludes with a discussion of ethical considerations.
Chapters 5 and 6 present the findings of this study. Chapter 5: Rotten Apples or a Culture of
Denial? starts with an overview of the general themes and patterns that emerged during coding before
discussing the findings that examine the content of the testimonies and public response and analyze the
difference in displays of national identity values between soldiers that report their experiences from the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These two broad themes focus on the Israeli case and present findings
and implications largely in the context of Israel and Breaking the Silence. Chapter 6: Military Virtues in a

9

Civilianized Force presents findings for those themes that are concerned with questions of military
ethics and military identity. The chapter shares analyses of the impact of civilian–military interactions,
the impact of location on unit cohesion and sources of declining motivation for soldiers during military
service.
Finally, Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion summarizes the findings of this study and situates
them in the existing literature. After discussing research limitations, the chapter offers
recommendations derived from the findings and proposes avenues for future research.

10

Chapter 2: Military Identity and Opposition Movements
This chapter introduces the development and functions of military identity and discusses various
types of nonviolent dissent from military action. First, theories of social identity construction are
introduced to show how group identities are formed and how these collective identities inform
individuals’ attitudes, values, and beliefs. There follows a review of the literature on military identity
formation, focusing on unit cohesion and differences between conscript and non-conscript armed
forces, sometimes referred to as all-volunteer forces, and the resulting implications. Using literature on
professional identity, the next section discusses the general trend toward the professionalization of
armed forces and this trend’s implications for identity construction in the military context. The second
part of this chapter explores nonviolent ways to voice dissent from military action in democracies. A
brief summary on theories of nonviolent action sets the stage for a more specific discussion of different
types of opposition to military action from those who serve, have served, or, in the case of conscription
service, are supposed to serve in the military.
Military Identity – Building a People’s Army versus a Professional Military
Theories of Social Identification
The concept of identity, or the “sense of self”, explains how individuals construct their view of
themselves and how they examine their place in an environment to form a sense of belonging. Social
identity is “that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to
that membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). Four main concepts are at the core of Social Identity Theory:
social categorization, social identification, social comparison, and psychological distinctiveness (Tajfel,
1974). Individuals categorize the social environment into meaningful groups, or social categories, which
aid in structuring and simplifying their environment and influences their behaviors and perceptions.
Some of these categories represent the individual’s in-group(s), the social categories the individual
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considers themself to belong to. Borrowing from Hegel’s concept of dialectics (see for example
Wegerhoff, 2008), according to Social Identity Theory categories only exist in comparison to each other,
and the existence of at least one other comparable unit is necessary to define any category. In Tajfel’s
(1974) words: “the definition of a group makes no sense unless there are other groups around” (p. 712). Out-groups are thus a necessary construct for in-group classification and play a vital part in the
ongoing process of identity construction (Brewer, 1999; Neumann, 1999). The construction of outgroups or “the other” and subsequent categorization based on real or assumed differences between
groups serve to form distinct categories that in turn present reference points in constructing and
reevaluating the self and others (Hall, 2011; Derrida, 1992; Turner, 1981). Social identification refers to
acceptance of in-group identities and the subsequent internalization and display of values and behaviors
associated with respective identities. Group membership often holds emotional significance and can
contribute to an individual’s self-esteem (Turner et al., 1979).
Social comparison describes the process of comparing and evaluating in-groups and out-groups.
Distinctiveness between categories helps individuals to define their own respective in-group. Further,
individuals strive to maintain a positive self-image. Thus, comparisons tend to focus on characteristics
that emphasize perceived positive traits, resulting in a favorable evaluation of the in-group. This is the
so-called “positive distinctiveness” principle (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This concept significantly
contributes to the explanation of phenomena like prejudice and stereotyping (Allport, 1954). Hogg and
Abrams (1988) describe the in-group/out-group relation more explicitly as “the insiders in a we-group
are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry to each other. Their relation to all
outsiders, or other-groups, is one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have modified it” (p.
17). Through comparing, individuals define and reflect on themselves and others in specific contexts
(Hogg & Abrams, 1988).
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Psychological distinctiveness describes the desire of individuals to structure their environments.
Differences between categories help in making sense of one’s surroundings, even when “such
differences do not in fact exist” and often lead to “the attribution of value to, and enhancement of,
whatever differences do exist” (Tajfel, 1974, p.75). All these group identification mechanisms influence
how individuals see themselves and explain how collective identities are derived from a variety of
different identities, including religious, political, ideological, occupational, and others. Individuals
commonly subscribe to a host of collective identities, but “identities are never unified and, in late
modern times, [are] increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed
across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions” (Hall, 2011, p.
4). The different sets of beliefs, values, and norms of various identities can lead to identity tensions as
different identities held within the same person may suggest competing behaviors (Ashforth & Mael,
1989). Collective identities generally suggest or even dictate expected behavior by constructing
accepted norms and socializing the individual into these norms; likewise, they communicate expected
behavior based on collective values. Solidarity toward in-group members, conformity to group norms,
and sometimes even discrimination against members of out-groups are commonly associated with
group membership and collective identities (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1972).
Military Identity – Sources and Implications
Military identity is the degree to which military personnel internalize military values and goals
(Johansen et al., 2014). As will be discussed in more detail below, strong identification with military
values increases cohesion, which is widely assumed to positively influence the functioning of a military
unit. Recruitment and public support are also crucial to compelling individuals to risk their lives on
behalf of the state. Thus, beyond intrinsically motivating factors, many states make military service
attractive with tangible goods, such as educational support after service (Gewirth, 1983; Simmons,
1983). In addition, to receive public support for military drafts the governing authority has to
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demonstrate that it will only expose service members to risks for the greater good of the state and that
it will not leave a wounded or dead soldier behind (Wong, 2005).
Political leaders and governments of various political leanings have attempted to connect
military identity to national identity and have used military service to form a joined national identity
(Epstein & Uritsky, 2004; Krebs, 2004). Three key mechanisms are at the core of this effort: socialization,
contact, and elite transformation (Krebs, 2004). Socialization into military culture includes being
introduced to habits, norms, traditions, policies, and expected behavior (Lancaster et al., 2018; Smith &
True, 2014). Basic training or officer school exposes new soldiers and officers to military culture in an
intensive and focused manner. This experience is essential to the development of military identity
because it creates distance from the civilian self and presents the military as the new in-group (Smith &
True, 2014). However, several studies suggest that while military service does have socializing effects,
the extent to which it alters or inserts beliefs and values may be overestimated (Krebs, 2004; Popper,
1998). Citizens of different socio-economic, religious, and ethnic backgrounds serve together in pursuit
of a common superordinate goal over an extended period of time, which diminishes stereotypes and
prejudices according to the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Krebs, 2004), ideally resulting in a more
unified national identity. Third, elite transformation refers to the shift in future leaders’ perceptions
regarding the nation based on contact and socialization, these redefined views of the nation will inform
work and behavior of future leaders and thus slowly change the nation’s self-perception (Krebs, 2004).
Several studies introduce scales to examine and measure military identity. Moskos (1977; see
also 1973; 1986) distinguishes between institutional and occupational military organizations and detects
a shift toward an occupational structure in the U.S. military after mandatory conscription service ended.
Institutions, according to Moskos (1977), are “legitimated in terms of values and norms” (p. 42), and
working for the institution is considered more of a calling than a work-for-pay arrangement. While
material compensations are often more meager than for similar employment outside of the institution,
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institutional membership is a significant source of esteem. Occupations, on the other hand, focus on the
self-interest of furthering one’s career and increasing monetary compensation.
Johansen et al. (2013) develop a scale that uses idealism, individualism, professionalism, and
warriorism to measure military identity in Norway. Franke (1997) similarly examines military identity
and value orientation of West Point cadets in terms of conservatism, patriotism, warriorism, and
Machiavellianism. Soeters (1997) compares results from thirteen countries in his analysis of military
value orientation based on Hofstede’s (1984) work on cultural differences and similarities and Moskos’
(1977) institutional-occupation model of military identity. Soeters’ findings suggest that military officers
tend to have an institutional rather than occupational identity and concludes that personal values
converge with military values and requirements over time. Macovei (2016) finds four key factors that
influence the internalization of military values: 1) affinity to military values, or the degree to which
military values correspond with individual value systems; 2) publicly available information that shapes
the individual’s perception and makes them want to behave in similar ways (for example, exposure to
inspiring books, movies, legends); 3) existence of moral guidelines and superiors who model behavior in
compliance with these guidelines; and 4) military value appreciation, specifically whether the individual
appreciates peers’ and superiors’ behavior when military values are displayed. Despite the foregoing,
Lancaster et al. (2018) remark that available scales and previous research do not sufficiently consider
national contexts and thus existing scales may not be suitable to measure and compare military identity
across different cultural and national contexts.
Cohesion: A Tale of Camaraderie and Loyalty or Perpetuation of In-group Favoritism?
Militaries aim to create a strong collective identity among service members in order to ensure
orders are followed promptly and efficiently in complex and high-pressure situations, a key benefit of
cohesion. Interest in studying cohesion emerged in the 1940s, most prominently with Shils and
Janowitz’s (1948) study on cohesion in the German Wehrmacht during World War II. Since then,
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cohesion has been the focus of a variety of studies, all seeking to identify factors that affect motivation
and performance in combat. The field largely focuses on Western and traditional state-sponsored
militaries, but in recent years a small number of studies on non-Western militaries and non-state
military style groups have emerged. Therefore, the literature review that follows mostly presents a
limited, Western-centered view. A summary on the available literature on non-Western militaries and
the slowly expanding literature on non-traditional military-style groups makes up the end of this section
and offers additional insights into external factors that may influence cohesion.
Cohesion is said to allow for the creation of a force and the targeted use and control of this
force (von Clausewitz, 1832; Shils & Janowitz, 1948; Wong, 2005; Tzu, 2012; Käihkö, 2018); cohesion is
also defined as “the capacity of national armed forces to fight with determination on the battlefield, and
to keep fighting even when a war appears lost” (Castillo, 2014, p. 1). In a cohesive unit, members
establish significant social bonds with each other and identify with the immediate group as a
representation of their broader military community, which is a vital component of military socialization,
particularly for combat troops (Wong, 2005). The mere potential of being exposed to violent conflict
increases cohesion among members of the armed forces (Käihkö, 2018). Notions like “no man left
behind” and “brothers in arms” are exemplary of this aspect of military socialization. Several studies on
cohesion confirm that if the immediate group provides for basic needs and a sense of power and
esteem, combat troops are less concerned with their own well-being and survival than on that of the
group and mission (Siebold, 2007; Shils & Janowitz, 1948). Mutual trust and loyalty within the group are
key components as well (Siebold, 2007), culminating in the assurance that the individual soldier and
their peers would not be left behind if wounded or dead. This assurance affects morale positively.
Loyalty in this context specifically increases cohesion and results in troops taking significant risks to
rescue and recover their wounded and deceased peers (Samet, 2005; Wong, 2005). Constant and
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repeated invocation of unifying factors, including meaningful symbols and commemoration of shared
history enhance cohesion (Käihkö, 2018) and reinforce a broader military identity (Regens, 1977).
Siebold (2007) identifies four components of unit cohesion: 1) horizontal cohesion describes the
bond between soldiers and their peers, 2) vertical cohesion describes the bond between soldiers and
their supervisors, 3) organizational cohesion describes the relationship between soldiers and their larger
unit of organization within the military and 4) institutional cohesion describes the relationship between
soldiers and their branch of service or their military in general. Siebold’s and other models of cohesion
have sparked an ongoing academic debate over future directions for the study of cohesion (see for
example Käihkö, 2018; 2021; Käihkö & Haldén; 2020; King, 2006; 2007; 2021; Siebold, 2007; 2018;
Siebold et al., 2016). Despite this disagreement, broad consensus exists that bonding between peers is a
core element of cohesion (see for example Shamir et al., 2000; Griffith, 2007; Bartone et al., 2002).
A small number of studies on cohesion in non-Western militaries have also been completed.
These indicate that mechanisms of cohesion depend on the cultural, political and historical context. In a
study of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Verweijen (2018) found a system of
patronage networks; according to Verweijen, external factors increase the importance of these
networks and their influence on cohesion. Patronage networks prevent bonding between those of equal
rank and thus prevent horizontal cohesion (Siebold, 2007). Instead, they encourage favoritism by
accentuating extra-military social identities, such as those based on ethnicity, regional background or
former ties to rebels. This provides for increased social bonding along already existing extra-military
identity lines and seems to overpower attempts to create a joint military identity, particularly in diverse
units. Similarly, a study on cohesion in the Afghan and Iraqi armies found that ethnic and sectarian
identities pose a challenge for unit cohesion (Simonsen, 2009). The study suggests that this division
along identity lines may be overcome by focusing on the mission and emphasizing the national character
and purpose of the military. While these studies are concerned with different political, cultural,
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demographic and conflict contexts, they share the common pattern of existing social identities
overshadowing or preventing cohesion. This has another potential consequence: if parts of the
population see the military as exclusively run by one group, this likely undermines legitimacy and
acceptance of the military in those parts of the population.
An increasing number of studies focus on non-state guerilla-style military groups, including
paramilitaries, terrorist groups and armed rebel groups. Similar to the findings of studies on nonWestern state militaries, results suggest that unit cohesion is complex and at once heavily draws on and
is restricted by existing social identities. In a comparative study on unit cohesion in Kurdish Peshmerga
and Lebanese Hezbollah fighters, Nilsson (2018) found that both groups recognize cohesion as a crucial
factor in battlefield success and deliberately attempt to build it through joint training focusing, again, on
existing group identities: Peshmerga focus on the existing joint social identity of being Kurdish and the
Kurdish struggle for independence whereas Hezbollah focuses on the ideological components of the
conflict. Importantly, Nilsson found that the mechanisms at play in creating unit cohesion largely depend
on the political context of the conflict and parties involved. Studying the impact of territorial presence
and control on cohesion in jihadist groups in Africa, Hansen (2018) found that mechanisms of cohesion
change with the size and permanence of a group’s control over a territory, suggesting that cohesion is
more prone to change than commonly assumed in the literature.
All Militaries are Not Equal: Differences between Conscript and Non-Conscript Forces
There is an overall trend in many western democracies to abolish or suspend conscription during
peacetime and instead focus on recruits that join the military voluntarily. This trend, the differences
between these two types of military recruitment and the resulting consequences have also garnered
researchers’ and policy makers’ interest. While a number of economic, social and political arguments
have been made for and against either system (see for example Hansen & Weisbrod, 1967; Lau et al.,
2004; Coleman, 1983; Fischel, 1996; P. S. Ng, 2005; Y. K. Ng, 2008; Piper, 1983; Tollison, 1970), a
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detailed account of all benefits and disadvantages is beyond the scope of this chapter. The following
part thus focuses largely on how these differences affect the nature and development of military
identity.
In states with mandatory military service, citizens of a certain age and – in most countries –only
males are required to complete a specified stint of military duty unless they qualify for an exemption.
Requirements for exemptions differ from country to country, but medical conditions and religious or
ethical objections are common qualifications. A more detailed analysis of reasons for exemption from
military service can be found below in the section Conscientious Objection to Military Service.
Moskos (2002) sees conscription service as the ideal-type of an armed force, holding that
mandatory military service is the “equalizer” that ensures citizens from all socio-economic backgrounds
serve. In theory, this would make the armed forces a representation of the larger society (HarriesJenkins, 1973; Janowitz, 1975). Further, military service and other non-military national service
requirements can instill national values and create and reinforce national identity (Krebs, 2004). Others
(Gewirth, 1983; Simmons, 1983) argue that the existence of conscription service violates the basic rights
to life and liberty of individual citizens and can only be justified under narrowly defined circumstances,
i.e., when other equally important rights cannot be protected without conscription. To uphold
conscription service, states must create a moral obligation to serve or find other justification for a
“basically a coercive policy” (Simmons, 1983, p. 82). Love for one’s country and patriotism are not
necessarily linked to one’s willingness to serve in the military (Paret, 1970), but this connection is
intentionally created by some governments to ensure public support and increase the willingness of
potential recruits to perform military service.
Arguments for non-conscript forces are also manifold. First, motivation and commitment to
serve increase with a sense of agency, and longer time commitments and a better-educated and highly
skilled force result (Janowitz, 1975). Second, to be competitive and attract qualified personnel, rewards
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for military service – usually a combination of monetary compensation and intangible benefits – have to
be closer to those for similar employment in the civilian sector in non-conscript forces than in conscript
militaries (P. S. Ng, 2005; Harries-Jenkins, 1973). It is thus no surprise that the all-volunteer force is
considered a more professional alternative. These factors lead a large stream of literature to conclude
that non-conscript forces are preferable to conscript forces (Friedman, 1962; Gewirth, 1983; Rostker,
2006). However, non-conscript forces are usually less of a mirror of society, as economically
disadvantaged and minority youth are more likely to join “voluntarily” due to a lack of viable alternatives
(Janowitz, 1975; Janowitz & Moskos, 1974). Eventually, Janowitz (1975) feared, non-conscript service
would perpetuate political and economic cleavages in a society.
Professional Identity and the Military
Professional identities are important sources of identity construction that “provide a lens
through which to understand ourselves and our professional community” (Fraser-Arnott, 2019, p. 1).
Borrowing concepts of self-definition and categorization from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner,
1979), professional identity contributes to how individuals conceptualize themselves and make sense of
their role in their environment. Based on attributes, beliefs, values, motives and experiences in
specialized occupations, professional identity helps individuals make sense of and reflect on their role
and behavior in their professional context (Billot, 2010; Ibarra, 1999). Further, a professional identity
equips the individual to make reasonable judgements within their professional context informed by
knowledge and experience in difficult situations (Kennedy, 2000). Professional identities develop over
time and, like other identities, are constantly constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed based on
experiences, interactions, and feedback.
The type of work an individual performs can be a significant source of pride and often
represents a part of one’s identity. While all types of work can be a source of pride and identification,
professional status comes with higher status and increased responsibilities. The literature defines
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professions by contrasting them to occupations. Generally, a number of key characteristics must be
fulfilled for an occupation to become a profession (Hall, 1969). A fundamental trait of a profession is the
existence and continuous advancement of a specialized body of theory and knowledge (Greenwood,
1957; Huntington, 1957; Hall, 1969; Susskind & Susskind, 2018). Formalized education teaches essential
theoretical knowledge and conveys standardized behavior and acceptable courses of action to new
members. Second, certain authorities and autonomies are granted with membership that allow the
professional to make decisions and act within defined limits. Because professionals are considered the
most qualified individuals to determine courses of action in specific contexts, the larger community
sanctions these authorities and autonomies, formally or informally, to ensure professionals can perform
their services (Greenwood, 1957; Hughes, 1958; Hall, 1969; Krejsler, 2005; Susskind & Susskind, 2018).
Entrance requirements to the profession are formalized and often include certificates and degrees
attesting to the successful completion of mandatory training (Evett, 2003; Gerhold, 1974; Hall, 1969).
Further, a governing body or association ensures membership requirements and other standards set by
the professional community are met and enforced (Evett, 2003; Gerhold, 1974; Hall, 1969; Huntington,
1957; Krejsler, 2005; Ross, 1916; Susskind & Susskind, 2018).
Ethical principles outline key duties and responsibilities of a profession. Sometimes formalized –
examples include the Hippocratic Oath for medical doctors and the military code of conduct – moral
guidelines focus on the responsibilities and limitations of the professional’s application of knowledge
and use of privileges. Crucially, the work of the profession aims to improve the welfare of the larger
community; its primary focus is not personal gain (Gerhold, 1974; Greenwood, 1957; Hall, 1969; Hughes,
1958; Huntington, 1957; Krejsler, 2005; McGrath Morris, 2008; Ross, 1916). Ideally, “in the true
profession the practitioner is made into a faithful servant of society by control from within” (Ross, 1916,
p. 16) and aims at serving their community. As Huntington clarifies, “the client of every profession is
society, individually or collectively” (Huntington, 1957, p. 9). While guiding principles aim to protect the
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community from unsafe and immoral conduct by members of the profession, they also intend to protect
the profession itself. If unethical practices become widespread and systematic, authorities may
withdraw the profession’s powers and privileges (Greenwood, 1957). Finally, each profession has a
unique subculture with its own values, norms and symbols. Values focus on the perceived benefits of
the work the profession yields, whereas norms define roles and expected behavior. Symbols serve to
signify and reinforce the profession’s subculture with insignia, dress and stereotypes and by retelling
successful legends or important historical moments that highlight the profession’s values and sacrifices
(Eriksson & Linde 2014, Greenwood 1957, Hall 1969, Regens 1977). Kennedy (2000) reorganized these
attributes into three main categories:
1. Specialized knowledge acquired over time; the work of predecessors and current
professionals informs relevant knowledge. Most important, specialized knowledge includes not only
how to do things, but also why specific actions are appropriate in certain contexts. Specialized
knowledge thus can guide the professional to make decisions under unexpected circumstances. Further,
members of the profession are careful to admit to their ranks only individuals who use this specialized
knowledge as permitted by the community.
2. Commitment to service, which guides professionals to address problems within the bounds of
their professional responsibility. This includes the acceptance of the structures that shape the
profession. A public commitment to serve the larger community is also part of this category, including a
pledge to make the best decision for the larger community or individual that is being served, not for
oneself.
3. Autonomy in decision-making allows professionals the right to set goals and determine
appropriate courses of action independently within the context of their expertise. Based on an
understanding that the first two categories, specialized knowledge and commitment to service, will
guide the professional through unforeseen circumstances, professionals enjoy certain freedoms to
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perform their work efficiently and effectively. However, this autonomy is restrained in two ways: first,
any decision has to promote the welfare of the target recipients or groups that are served by the
profession; second, the proposed course of action has to be within the bounds of an established code of
ethics or be accepted by other professionals in the field.
The notion that the military exemplifies a profession has largely been accepted in the literature
since the 1950s and 1960s, when civil–military relations became a focus of research (Harries-Jenkins,
1990; Wolfendale, 2009). One stream of literature on military professionalism, however, focuses solely
on those individuals who “join the armed forces of their own free will, voluntarily choosing to pursue a
military career for a fixed or indeterminate period of time” (Yiannoros, 2018, p.23; see also Moskos,
1970), effectively excluding conscripts. The majority of early research even excludes enlisted service
members and focuses solely on the officer core (Abrahamsson, 1972; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960).
Huntington (1957) makes “management of violence” (p. 11) the distinguishing feature of a professional
in the military, discounting officers such as medical and legal practitioners or chaplains who are not
directly involved in the management of violence. Those officers, Huntington argues, may “belong to the
officer corps in its capacity as an administrative organization of the state, but not in its capacity as a
professional body” (Huntington, 1957, p. 12). Countering this view, other authors (Harries-Jenkins 1990,
Janowitz 1960) point to changing skill and task requirements in the military over time and argue that the
increase in demand for more technical and less combat-oriented skills broadens the spectrum of tasks
performed by military members that go beyond the pure management of violence. Restructuring and
redefining military tasks also raises the question of who performs these professional duties. A number of
authors (Harries-Jenkins, 1990; Downes, 1985; Regens, 1977; Wolfendale, 2009) argue for broader
definitions to include non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and enlisted service members.
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The following section uses Kennedy’s (2000) classification of a profession to organize the
literature on military identity and to examine the extent to which the military fulfills the criteria of a
profession.
1.

Specialized knowledge:

As a highly structured organization (Harries-Jenkins, 1990), the military has produced a
significant body of professional knowledge and expertise (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960), with the
military apparatus having almost exclusive ownership of knowledge in its specific area of expertise
(Evetts, 2003; Wolfendale, 2009). Military members, enlisted and officers alike, receive formalized
training and education, with officers receiving significantly more specialized training on the whole
(Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). Huntington (1957) estimates that the average officer will spend
about a third of their career in formal training. Due to its quasi-monopoly over certain areas of expertise
and based on its unique mandate to ensure security of the state, the military must constantly engage in
expanding the specialized knowledge and (re-)training its members in specialized skills (Janowitz, 1959).
2.

Commitment to service:

Commitment to service and upholding professional standards is a crucial element of military
work, due to its obligation to ensure the security and safety of the state and its citizens (Huntington,
1957; Janowitz, 1959). Traditionally, militaries are linked to a particular state, and thus have a sole
client: the state (Sarkesian et al., 1995). As Huntington (1957) puts it: “the military profession exists to
serve the state” (p. 73). However, private armies, paramilitaries and even private contractors can
perform these roles without the necessary allegiance to one state or actor. Irresponsible use of the skills
and knowledge of the military professional can severely endanger and harm individuals and society
(Huntington, 1957). Commitment in the military is linked to professionalism (Johansen et al., 2014;
Wolfendale, 2009), and, in the case of traditional militaries that act on behalf of a state and are directed
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by its leaders, a high degree of professionalism is connected to altruism (Johannsen et al., 2013),
bolstering the service aspect.
The notion of commitment to service is important because of the unique responsibility that the
permission to use lethal force brings (Huntington, 1957; Wolfendale, 2009). Conversely, potentially
being subjected to lethal force by opposing militaries can result in “the ultimate liability” (Sarkesian et
al., 1995; p. 90). The “no man left behind” notion and the commitment to recover and rescue wounded
or dead unit members is a trait of a professional military that increases a collective sense of
responsibility for each other and the mission (Wong, 2005).
3. Autonomy in decision-making:
Military leadership and advisors have significant authority and autonomy: notably, they control
how problems are defined and what potential solutions to these problems are offered and
recommended. Proposed courses of action and decision-making by military leaders are in many
situations generally accepted by the governing authority, including political leaders (Evett, 2003; Feaver,
1996; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Wolfendale, 2009).
While the literature is divided on which military members to include in the professional military
discussion, the military is widely seen as a professional organization. This status is crucial for the state
military because without it “the military would be morally no better than a mercenary army”
(Wolfendale, 2009, p. 127). Assuming that conscripts do not develop a professional identity, instilling
values and standards is crucial to ensure cohesion and expected behavior within the military and for the
military to continue to enjoy significant authority and autonomy from the greater community and
political leadership.
Voicing Dissent to Military Action in a Democracy
The expression of dissent and the right to protest and voice this dissent are pillars of civil rights
in modern democracies. The following section briefly introduces nonviolent theories to set the stage for

25

a detailed account of different forms of opposition to military action, from civilians refusing to serve in
the military to opposition by military members in and out of uniform to specific missions, actions, or the
use of particular weapons.
Theories of Nonviolent Opposition Movements
Organized opposition movements using nonviolent protest abstain from all violent behavior,
either out of principle or due to pragmatic calculations that a nonviolent strategy is the most viable
course of action. The adoption of nonviolent methods is frequently a strategic decision due to power
asymmetries (Schock, 2015; Dudouet, 2008). Drawing from a wide range of available tactics and
methods, nonviolent action has been used throughout history to change laws, increase awareness of
social injustices and spark public debates. To be considered nonviolent an action must fulfill two key
criteria: it must be free of either violence or the threat of violence, and it must be outside of the
channels of routine politics (Schock, 2015). Nonviolent resistance starts with the withdrawal of consent
(Sharp, 1973) and focuses on the power of collective action (Bartkowski, 2013). Generally, nonviolent
action takes one of two forms: commission or omission – taking actions that are unusual or even
forbidden or refusing or withdrawing from generally expected political actions (Sharp, 2005). A crucial
component of nonviolent action is raising awareness in the hope of sparking public debate, mobilizing
sympathizers of the cause, and ultimately increasing pressure on the opposing party.
Sharp (2005) identifies three key mechanisms for political change: conversion, accommodation,
and nonviolent coercion and disintegration. Opponents rarely change behavior because they changed
views, or are “converted,” but some demands may be accommodated if maintaining the status quo
becomes too costly, economically or politically (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Nonviolent resistance
often intentionally provokes or creates conflict and controversies to create publicity and raise
awareness. Convincing others to join the movement or at least sympathize with the cause puts pressure

26

on the opposition to make concessions because upholding the status quo becomes too expensive, for
example when their reputation is negatively affected.
Opposition from Within: Types of Nonviolent Action to Military Action
Following Schock (2015), only those actions that are outside of conventional and routine politics
are in fact considered nonviolent action. Thus, many acts of expressing dissent that are free of violence
may seem to represent a nonviolent action at first glance but in fact are part of standard politics and are
not considered to be a nonviolent action. Objection to military service or to specific military action
manifests in different ways, and states vary dramatically in how they handle these displays of dissent.
While there are many examples of civilian opposition to military service or action, this section focuses
exclusively on dissenting action by military members. Requesting status as a conscientious objector in a
state that offers this option, for example, is part of conventional politics and may therefore be a display
of dissent but not a nonviolent action (Hallward & Norman, 2015). That said, the next part discusses
conscientious objection to show when and how it may turn into an act of nonviolence.
The final parts of the chapter examine critical voices from within the military: actions during
military service that subject the refuser to severe legal punishment, and the involvement of former and
current military members in “out of uniform” activism. Two key factors determine the available types of
dissent and potential outcomes: the status of the dissident (civilian or military) and the type of refusal
(selective or total) (Noone, 1993). So-called “military peace movements” (Leitz, 2014) regularly
subscribe to non-violent action and create controversies by sharing their stories. The term “military
peace movements” itself reflects the contradiction and identity tension those activists face due to their
dual military and peace activist identities. Before focusing in detail on military peace movements, I first
examine other types of opposition and resistance to military action.
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Conscientious Objection to Military Service
Conscientious objection is the refusal to serve in one’s nation’s military based on religious or
ethical beliefs; in some countries, political beliefs or other personal reasons are accepted as well. Socalled total refusal, objection to serve in the military in any capacity, mostly applies to states that have
conscription service (Moskos & Chambers, 1993; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High
Commissioner, 2012; Palonen, 1985), but is also an issue of debate in all-volunteer militaries when
individuals change their mind after joining the armed forces (Baudisch, 2006; Friedman, 2006).
Exemption from conscription service based on religious beliefs and moral convictions has a long
tradition. The United Nations Office for Human Rights cites a conscientious objection in the year 295
A.D. as the earliest case, and many historical examples, often put forward by pacifist religious minorities,
are known throughout history (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2012). In
Europe and the United States for example, historic peace churches such as the Mennonites and Quakers
have advocated for conscientious objection since long before many militaries were converted to nonconscript forces (Childress, 1983; Hallward & Norman, 2015). Moskos and Chambers (1993) distinguish
between religious and secular conscientious objection and notice an increase in secular reasons cited by
conscientious objectors that include political and private concerns not covered under religious or ethical
beliefs.
Conscientious objection is thus most commonly associated with civilian and total objection, but
can take other forms as well (discussed in more detail below). In several countries, including Brazil, Italy
and Switzerland, mandatory military service is a core requirement of citizenship included in their
respective constitutions (Noone, 1993). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and several domestic
human rights conventions see conscientious objection as a human right (United Nations Human Rights
Office of the High Commissioner, 2012; Yiannaros, 2016). A few countries, including The Netherlands
and Germany, provide conscientious objection as a fundamental right in their constitutions (Dutch
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Constitution art. 994; German Basic Law, art. 4, §35) and in these cases in which a formal path to
conscientious objection is provided and regularly used conscientious objection does not present a form
of nonviolent action. Rather, it is a type of regular dissent.
Questions regarding whether conscientious objection should relieve individuals from military
service, who should qualify and under what conditions have been discussed by religious, political,
economic, legal and philosophical scholars alike (Childress, 1983; Kuhlmann & Lippert, 1993; Moskos &
Chambers, 1993; P.S. Ng, 2005; Noone, 1993; Rostker 2006). The processes and requirements for
conscientious objectors to be relieved of mandatory military service vary widely from state to state and
have changed within states over time. In Germany, for example, while conscientious objection was
specified in the 1949 Constitution, the objector had to justify his reasons in writing and in front of a
panel until 1976. In 1977, so-called postcard objections became legal, and individuals could inform the
government of their conscientious objection via postcards. Even though this simplified process was
reversed just months later, by 1991, about half of all potential draftees made use of their right to
conscientious objection (Kuhlmann & Lippert, 1993). Conscription service was suspended in 2011 in
Germany, but a court clarified that the right to conscientious objection remains intact for voluntary
members of the armed forces. That is, service members may change their minds and claim conscientious
objector status after they have joined the armed forces (Baudisch, 2006), the so-called conscientious
objection in uniform (Moskos & Chambers, 1993).
Besides the issue of human and civil rights, Childress (1983) points out that forcing individuals to
perform military service against their will might cause internal problems for the military because of the

4 The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

www.government.nl%2Fbinaries%2Fgovernment%2Fdocuments%2Freports%2F2019%2F02%2F28%2Fthe-constitution-of-thekingdom-of-the-netherlands%2FWEB_119406_Grondwet_Koninkrijk_ENG.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3JfxrHpQFUYaCKWHen_Lm5 German Basic Law. https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf
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“difficulty or even impossibility of making adequate soldiers out of people who are conscientiously
opposed to fighting” (p. 149). Opposition to conscientious objections often points to the unequal burden
of communal duties that supposedly benefit the collective (Childress, 1983; Gewirth, 1983). For this
reason, conscientious objectors are often required to perform some other sort of alternative service
that benefits society for equal or slightly longer amounts of time (Childress, 1983; Noone, 1993).
Opposition in Uniform
The second major category, action during military service, encompasses a large spectrum of
action that demonstrates dissent to specific actions, wars or use of weapons. While some objections are
voiced through official channels and formalized procedures, others are considered illegal and may result
in severe judicial punishment. The unifying factor of these dissenting actions is that they are undertaken
while in uniform.
Selective objection is the refusal to perform certain duties or participate in specific conflicts that
the military member does not believe to be in line with his freedom of conscience (Yiannaros, 2016).
This pertains to specific wars, military operations, or the use of specific weapons (Noone, 1993), and,
while mostly carried out by those already in the military, selective objection is sometimes announced
prior to entering the military (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2006;
Moskos & Chambers, 1993). Traditionally, selective objection is less likely to be approved than total
conscientious objection. Getting a selective objection granted is even more difficult ‘in uniform’ than for
civilians being called for conscript service, because it “disrupts the chain of command in a military and
challenges the foundations of a war, as well as civilian authorities over militaries” (Leitz, 2014, p. 56; see
also Noone, 1993; Yiannaros, 2016). A niche argument focuses on the duty of resisting orders that
violate one’s conscience and holds that it is not only a right but in fact an obligation grounded in
professional integrity (as opposed to personal morals) (Wolfendale, 2009). By claiming professional
status, the argument goes, the military must adhere to “stringent moral constraints” (Wolfendale, 2009,
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p. 127). Key here is that, unlike objections based on personal beliefs and values, action or inaction based
on professional integrity suggests that all members of the profession should behave the same way
(Wolfendale, 2009) and that those behaving differently are in violation of their professional duties.
While militaries handle selective objection differently, some states have a record of
accommodating such requests. In 2005, the Federal Administrative Court in Germany acquitted a major
who had refused to participate in a software program that he believed supported Operation Iraqi
Freedom. The major was charged with disobeying an order, but the court, distinguishing between
constitutional rights that do not always apply to military members and basic rights that apply to all
humans, sided with the major. Basic rights, following the judgement, include freedom of conscience. As
a result, the major could not be ordered to complete tasks that violated his moral convictions (Kotzur,
2006). Military personnel give up some of their civil rights while serving, for example including military
regulations on free speech (Leitz, 2014). This example, however, shows the nuances of these rights and
highlights that while military members are subject to military law, they do not give up all of their other
rights while serving.
Many military members have cited the Nuremberg trials when explaining their reasons for
selective objection or disobedience of orders. The Nuremberg trials established several precedents in
the prosecution of Nazi Germany. Most notably, the trials established that following orders is not a
legitimate defense if these orders violate international law and that individual government officials can
be prosecuted for their participation in state’s war crimes (Murdough, 2010).
Both conscientious objection and selective refusal are formal acts of refusal; many democratic
states have established protocols and procedures for how to treat these objections, including the
requirements and thresholds that need to be met in order for them to be considered lawful, how the
governing authority should be notified of the objection and the potential consequences for the objector.
The state and the individual are both involved in the process of obtaining an exemption as a
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conscientious objector, and if the objector’s nation recognizes selective objection the same is true,
through a structured procedure that outlines parameters and consequences.
In contrast to these formal objections, actions – or inactions – taken by an individual during
military service without prior announcement and without following formal protocols often constitute
severe violations of military law and conduct and almost always result in legal consequences. Examples
include defection, desertion and absent without official leave (AWOL. While AWOL is the unauthorized
temporary abandonment of one’s duty (Koehler et al., 2016), deserters do not intend to return and face
more severe judicial punishment. Military personnel inclined to desert amid a civil war often remain in
the armed forces out of fear of potential punishment (Koehler et al., 2016; McLauchlin, 2010).
Historically, deserters were tried for treason and often executed (United Nations Human Rights Office of
the High Commissioner, 2012). In some cases, though, deserters have been honored years and
sometimes decades later for their refusal to participate in unethical practices or illegal wars; a memorial
in Vienna, for example, honors Austrian deserters that left the German Wehrmacht. Desertion continues
to be the sole option to avoid military service in some countries with mandatory service requirements.
Defection, giving up allegiance to one’s state with the intention to join another, is the most extreme of
these cases. In the case of military defection, this might be to join the armed forces of another state or a
rebel group.
Huntington (1957) recognizes disobedience by military officers as legitimate when warranted by
professional competency and assumes this disobedience to eventually lead to an increase in
professional efficiency because it underscores the responsibilities of a profession, confirms values and
sets new standards of professional behavior that improve the profession’s integrity. In terms of
objections rooted in ethical considerations, Huntington sees the military service member as first and
foremost bound by professional duty and expected to obey superiors’ orders as long as they fall within
the professional code of conduct. He holds that disobedience based on individual morals may be
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justified in the “most extreme instances” (1957, p. 78) but does not explain what those circumstances
may be.
Opposition out of Uniform
Actions of dissent by former or current military members that are taken “out of uniform,” i.e.,
when the military member is not on duty, generally expose activists to less significant legal punishment
than those actions done “in uniform”. However, involvement in peace and antiwar movements poses
different risks for military members than for civilians. Whether or not a military member is currently
serving plays a role in the severity of potential consequences, which are generally more severe for
current military members than former ones (Leitz, 2014). Leitz (2014) identifies three types of
consequences: official, estrangement and psychological (p. 33).
Many activists draw on their prior experience and recount “ground truths,” a notion referring to
the assumption that only combatants know the truth on the ground (Leitz, 2011; Tidy, 2016).
Experiences during military service inform objections, protest and specific arguments. Examples of
veterans’ involvement in peace organization are manifold: from U.S. organizations like Veterans for
Peace, Veterans for Common Sense and Vietnam Veterans Against War to Combatants for Peace and
Breaking the Silence in Israel, military service is the shared characteristic of members of these
organizations. Many, like Veterans for Peace, encourage civilians to join them in non-voting status,
effectively expanding their reach and connecting to the larger community. However, because the act of
opposition usually does not interfere directly with their duty, the above-mentioned groups are not
military opposition in the traditional sense. Instead, these groups are largely described as military peace
movements or military dissent movements (Leitz, 2014; Tidy, 2016). Huntington (1957) argues that “the
participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional
competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional
values. The military officer must remain neutral politically” (p. 71). The above-mentioned groups and
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many others have chosen to become engaged in nonviolent action and thus decided to use channels
outside of conventional politics, because they either believe other moral or ethical principles to be more
important than their military duty or because they consider specific orders, wars or missions to be illegal
or unethical and thus reject participating in certain actions. However, former military officers in many
countries, including Israel and the United States, have campaigned, often successfully, for political office
after a mandatory cooling-off period. Prior military service is highlighted as evidence of the candidate’s
patriotism, devotion to country and managerial and organizational skills.
Official consequences for engaging in protests that oppose military action differ dramatically
based on respective military regulations and military law, the level of involvement and military status of
the activist and the cultural and political context. Loss of rank or deferred promotion are common
punishments, though in some cases these actions can lead to imprisonment (Leitz, 2014). Some activists
experience estrangement due to public or outspoken engagement, even if done as conscientious
objectors or out of uniform. Stereotypes and personal preferences within the military community play a
role, and media accounts labeling them “traitors” or “disloyal” can lead to feelings of estrangement and
the loss of some connections inside and outside of the military (Leitz, 2014). This connects back to the
contradiction of military peace movement and can lead to psychological consequences in the form of
identity tensions: Military activists are situated within and outside of military communities and often
also within and outside of peace movements. This is indicative of internal identity tensions that can arise
due to the military–activism dilemma since estrangement from community and family relations can raise
questions about one’s sense of identity. Identifying some wars, military missions or routines as illegal or
immoral helps resolve this identity tension by integrating the military identity and activist identity. For
example, several U.S. military members heavily criticized the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and largely
pointed to questions of legality of the invasion. This provided protesters a way to maintain their
professional military identity and establish an activist identity at the same time. Activism to resist a
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perceived illegal military mission thus complements or even strengthens an individual’s military identity
due to perceived value incongruencies (Leitz, 2014).
For those engaging in activism in and out of uniform, an intimate knowledge of military
procedures and participation in military missions can increase their legitimacy in the public eye when
criticizing military action. Likewise, military and political leaders are more likely to respond to military
activism; on one hand, public criticism from the inside may disrupt cohesion and affect morale inside the
military negatively. On the other, due to their military work these activists may either have or be
perceived to have credible information supporting their standpoint when criticizing specific missions or
routines that could sway the public’s opinion in their favor if made public. Due to a fear of retaliation,
potential legal consequences and the above-mentioned tension between the military and activist
identity, activism is often kept private, and many members wish to remain anonymous for fear of being
cast out of their community or of official consequences (Leitz, 2014).
Summary
This chapter discussed the sources and nature of military identity and of military opposition. The
literature identifies unit cohesion as a key factor for successful military campaigns, particularly in
challenging or desperate situations. Further, the chapter discussed differences between conscript and
non-conscript militaries along with a general trend toward the professionalization of armed forces.
The spectrum of military opposition in and out of uniform is broad and offers a wide array of
ways to demonstrate dissenting opinion, with varying degrees of risks for the protester. From refusing to
participate in military missions in specific contexts as active military personnel to protesting wars as part
of a veteran’s organization, the political and legal context determines an activist’s options and the
consequences they face. The review of literature in this chapter sets up the theoretical foundation for
the next chapter, which introduces the case of this dissertation: Breaking the Silence.
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Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence summarizes the history of the IDF, introduces the
complex Israeli dynamics and policies regarding military service and then introduces the organization
Breaking the Silence in the context of other military opposition movements in Israel.
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Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence
This chapter traces the close connection between Israel’s military sector and civilian life back to
pre-state civil militias and Zionist ideology. To this day, the military symbolizes aspects central to JewishIsraeli national identity and civilian life in Israel. Episodes of violent conflict with Arab countries and the
Palestinian population over contested territory throughout the State of Israel’s history have led to a
heightened sense of insecurity that inevitably shaped much of Israel’s society over the years. Almost
universal conscription and mandatory reserve duty for many Israelis until middle age effectively created
a society in which, at least in theory, the vast majority of members have performed some military
service. While current enlistment numbers continue to drop (Jager, 2018), military service is still a key
component of Israeli nation-building. One might assume that conscription service stems from the need
to build and maintain a strong military force to respond to security concerns, but this is only part of the
answer. To fully understand the role of the military, and particularly of conscription service, a closer look
into Israeli history, both prior to and since Israeli statehood, and related political dynamics is required.
Israeli statehood was the declared goal of Zionism, which soared in the late 19th century in
response to increasing anti-Semitism in Europe and Russia. At its core, Zionism intended to create a
homeland for the “new Jew,” a Jewish community that would be free from the oppression many
experienced in the diaspora and able to defend individuals and the new homeland alike. When the goal
of statehood was eventually accomplished in 1948, defending the territory with a strong military was
the logical consequence; it was also a way to protect and preserve the new Jew and the newly emerging
Jewish society in Israel.
In Israel’s first decade of statehood (1948–1958), first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion utilized
the military to accomplish a goal beyond security: he saw conscription service as an effective tool for
nation-building. In the first three-and-a-half years after independence was declared, about 690,000 Jews
migrated to Israel (Shapira, 2012). Initially, Jews who had survived the horrors of the Shoah (Holocaust)
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in Europe were the primary group of immigrants. In the early 1950s, large-scale operations like
Operation On Wings of Eagles and Operation Ezra and Nehemia6 increasingly brought Jewish
communities from Muslim countries in Asia and Africa to the young state. Israel’s new immigrants
brought different languages, customs, traditions, and distinct interpretations of Judaism to the state and
its developing society, and Ben-Gurion quickly recognized the need to create a collective identity and
merge the mosaic of diverse Jewish traditions and customs into one nation. In 1951, while campaigning
for the upcoming elections, Ben-Gurion remarked, “I see in these elections the shaping of a nation for
the state because there is a state but not a nation” (Kafkafi, 1991, p. 3, as cited in Ben-Eliezer, 1995, p.
264). Much of the nation-building fell to the military, which became a melting pot for Israel’s Jewish
community, crossing ethnic, cultural and socio-economic lines. Even though military service
requirements for new immigrants were significantly reduced and entirely eliminated for immigrants
aged 22–26 in 2016, military service remains a key component in integrating many immigrants into their
new society to this day. As then-Deputy Commander of the army’s enlistment program, Lt. Col. Azuran,
explained in 2016, “We see IDF service as a central tool in acclimating immigrants to the Israeli society
and a tool for absorption into the country” (Gross, 2016, para. 8).
These aspects of security, identity and nation-building illustrate the deep-rooted connection
between the military and various parts of Israeli civil society. Security and defense, oppression in the
diaspora, ideology and immigrant acclimatization: the military and military service are undeniably crucial
parts of Israeli civilian society and have become symbols that construct and reinforce collective national
values and identity. This chapter explores this phenomenon from different angles. The first two sections

6

Operation On Wings of Eagles, also known as Operation Magic Carpet, was the first of a series of operations that
were part of the Jewish exodus from Muslim and Arab countries. During Operation On Wings of Eagles, almost
50,000 Jews were airlifted from Yemen to Israel in 1949/1950. Operation Ezrah and Nehemia took place in 1951
and 1952, airlifting around 120,000 Iraqi Jews to Israel.
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summarize the history and evolution of Israel’s armed forces from pre-state militias to today’s modern
military, the IDF. Building on this brief historical excursion, the subsequent section focuses on the use of
conscription service as a tool for nation-building and explores how mandatory military service has been
challenged and adapted over the years. Next, the ethical code that guides the IDF and its soldiers is
explored, and analysis demonstrates how it reflects historical challenges and is seen as a source of pride
among many Israelis. Illustrating how the military has become an integral part of Jewish-Israeli identity,
ample examples highlight the military’s influence on various aspects of Israeli civilian life and vice versa.
There then follows an introduction to the Israeli peace movement, followed by a summary and analysis
of military peace and resistance groups historic and current; these cases shed light on the culture of
dissent and opposition prevalent broadly in Israeli society and specifically in the IDF. Finally, the last part
of this chapter introduces the primary case study for this dissertation: Breaking the Silence. A summary
of Breaking the Silence’s activities follows a description of the creation and broader vision of the group.
A discussion of the condemnations Breaking the Silence has been met with by parts of the Israeli
government and some segments of the Israeli public concludes this section. A brief summary of the
most important historical and political milestones along with key dynamics that are crucial to
understanding the case of this research concludes this chapter.
Israel’s Military: A Unique Story
Lauded as the most moral army in the world by some and condemned as violent oppressors by
others, the IDF has played important and diverse roles in much of Israel’s history. This section explores
the creation of Israel’s armed forces and its role in nation-building with an emphasis on the military
ethics code, and discusses civil-military relations in Israel.7

7 More detailed accounts of the evolution of the IDF and discussion of ethical values can be found for example here: Drory,

2005; Rodman, 2019; Ruth, 1996; van Creveld, 2002.
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Fighting for Statehood: Tumultuous Beginnings
Long before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, various Jewish civil militias
operated in the area that today is Israel/Palestine. A small number of Jewish communities existed in the
area since at least Roman times (Gilbert, 2014). However, it was not until the Jewish immigration wave
of 1881–1903, also called the First Aliyah8, that the Jewish population reached more than 5,000 people.
During the First Aliyah, roughly 30,000 Jews, mostly from Eastern Europe, came to what was then
Ottoman Syria (Rubin, 2012). Pogroms in Russia and other parts of Europe and the Dreyfus Affair 9
highlight the increasingly visible and at times violent anti-Semitism that fueled the rise of Zionism in
Europe, eventually leading to the Second Aliyah.
The Second Aliyah of 1904–1914 increased the Jewish population in Israel/Palestine by 40,000
people (Rubin, 2012). The immigrants of the Second Aliyah brought with them the ideals of Zionism and
a focused desire to create a Jewish culture and community that was distinct from those in the diaspora
and had the goal of Jewish statehood (Hallward, 2011). Theodor Herzl is commonly seen as the founder
of Modern Zionism, even though he himself had never been to Israel/Palestine, nor was he the first to
propagate Zionism. His 1896 publication Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) outlines his vision of
establishing a Jewish state in the historic land of Israel and introduces the distinction between the “new
Jew” and Jewish communities in the diaspora. The new Jew – “the native Jew of Palestine” (Almog,
2000, p. 4) or the “Sabra”, as a native-born Jew is commonly referred to in Israel – was envisioned as the
ideal type of citizen in Herzl’s Zionism. While Jewish communities in the diaspora were associated with
victimhood, oppression and passivity, the new Jew was seen as idealistic, rebellious, free, proud and

8

Aliyah is a term for Jewish immigration into the historic land of Israel, literally meaning “going up”.

9 French Captain Alfred Dreyfus was wrongly convicted of treason in 1894. Initial charges and the subsequent trial were heavily

motivated by anti-Semitism and despite evidence of his innocence, the French army refused to exonerate him before he was
eventually found innocent in 1906 (Bach, 2012).
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willing to fight for his land and people (Katz, 1996; Shapira, 2012). Named after the desert plant sabra
(also spelled tsabra, “prickly pear” in English), known for its thick skin but sweet interior, the new
generation of Israeli Sabras featured another unique characteristic: they spoke Hebrew as their mother
tongue. After centuries of being solely used for reciting sacred texts, the revival of Hebrew as a spoken
language in Jewish homes was initiated by Ben Yehuda in the late 19th century and, while some resisted
its use initially, became another symbol of Zionism (Glinert, 2017; Kuzar, 2001). Yiddish was seen as the
language of exile; Modern Hebrew was the language of a united Jewish nation in its historic homeland
(Shapira, 2012). The Sabra turned out to be a crucial piece of Jewish-Israeli identity construction,
representing the ideal type on which the creation of the new Jewish-Israeli society and culture – one
free from oppression – rested (Almog, 2000; Conforti, 2011). To this day, the term Sabra is used to
describe Israeli-born Jews; in 2018, about 75 percent of all Israeli Jews were Sabras (Israel Central
Bureau of Statistics, 2019b).
During the late 18th and early 19th century, it was common practice to hire Arab guards to
protect Jewish settlements. However, immigrants, particularly those of the Second Aliyah, were critical
of this practice. They started self-defense organizations to replace Arab guards with Jewish ones as early
as 1907 (Shapira, 2012). The first organized effort came in the form of a group calling itself Bar-Giora
after Simon Bar-Giora, a leader of a Jewish revolt against the Romans. Less than two years later, part of
the Bar-Giora leadership and others founded the larger Jewish guard and self-defense organization
Hashomer, and Bar-Giora was absorbed into it. Hashomer’s focus too was to provide defense and
protection to Jewish settlements, but the group attempted a more unified and organized approach
(Drory, 2005). Nevertheless, Hashomer was criticized by parts of the Jewish population either as a group
of agitators that would increase conflict with their Arab neighbors or as not displaying Jewish culture
adequately: Hashomer used Arab symbols, including horses and specific weapons (Shapira, 2012; van
Creveld, 2002). Hashomer was highly selective and never grew to be larger than roughly one hundred
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members (van Creveld, 2002). When the civil militia Haganah was created in 1920, Hashomer was
dissolved (Sorkin et al., 2011).
Haganah, literally meaning “defense,” started as an underground self-defense force of
volunteers protecting Jewish settlements, but its activities ultimately went far beyond the defense of
settlements and territory. Under Haganah leadership and partly through collaboration with the British
after they had resumed control over the British Mandate of Palestine, Haganah’s activities became more
structured; training programs, acquisition and production of light arms and the establishment of a
modest intelligence network were focal points (Calhoun, 2007; Jawad, 2016; Ozacky-Lazar & Kabha,
2002; Shapira, 2012). Splinter militias like the Irgun (Irgun Tzvai Leumi; the National Military
Organization) and the Stern gang (LEHI, Lohamei Herut Yisrael; Israel Freedom Combatants) went their
own ways after criticizing the Haganah as being too passive.10 Attempts by the Haganah, partly with
assistance of the British, to constrain or suppress these splinter groups failed and their activities
undermined and challenged the Haganah’s authority at times (Bauer, 1966; Shapira, 2012). The British
had restricted Jewish immigration into the Mandate’s territory by the 1930s. Following Arab opposition
to the quickly changing demographics in the area, the 1939 White Paper curtailed Jewish immigration
and land acquisition even further for the following five years (Hacohen, 2001; Rubin, 2012). The
Haganah nevertheless facilitated underground missions to bring Jewish immigrants to the British
Mandate of Palestine. In the late 1930s, the Zionist leadership endorsed both legal and illegal Jewish
immigration into Palestine, culminating in clandestine missions by the Haganah that brought in around
70,000 Holocaust survivors on ships in the final pre-statehood years from 1945 to 1948 (Shapira, 2012).

10

Until the mid 1930s, the Haganah followed principles of self-restraint, focusing on defense and refraining from counterstrikes
and revenge operations against Arab communities. During this time, even though it was illegal to set up militias in the British
Mandate, the Haganah was silently accepted and at times even secretly cooperated with the British. The 1939 White paper
publication changed that and the Haganah started to actively work against British directives, for example by facilitating largescale Jewish immigration into the area (Bauer, 1966).
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The Haganah was largely successful in defending Jewish communities and seizing more land in 1947 and
’48, but the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 called for the formation of an official
military for the new state. After much of the Haganah was transformed into the Israel Defense Forces in
late May 1948, it was officially dissolved days later (Gilbert, 2014; Shapira, 2012).
The Israel Defense Forces: From a People’s Army to a Modern Military
The Israel Defense Forces, or Tzva HaHagana Le’Israel (Army for the Defense of Israel), was
created on May 26, 1948, in the midst of what was known as the War of Independence to the Jewish
population and the Nakba, or catastrophe, to the Arab population. Since its declaration of
independence, the State of Israel has fought eight international wars and faced two years long
Palestinian uprisings, or intifadas, during which the Palestinian population in the OPT protested, at times
violently, against Israel’s ongoing military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, the IDF
has carried out a number of shorter military operations in the OPT. An exhaustive summary of the
history of Israeli wars, conflicts and corresponding peace accords is beyond the scope of this chapter
and has been done elsewhere (see for example Gartman, 2015; Gilbert, 2014; Shapira, 2012). These
events are discussed here only regarding the emergence and evolution of the IDF and, later in this
chapter, in regard to the rise of the Israeli peace movement and opposition to the occupation from
within the IDF.
During its first twenty years of statehood, Israel was involved in three major wars: the War of
Independence, the Sinai War of 1956, and the Six-Day War in 1967. During these early years, public
support for the IDF was almost universal. The aftermath of the 1969–70 War of Attrition and the Yom
Kippur War in 1973 initiated a slow change in attitude within the Israeli public. The seemingly endless
cycle of violent conflict with neighboring countries increasingly fatigued the public and the number of
civilian casualties led to the emergence of the peace movement that would take full effect during the
First Lebanon War in 1982.
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A new type of warfare, characterized by civil unrest and unconventional methods, also
challenged the IDF during the First and Second Intifadas. The First Intifada started in 1987 and largely
manifested in civil disobedience and resistance, including boycotts and strikes (Abu-Nimer, 2003), and
involved some inflammatory strikes against civilian Israeli populations. The IDF responded with brutal
force, and international human rights watch groups heavily criticized Israel for their asymmetrical
response. The Madrid Conference, a cosponsored peace conference attempt by the United States and
Russia in 1991, led to a round of bilateral meetings between delegates of Israel and Palestine and
resulted in the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. The Oslo Accords included several confidence- and
trust-building measures and outlined a plan for future negotiations to pave the way to a permanent
peace agreement. However, the lack of monitoring and accountability measures in the Oslo Accords
became problematic when, after some initial successes, each side began to accuse the other of not
complying with the stipulations in the Accords. Palestinians saw Israeli settlement expansions in the
West Bank and the establishment of checkpoints as clear breaches, while Israel claimed Palestinian
leaders were not doing enough to avoid suicide attacks in Israel. The outbreak of the Second Intifada in
2000 officially marks the failure of the Oslo Accords (Dibiasi, 2015). Even though nonviolent efforts
continued (Hallward, 2011; Norman, 2010), violence, suicide attacks and military action largely
dominated the Second Intifada (Matta & Rojas, 2016).
Nation Building Through Military Service
Ben-Gurion envisioned a military that would not only safeguard and secure the new state but
also serve as a tool for nation-building and in turn be the “people’s army” (Levy, 2008). In Israel’s early
days, nation-building was a critical issue that garnered much attention. In 1958, Ben-Gurion further
explored what the character of the new state and its nation should be by asking 50 Jewish scholars and
intellectuals to provide clarification on questions of Jewish identity such as how to register the religion
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and nationhood of children of Jewish fathers and non-Jewish mothers;11 answers to these questions
were intended to shape the state’s character (Ben-Rafael, 2002). Ben-Gurion had hoped that a nation-inarms would have a threefold benefit: supply the necessary manpower for the new state’s army to
safeguard and secure its borders; create strong support for the military within the population; and
create a so-called melting pot for Israel’s diverse Jewish population (Cohen, 2013; Sucharov, 2005).
Tasked with nation-building, the army expanded its mandate into many traditionally civilian domains,
most prominently education, immigrant absorption and settlement (Drory, 2005; Epstein & Uritsky,
2004; Perlmutter, 1968). Additionally, the IDF took part in the negotiation and implementation of the
Oslo Accords (Levy, 2008).
Conscription for all men and women between the ages of 17 and 25 was introduced in late
1947. As of 2019, military service is mandatory for all male and female Jewish and Druze citizens and
Circassian men. Men serve a minimum of 32 months and women 24 months, with continuous reserve
obligations until the ages of 41–51 for men and 24 for women. There are several exceptions. According
to the Israeli Defense Service Law, women are exempt if they are pregnant, have a child, or are
married.12 Haredim, the Jewish ultra-Orthodox population, are traditionally exempt from conscription
service, but this has also been a contested issue in Israeli politics. Volunteers of other Israeli minorities
that are not required to serve but choose to total about 5,000 individuals per year (Kanaaneh, 2009),
compared to an estimated 60,000 new mandatory conscripts a year.
Due to mandatory military service, almost all elected officials have some prior military service
experience. Military service, and even fighting on behalf of widely perceived radical pre-state militias
like Irgun, is highly regarded in much of Jewish-Israeli society and closely connected to the Sabra identity
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Judaism is matrilineal, meaning that belonging to the Jewish faith is passed on by the mother.
Israel Defence Service Law. https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/1980-1989/Pages/Defence%20Service%20Law%20Consolidated%20Version--%205746-1.aspx
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propagated by Zionism. Serving in elite units and having a military background are often at the heart of
political campaigns, allowing candidates to portray themselves as brave leaders who fought for their
country and nation. The list of prime ministers and presidents whose military records have played a vital
role in shaping their public personas is long. Ariel Sharon, Israel’s 11th Prime Minister (2001–2006), for
example, fought in many of Israel’s wars, including the War of Independence in 1948, just days after the
establishment of the state (Gilbert, 2014), the Six-Day War (1967), the War of Attrition (1967–70), the
Yom Kippur War (1973) and others. Even membership in pre-state radical militias does not seem to have
a negative impact, instead translating into social and political capital similarly to more traditional
military service. Menachem Begin, Israel’s sixth Prime Minister (1977–1983), was leader of the Irgun, a
militia that employed a more radical approach to fighting the British and repeatedly undermined the
Haganah’s authority (Shilon, 2012). Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin (1974–77 and 1992 until his
assassination in 1995), Ehud Barak (1999–2001), and Benjamin Netanyahu (1996–1999 and 2009–2021)
are other examples of politicians with significant military careers prior to their engagement in politics
(Epstein & Uritsky, 2004). In most recent history, former Chief of General Staff of the IDF Benny Gantz
formed a new party, the Israel Resilience Party, and campaigned for Prime Minister in the September
2019 Knesset elections. His campaign, too, highlighted his military achievements.
Military service is at the core of Jewish-Israeli nationhood and the Israeli government rewards
the fulfillment of the burden of defending the state with extensive benefits. These benefits include
easier access to and support for education, employment opportunities and promotions (even though a
number of recently adopted laws aim at curtailing these practices) and participation in the
governmental land lease program, all tied to completion of military service (Kanaaneh, 2009;
Kimmerling, 1993; Smooha, 1997). These benefits increase social mobility and social prestige and
discriminate against other groups (Levy, 2013). Further, as Lomsky-Feder and Sasson-Levy (2015) point
out, “the military is the main locus for achieving recognition and being part of proper Israeliness” (p.
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190). In contrast, identity construction of non-Jewish minorities in Israel takes place “on the margins of
society” (Kanaaneh, 2009, p. 78). Israeli minorities that are not required to serve in the IDF, most
specifically Israeli Muslims, often face strong criticism from their own community if they volunteer for
military service (Kanaaneh, 2003, 2009). While mandatory conscriptions have been declining (Jager,
2018), rates of voluntary enlistment and participation in national service by non-conscript minorities
have been increasing since 2010 or so (Corbin, 2016; Goldman, 2017; Magnezi, 2010). This may indicate
an increase in the desire by minority groups to participate in the national discourse and a general
broadening of the conceptualization of ‘Israeliness’ to include non-Jewish minority groups.
The IDF Today: The Most Moral Army in the World?
The IDF prides itself on being “the most moral army in the world,” a notion frequently repeated
among the Israeli public (Hallward, 2011; Joronen, 2016; Khalidi, 2010; Livnat & Kohn, 2018). What has
been labeled the “moral army mythology” (Eastwood, 2017) rests on two central assumptions: first, that
Israel only fights wars of no choice, those that pose a threat of extinction to the nation; second, that
when engaging in a war of no choice, Israel’s soldiers abide by the principle of “purity of arms” (see also
Sucharov, 2005), which is part of the IDF’s ethical code, emphasizing the distinction between
combatants and civilians and dictating that an IDF soldier should do “all he can” to avoid harming enemy
civilians’ lives, bodies, dignity and property.13
An attempt to formalize and standardize ethical guidelines and military conduct was made in
1994 with publication of the Spirit of the IDF, or the Ruach Tzahal, a moral code meant to guide IDF
soldiers in ethical decision-making. Israeli philosopher Asa Kasher, members of the IDF Human
Resources Directorate, the Judge Advocate General and the Chief Education Officer were tasked with
drafting a code of conduct for the IDF in the early 1990s (Eastwood, 2017). The Spirit of the IDF is
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The Spirit of the IDF, updated version. As cited in Eastwood (2017).
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derived from four sources: the tradition of the IDF and its military heritage as the IDF; the tradition of
the State of Israel, its democratic principles, laws and institutions; the tradition of the Jewish People
throughout history; and universal moral values based on the value and dignity of human life. 14 Updated
with significant changes in 2001, the current code makes reference to three fundamental values: 1. the
Defense of the State, its Citizens and its Residents; 2. Patriotism and Loyalty to the State; and 3. Human
Dignity. The code then lists ten values (Figure 3.1).
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The Israel Defense Forces, “Who we are”. https://www.idf.il/en/who-we-are/
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Figure 3.1
The Spirit of the IDF
1.

2.

Pursuit of the Mission and Drive to Victory – IDF servicemen and women will fight and conduct themselves
with courage in the face of all dangers and obstacles. They will persevere in their mission resolutely and
thoughtfully even to the point of endangering their lives.
Responsibility – The IDF serviceman or woman will see themselves as an active participant in the defence of the
state, its citizens and residents. They will carry out their duties at all times with initiative, involvement, and
diligence with common sense and within the framework of their authority, while prepared to bear responsibility
for their conduct.
3. Honesty – The IDF servicemen and women shall present things objectively, completely, and precisely, in
planning, performing and in reporting. They will act in such a manner that their peers and commanders can rely
upon them in performing their tasks.

4.

Personal Example – The IDF servicemen and women will comport themselves as required of them, and will
demand of themselves as they demand of others, out of recognition of their ability and responsibility within the
military and without to serve as a deserving role-model.

5.

Human Life – The IDF servicemen and women will act in a judicious and safe manner in all they do, out of
recognition of the supreme value of human life. During combat they will endanger themselves and their
comrades only to the extent required to carry out their mission.

6.

Purity of Arms – The IDF servicemen and women will use their weapons and force only for the purpose of their
mission, only to the necessary extent and will maintain his human image even during combat. IDF soldiers will
not use their weapons and force to harm beings who are not-combatants or prisoners of war, and they will do
all in their power to avoid harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property.

7.

Professionalism – The IDF servicemen and women will acquire the professional knowledge and skills required to
perform their tasks, and will implement them while striving continuously to perfect their personal and collective
achievements.
8. Discipline – The IDF servicemen and women will strive to the best of their ability to fully and successfully
complete all that is required of them according to the orders and their spirit. IDF soldiers will be meticulous in
giving only lawful orders, and shall refrain from obeying manifestly illegal orders.

9.

Comradeship – The IDF servicemen and women will act out of fraternity and devotion to their comrades, and
will always go to their assistance when they need their help or depend on them, despite any danger or difficulty,
even to the point of risking their lives.

10. Representation – The IDF soldiers view their service in the IDF as a mission. They will be ready to give their all in
order to defend the state, its citizens and residents. This is due to the fact that they are representatives of the
IDF who act on the basis and the framework of authority given to them in accordance with IDF orders.
Adapted from: https://www.aka.idf.il/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/4/47634.pdf
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Civil-Military Relations in Israel
Israel devotes a significant amount of its resources to security. At its height in 1970, Israel’s
military expenditure rose to an astonishing 28.7% of GDP (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2019a). In
2017, the State of Israel spent $19.6 billion, or approximately 5.1% of its GDP, on the military, putting it
in fifth place in terms of GDP percentage spent worldwide (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2019a). In
2018, Israel spent reportedly 4.3% of its GDP on defense, indicating an overall downward trend (SIPRI,
2019). In 2019, Israel’s defense budget was $19.3 billion, representing 4.9% of the state’s annual GDP
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2020). These numbers contribute, among other factors
discussed below including reputation, collective experience and reserve duty, to the assessment that the
military is an influential actor within Israeli society.
The IDF and its soldiers are held in high regard by the majority of the Israeli population (Rosman
& Israeli, 2015). According to the 2018 Israel Democracy Index (Herman et al.), 78% of the general
population trust the IDF, making it the most trusted institution in Israel. Nevertheless, changes in civilmilitary relations are evident. The media, civil rights advocate groups and even the judicial system
examine IDF action more critically today than they did in the early statehood years and “the IDF has, in
many respects now become an arena of societal tension rather than an instrument of societal cohesion”
(Cohen, 2006, p. 777–8). One example is the struggle over ultra-Orthodox military service, a
manifestation of the tensions between secular and religious parts of Israeli society. For decades, the
Haredim, the Jewish ultra-Orthodox community, received deferments from military service to devote
their time to the study of the Torah instead. This deferment, a de-facto exemption (Livny, 2018), has
been a cause of animosity in Jewish-Israeli society for decades. At the founding of the state in 1948, 400
Haredim were given deferments. In 2009, the number had risen to 54,000 (Bick, 2010). The secular
population calls for “sharing the burden” among all Israeli Jews and consequently requests that Haredim
be included in army duties. The Haredim insist they do their part to protect the nation and state through
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the study of sacred texts and prayers. After the 1998 decision of the High Court that the large number of
exemptions was unconstitutional, the battle over conscription, exemptions and enforcement of Haredi
military service in the Knesset began and is still ongoing. In response, the IDF established military units
that consist exclusively of Haredim which accommodate the need for strict separation of the sexes and
dietary requirements, among other things (Drory, 2009). The number of Haredi conscripts is slowly rising
but remains a divisive issue in Israeli society with the IDF at its center (Perez, 2014).
Changes in international warfare also have led the IDF to make significant changes over the
years. The increased use of advanced technologies in modern warfare calls for new and often highly
specialized skillsets in areas such as cyber warfare and intelligence. Because these skills require
significant training and constant retraining, career military and conscripts almost exclusively work in
those areas (Amit, 2018; Harel, 2016). This prompted the IDF to reduce mandatory duty of roughly
100,000 reservists (Even & Yashiv, 2016). These recent changes in mandatory service requirements due
to the need for more specialized skillsets contribute to the ongoing debate about and occasional
changes regarding the professionalization of the IDF.
Although the Israeli political system demonstrates strong democratic characteristics, the
unusual influence of the military over spheres of civilian live has led scholars to examine Israeli militarycivilian relations, coming to varied conclusions. Mansbach (2011) argues that the military and its
discourse and practices occupy the spaces where “the social fabric as well as identities are being
shaped” (p. 132), making it a key factor in Jewish-Israeli identity production (Kanaaneh, 2009).
Descriptions like “military democracy” (Kanaaneh, 2009; Mansbach, 2011) and “a military with a state
attached” (Kanaaneh, 2009, p.6) have also been used by scholars to describe the intimate character of
civil-military relations in Israel. Kimmerling (1993) argues that Israel is an example of “cultural
militarism,” which he defines thusly: “Cultural militarism obtains when the armed forces become
essential to the social experience and collective identity, when they rank as one of the collectivity’s
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central symbols and the very embodiment of patriotism” (p. 202). Cohen (2006) concluded that Israel
represents a unique hybrid system in how civilian-military relations are structured, and that while the
state displays many features commonly associated with a democratic system of governance, it also gives
the military an unusual amount of autonomy and reach into civilian life.
Fewer scholars have examined the other side of civil-military relationships in Israel, i.e., the
influence of the civilian sector on military affairs (see for example Ben-Dor et al., 2002; Ben-Ari &
Lomksy-Feder, 2011; Lomsky-Feder et al., 2008; Kimhi, 2014). These studies focus largely on the
influence reservists and conscripts, including their families, have on the military. In 2019, the army, by
far the largest branch of service of the IDF, had 126,000 active personnel. Of those, 100,000 were
conscripts and 26,000 full time career military personnel. In the same year, a total of 102,500 conscripts
served in the IDF (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2020). Conscripts receive basic training
that, besides teaching basic skills required for their duty, is designed to stimulate the development of a
military identity. Because of the limited options for avoiding military service and thus the non-voluntary
nature of military service for some conscripts, they may be less motivated to serve in the military and as
a consequence continue to rely on their civilian views and perspectives. Also, since conscripts usually
enter military service right after completing high school, parents are often highly involved in military
affairs, from radio programs that feature parents’ voices on the IDF radio station Galei Tzahal (Meyers,
2016) to reports of parents calling their child’s commander or filing formal complaints to voice
disagreement with disciplinary actions, assignments or missions (Knesset News, 2019; Lavie, 1999).
Parents, who often have served in the IDF themselves, demand a place at the table when it comes to
military affairs that involve their children. Parents have also mobilized around their identity as parents
whose children participate in wars and other military operations to voice their concerns and legitimize
their criticism. Examples include groups like Mothers Against Silence, who organized following a public
letter by a soldier’s mother criticizing the First Lebanon War (Helman, 1999). Four Mothers, another
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example of parents’ protest, advocated for the withdrawal from Lebanon starting in 1997 (Lieberfeld,
2009; Rosenbaum, 2020).
The potential for civilian influence on the military becomes clear when looking at reservists:
400,000 reservists performed annual duty in the army in 2019 (International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 2020). Reservists play a crucial part not only in supplementing personnel requirements, but also
in bringing civilian influence into the military. Many Israelis are required to perform annual reserve duty
until middle age,15 but these reservists live a civilian life most of the time. Thus, they “are soldiers and
civilians…outside yet inside the military system” (Lomsky-Feder et al., 2008, p. 593; see also Gazit et al.,
2020). Bringing their civilian experiences, values and behavioral expectations with them during annual
duty, reservists play a crucial role in the “civilianization” of the IDF. While they may have a “distanced
view of military decisions” (Ben-Ari & Lomsky-Feder, 2011, p. 363), they also serve as mediators
between the armed forces and civilian society. However, studies also identify reserve duty as a source of
identity conflict when the tasks a reservist performs are inconsistent with “typical ways the individual
behaves or the individual’s prime role identity” (Griffith & Ben-Ari, 2020, p. 13). Ben-Ari (1989) finds that
in order to resolve these identity tensions, individuals tend to suppress or downplay the significance of
the action or reframe it by finding a justification for the behavior. However, in the history of the IDF,
reservists have often been outspoken critics and publicly criticized and opposed military action (Levy,
2011). See the below sections Protest in Uniform and Protest out of Uniform for examples of reservists’
activism. This may be explained by a combination of the factors described above and other non-military
identities that “override” the identity tension resolution mechanism outlined by Ben-Ari (1989).
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Reserve duty requirements can vary; from 40 years of age up to 43 for some specialists, females are required to perform
reserve duty until age 38 unless they are married or pregnant (International Istitute for Strategic Studies, 2020). Some reservists
volunteer to serve longer than the mandated time.
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To sum up, civil-military relations in Israel have been studied extensively by a host of scholars,
largely concluding that the military has unusual influence on civilian life. Crucially though, and less
studied, the composition of the IDF – with the majority of the force being conscripts and reservists – also
provides a steady civilian influence on the military.
Serving in the Occupied Palestinian Territories
The decades-long conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has had traumatic effects on both
communities. Competing narratives regarding claims to land and different perspectives on historic and
current events, further complicated by internal power struggles and opposing factions on either side,
has led to a protracted conflict that traumatizes Israeli and Palestinian civil societies. (A summary of key
events, that lays no claim to completeness, can be found in Appendix C.) Further, born partly out of the
competing conflict narratives but also due to a host of sometimes-competing actors within each society,
each side represents both perpetrator and victim in certain contexts and narratives. A detailed
discussion of the effects of generations of Palestinians living under military occupation and the resulting
detrimental consequences on Palestinian economy, infrastructure, civilian life and mental health is
beyond the scope of this study, but a host of academic research projects have examined and discussed
these in detail (see for example Atallah, 2017, Giacaman et al., 2007; Peltonen et al., 2017; Veronese et
al., 2018). Due to the focus of this dissertation, the following section discusses Israel’s trauma, showing
that a heightened sense of anxiety and insecurity is fairly common among Israeli civilians and even more
so for those on military duty in the OPT.
Episodes of violent attacks on Israeli civilians by Hamas and other non-state actors have
contributed to a psychology of fear among the Israeli public. Suicide attacks, rocket attacks, kidnappings
and stabbing attacks build to a state of alertness and anxiety among Israeli civil society. In 2019, over
1,400 rockets from Gaza attacked Israeli territory, and even though the number of casualties and
injuries from these attacks was relatively small, the traumatizing effect is undeniable. As terrorism
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"undermines the sense of security and disrupts everyday life, harming the target country’s ability to
function” (Ganor, 2004, p. 33), the unpredictable nature of these attacks plays a key role in instilling
feelings of insecurity and anxiety. Terrorism in Israel is characterized by “recurring incidents or ongoing
terrorism” (Siman-Tov et al., 2016, p. 76), leading some scholars to describe the situation as “chronic
terror” (Zeidner, 2006, p. 297) and “national trauma” (Friedman-Peleg & Bilu, 2011, p. 416).
Starting with the Second Intifada in 2000, suicide attacks, rocket attacks and other violent
attacks targeted at the Israeli Jewish population have had significant impact on Israeli civilian life and its
economy and overall instilled a sense of anxiety and insecurity among the population (Gelkopf et al.,
2008). Several studies have found that during the Second Intifada about ten percent of the Israeli
population developed symptoms of PTSD (Bleich et al., 2003, 2006; Gidron, 2002). Bleich et al. (2003)
found that during the same timeframe, 16% of Israelis had firsthand experience of a terror attack, and
37% suffered from secondary victimization from a terror attack, usually as a close friend or family
member of a victim.
According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.), 1,361 people have been killed by
Palestinian terror attacks since September 2000. These numbers reflect changes in conflict dynamics.
For example, 457 of these casualties occurred in 2002 at the height of the Second Intifada. In 2019,
more than 1,400 rockets and shells were launched from Gaza (Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center, 2021). The year 2020 saw a slight increase in Palestinian terror attacks but stayed
far below previous levels reached during the Second Intifada (Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center, 2021). In 2020, almost half of all attacks carried out by Palestinians were stabbings
(Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Center, 2021); three Israelis were fatally wounded in these attacks
(Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).
In addition to experiencing civilian trauma, most Israelis also serve in the IDF at some point.
While an exhaustive discussion of the effects of exposure to and participation in combat goes beyond
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the scope of this study, it is crucial to say here that research on the mental health of veterans following
combat exposure in Israel, the U.S. and elsewhere has linked involvement in combat activities with
various symptoms of distress, including anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder and depression (see for
example Fortson-Harwell, 2017; Ginzburg & Solomon, 2011; Morgan et al., 2018; Nash & Figley, 2011).
Serving among a civilian population comes with unique challenges that may increase anxiety and fear
among military members. For example, identification of terrorists in the civilian population can be
challenging and “may evoke fear and anxiety especially in ambiguous situations where soldiers do not
know whether they are confronting civilians or terrorists in disguise” (Bleich et al., 2008, p. 877).
Soldiers who serve among the Palestinian civilian population have higher exposure to traumatic events
including civilian-related violence from either side. Bleich et al. (2008) found that soldiers experienced
civilian-related violence as victims (a little over 50%) and as perpetrators (33%). About 17.4% perceived
their behavior as degrading toward civilians. An important note here is that differences in unit culture
and reputation not only affect recruits’ preferences regarding where they would like to serve, but likely
also influence soldiers’ behavior and perceptions of their own actions. While the differences between
units have not received a lot of scholarly attention, the reputations of some units are well known and
frequently invoked in conversation among Israelis. Available studies focus on broader differences, for
example between ground forces and air forces (Ben-Shalom & Tsur, 2018), reservists and conscripts
(Kimhi, 2014), or focus on the integration of ultraorthodox and female recruits (Drory, 2009; Levy, 2013;
Rosman, 2020; Rosman-Stollman, 2018; Stern & Ben-Shalom, 2020).
As civilians, Israelis are exposed to traumatic events and share a general sense of anxiety and
insecurity. As military members, they are exposed to violence in three potential ways: as witnesses,
victims and perpetrators. This combination of potential traumatic experiences highlights a dilemma
inherent to the IDF presence in the West Bank: the already heightened sense of insecurity as a civilian is
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further exacerbated during military service, resulting in overall increased levels of stress among
combatants.
The OPT are two geographically separate areas: The West Bank is to Israel’s east, sharing a
border with Jordan. Gaza, on Israel’s west, borders Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea. Figure 3.2 shows
both parts of the OPT and Israel. Whereas the West Bank is about sixteen times the size of Gaza (5,860
km² compared to 360 km²), population density in Gaza is roughly ten times higher than in the West
Bank.
As of 2019, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population density in Gaza
to be 5,453 persons/km² and in the West Bank to be 528 persons/km². Approximately 3.1 million
Palestinians live in the West Bank compared to two million in Gaza (Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics, n.d.). Gaza, unlike the West Bank, is in complete Palestinian domestic control, though its
borders are under the control of Israel and Egypt.
The two areas differ in size and population density, but just how dissimilar they are becomes
apparent when looking at economic factors. In 2018, the unemployment rate in Gaza was 52% and in
the West Bank 18% (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2019a). Multiple sites of religious
significance, including Bethlehem and Hebron, are located in the West Bank, making it a tourism draw
that generates income for some West Bank Palestinians. In the first six months of 2017, 1.4 million
international visitors visited the West Bank; no data is available for Gaza (Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics & the Ministry of Tourism, 2017). Approximately 53% of Gaza’s population lived in poverty in
2017, compared to 14% in the West Bank (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2019b), highlighting
the economic disparities even further.
The two areas also differ considerably in terms of IDF presence, which is permanent in the West
Bank – where the IDF has partial jurisdiction – and completely absent in Gaza, where the IDF is stationed
only on the Israeli side of the border. About 20 miles south of Jerusalem in the West Bank is Hebron,
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which holds significance for all three Abrahamic religions. For example, the Cave of Machpelah, also
known as the Tomb of the Patriarchs, in the old city of Hebron is said to have been acquired by Abraham
as burial plots. Considered the second holiest place in Judaism after the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the
Tomb of the Patriarchs is also the fourth holiest in Islam, after Mecca, Medina and the Al Aqsa Mosque
in Jerusalem. On top of the cave structures is a building constructed in Herodian times, which served
after the Muslim conquest as a mosque. Today, the structure is divided and serves as a mosque and a
synagogue, making this a site of repeated conflict. In 1994, a Jewish settler killed 29 Muslims praying in
the mosque during Ramadan, which elevated tensions in Hebron and led to the division of the space
into two. Formerly a lively center of business activity, Hebron today is shaped by violent confrontations
between Jewish settlers and Palestinian residents, by an IDF presence and by heavy restrictions on
Palestinian business activities and civilian life.
The West Bank is divided into three areas: Area A, which makes up 18% of West Bank land and
where approximately 55% of the population resides, is under control of the Palestinian Authority. Area
B, representing 21% of the area and 41% of the population, is under Palestinian civil administration and
Israeli security control. Area C, making up 61% of the land in which 4% of the population live, is
completely under Israeli control. Importantly, the different areas are not continuous blocks of land but
rather are scattered across the West Bank. Thus, a Palestinian going from a location in Area A to another
location in Area A likely will have to cross through Area B or C and will be subject to Israeli checkpoints,
roadblocks and other measures that further increase the number of deployed IDF personnel. According
to a 2017 report from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
the last annual report with these numbers available, there were 572 movement obstacles in December
2016 in the West Bank, including roadblocks, road gates and checkpoints. Eighty-four gates allowed for
crossings of the Separation Barrier, nine of them open daily and others open only on some days of the
week or during olive harvest season. In contrast, there is no official permanent IDF presence in Gaza, but
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two crossings into Israel are controlled by the IDF, and both are closed for tourists (OCHA, 2017). The
2005 Gaza disengagement campaign resulted in the dismantling of all Israeli settlements in the Gaza
Strip and stands in contrast to the over 450,000 Israeli settlers currently residing in the West Bank (AP &
Staff, 2020). Settlements in the West Bank receive protection from the IDF and consequently increase
the number of IDF troops stationed in the area. While there is no official data available on numbers of
IDF troops stationed in a specific area, due to the number of checkpoints, Israeli civilians living in the
area receiving protection from the IDF and area under control of the IDF, it can be deduced that IDF
presence in the West Bank is significantly higher than on the Gaza border.
However, when looking at fatality rates for IDF personnel, Gaza is more dangerous than the
West Bank. According to OCHA (n.d.), casualties of Israeli security forces in the OPT from 2008 to 2019
totaled 84, with 32 in the West Bank and 52 in Gaza. These numbers explain the higher threat
perception for IDF members completing missions in Gaza. Additionally, because Gaza is not an occupied
territory, the experiences of soldiers in Gaza differ vastly from those of soldiers in the West Bank. In the
West Bank, many soldiers interact daily with settlers and Palestinian civilians during military actions that
have become routine, including roadblocks, checkpoints and so-called mapping exercises during which
soldiers enter a Palestinian home, record who lives in the house and draw a map of the interior of the
house (Yesh Din et al., 2020). Opposed to Gaza, where no settlers reside, soldiers in the West Bank also
interact with settlers during patrols, particularly in Hebron and when guarding settlements. Since there
is no official IDF presence in Gaza, soldiers enter Gaza during large-scale military operations that target
Hamas, including targeted killings, confirmation and destruction of tunnels or attempts to rescue Israeli
civilians and soldiers kidnapped by Hamas (see for example Bouris, 2015; Marcus, 2019). Thus, the
mission and activities of the IDF in these two areas differ considerably. The fact that interaction with the
civilian population in the West Bank is part of many soldiers’ everyday routine, paired with civilian life
being more vibrant and the presence of a tourism industry make large parts of the West Bank relatively
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safe. In Gaza, soldiers rarely if ever interact with civilians, the infrastructure is limited and there is
virtually no tourism. Soldiers enter Gaza for specific missions and operations only, which often involve
the use of lethal force; those missions are seen as less routine compared to many daily activities in the
West Bank. For these reasons, Gaza is considered a more dangerous location for anyone entering,
including IDF troops.
Israeli Peace and Opposition Movements
While there have been a small number of peace activists in Israel/Palestine in early Israeli
statehood and even pre-statehood years (Hermann, 2009), it was not until the 1970s that the Israeli
peace movement began to grow and gain political power (Bar-On, 1996). The Labor Party, which largely
advocated for a “land for peace” trade, was in power during much of the decade. Israel signed its very
first peace treaty, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, in 1979. Even though Israel had been victorious in
past wars, the Israeli public began to grow weary of the seemingly endless stream of violent conflict. A
sense of uncertainty due to the constant threat, real or perceived, of military attacks by neighboring
countries increased again during the Yom Kippur War, as Israeli intelligence had failed to detect the
imminent attack and alert the military and civilian population. A key request of the peace movement
was the two-state solution, a notion largely rejected by the Israeli public and politicians at the time
(Hermann, 2009). Protesters advocating for peace and political change lined the streets in the 1970s and
1980s during the First Lebanon war, at least in part because much of the Israeli public considered the
occupation of southern Lebanon by the IDF illegitimate. At its height, the peace movement had a few
thousand activists in the inner circles of all peace groups, but some demonstrations brought a few
hundred thousand people to the streets – an impressive 14% of the population (Bar-On, 1996).
The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995 outlining a plan for peace between Israel and
the Palestinian Liberation Organization were big wins for the peace movement, and the Accords enjoyed
broad public support. An end to the decades-long conflict between Israel and its Palestinian neighbor
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seemed in reach. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination in late 1995 and a rise in suicide attacks
by Palestinian militants in the following months, however, changed public sentiment and the Israeli
mainstream largely considered the Peace Accords a failure. Consequently, the Israeli peace movement
lost momentum in the 1990s and early 2000s and was largely vilified or ignored altogether by politicians
and large segments of the Israeli public, leaving the movement “politically redundant” (Hermann, 2009,
p. 5). Following the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, another surge of peace advocate groups
emerged, many of whom intentionally subscribed to principles of nonviolent action (Dibiasi, 2015;
Hallward, 2011; Norman, 2010).
Most activism in Israel has been from the left of the political spectrum. At this juncture it is
important to point out that “left” and “right” in Israel are constructed differently from most other
Western democracies. The issue of the occupation and attitude toward the peace process are core
issues in determining “left” and “right” in the Israeli context. While the left focuses on political solutions
and sees territorial concessions as a viable option toward peace with the Palestinian people, the right
aims to limit or eliminate territorial concessions and tends to prefer a military solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict (Hermann, 2009). This tension is also visible in the peace movement, and in order to
broaden their appeal to a larger audience, some movements, such as Yisrael Shelanu in the mid-1970s,
intentionally avoid making a clear stance on the occupation in an attempt to avoid alienating potential
supporters (Bar-On, 1996). The literature on social movements suggests that invoking a collective
identity or a common ideological vector is a crucial factor for a movement to gain and maintain
momentum (della Porta & Diani, 2006). Several nonviolent and/or peace movements in Israel are
examples of this: Machsom Watch consists exclusively of female activists, the group Combatants for
Peace focuses on the shared combatant experience and identity, the Parents Circle Forum brings
bereaved Palestinian and Israeli parents together and membership in Rabbis for Human Rights is
exclusive to Rabbis, albeit of different traditions. The next section summarizes and analyzes Israeli
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groups that build their collective identity on one key attribute: military service. While some individuals
refuse to serve altogether, others refuse to carry out specific orders or participate in military missions
that could harm civilians and others draw from their military experience to question military conduct. At
the core of all the following groups and movements is one key issue: the perception that some or all
military actions performed by the IDF are not compatible with national values and/or personal ethics.
Opposition from Within: Protesting Military Action and Refusing to Participate
Since the military plays a crucial role in Jewish-Israeli identity construction and perpetuation,
active and veteran members of the IDF participating in opposition movements regularly receive public
attention and are often a topic of contention in the public discourse. Military service serves as a
surrogate for good citizenship (Ben-Ari & Lomsky-Feder, 2011). Activists invoking their own military
identity and organizing their collective action around their own military service experience has been a
source of heated debates in the past. On one hand, these activists have shown their loyalty to the state
and the nation by serving in the military (Leitz, 2014). On the other, their public criticism is interpreted
as divergence from the prototypical identity by some segments of the population.
As discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2: Military Identity and Opposition Movements,
there are three broad categories of military opposition: refusal of military service altogether, protest in
uniform and protest out of uniform. I will now use these classifications to examine each type of military
opposition in the Israeli context through examples of groups or movements that oppose military service
or some aspect of military action via one of these three categories.
Conscientious objection to military service
Avoidance of all military service, also called “total” objection, is most commonly attempted through
conscientious objection (see Chapter 2: Military Identity and Opposition Movements for a detailed
account of how different states handle conscientious objection differently). During the first decades of
Israel’s existence, conscientious objection was almost unheard of and no significant pacifist movement
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existed in the newly founded state. This is another indication of a unique dynamic between Israeli
national identity and military service, or, as Weiss (2014) puts it: “Refusal of military service in Israel
reflects more than ethical qualms over nonviolence: it also reflects the central ontology of the Israeli
state and its notions of community, loyalty, obligation, and betrayal always tied to the question of
Palestine” (pp. 1-2). A few isolated cases of conscientious objection in the first decades are known, but
the Israeli government tried to keep these instances out of the public eye (Livny, 2018).
In 1970, a group of high school students sent an open letter to Prime Minister Golda Meir
announcing their refusal to begin their mandatory military service. During almost all episodes of major
violent conflict that involved Israel since then, a new generation of Shministim, or twelfth graders,
followed suit and publicly refused to serve in the military (Lynd & Lynd, 2017). The vast majority of these
cases can be categorized as selective refusal since the activists opposed service in a specific territory, for
example Lebanon or the West Bank. Many cases of selective refusal were partly accommodated in the
1970s by reaching compromises: some soldiers who refused to serve in the OPT were stationed within
Israel. Generally, the IDF preferred informal accommodations to keep these cases quiet (Livny, 2018). In
other cases, selective refusals were not accommodated and were treated like total refusals, sometimes
leading the activist to serve time in prison. Exemptions from military service based on conscientious
objection remain a rare occasion in Israel compared to other democracies (see Chapter 2: Military
Identity and Opposition Movements); the vast majority of exemptions of military service today are
granted on religious or medical grounds (Ahronheim, 2020).
Protest in Uniform
Protest in uniform can take a variety of forms, from the structured announcement of selective
refusal to serve in specific geographical locations or participate in certain missions to objecting to the
use of certain weapons to complete conscientious objection during military service, unstructured
desertion or even defection.
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The list of acts of selective objection in the Israel Defense Forces is long. The first organized
movement emerged in the 1982 Lebanon War. Yesh Gvul, literally “there is a limit” or “there is a
border,” was founded by combatants who refused to participate in military missions in Lebanon. Still
active today, military members that join Yesh Gvul now refuse to serve in the OPT. The organization
provides financial support to so-called refuseniks and aims to change the public’s perception of the
occupation and military action through education (Grossmann & Kaplan, 2006; Lynd & Lynd, 2017). Yesh
Gvul represents the largest organized group of selective refusal (Reznik, 2002); some of its members
have been sentenced to military prison due to their refusal (Dekar, 1988).
Several other acts of selective refusal have affected Israeli political and military membership in
the years since. While Yesh Gvul membership is open to anyone who has completed some military
service or refuses mandatory conscription, other movements have exclusive membership requirements,
often to a specific unit. While this limits the number of potential members, the elite character of many
of these units builds on the legitimacy activists have gained through their military service in the eye of
the public. This often poses serious challenges for leadership while simultaneously capturing the
attention of the Israeli public. One example is the Pilots’ Letter, published in September 2003, in which
27 Air Force pilots renounced their involvement with missions that they said were likely to harm
civilians, pointing particularly to targeted killings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Citing moral and legal
objections and a concern for the impact of the ongoing occupation of the OPT on Israeli society, the
pilots emphasized their love for country and clarified that they had no intention to refuse any other part
of their military service (Hirschfeld, 2005). The general public and political and military leadership
quickly condemned the pilots’ public criticism and open resistance to military orders. Knesset Member
Eli Aflalo equated the letter to treason, and Defense Minister Mofaz said the pilots’ action benefitted
Palestinian terrorists. One pilot withdrew his signature on the letter amid public pressure, while a highly
decorated flight instructor joined the movement (Alon & Harel, 2003). While the signatories of the letter
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were grounded, they were not tried in military court for their refusal, a potential indication of the
importance of their elite status.
Similarly, the so-called Commando’s Letter, in which members of the elite combat unit Sayeret
Matkal announced their refusal to participate in missions in the occupation (Lynd & Lynd, 2017) drew
heavily on the elite unit status. Matkal was tasked with several high-profile rescue missions of hostages,
and a number of Israeli Prime and Defense Ministers had served in the unit, increasing the legitimacy of
the signatories of the letter while ensuring they received attention from the public and leadership alike.
Another public refusal came in 2002 with the Combatant Letter, published by the group Courage to
Refuse, in which reserve officers and soldiers announced their refusal to serve beyond the borders of
1967 (Grossman & Kaplan, 2006). Refusal that comes from within the IDF poses a two-fold problem for
the Israeli government: objectors have already proven their loyalty to the state and nation through their
prior military service. Yet, their firsthand experience within the military might also increase the
perceived legitimacy of their accusations and objections to ethical violations among the public.
Protest out of Uniform
This form of protest occurs while a current or former military member is literally not “in
uniform,” most often after having left the military. Activists benefit from their intimate knowledge of
military procedures and participation in military missions and, by invoking their military identity,
increase their legitimacy in the public eye. Military and political leaders are confronted with a dilemma
when facing criticism from current or former military members: on one hand, public criticism from the
inside” may disrupt cohesion and affect morale negatively; on the other, due to their military service
these activists might have credible information about specific missions or routines to support their
standpoint, and this could sway the public’s opinion in their favor if the objections were to be made
public. While this dilemma is more pressing with activism in uniform, the social status and prestige of
military service extends past the actual service and makes it difficult to discount activists’ out of uniform
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claims as meritless. However, limiting activism is much more challenging when the activist is no longer
an active member of the military. Due to a fear of retaliation, ostracism and potential legal
consequences, activism is often kept private, and many activists remain anonymous (Leitz, 2014).
Several groups and projects composed of current or former military personnel have formed and
engage in awareness raising by sharing personal experiences during service. Reservists are at the
forefront of Israeli military peace movements and continue to remind the public of “the gap between
the nation’s commitment and their fulfilment” (Levy, 2011, p. 63). Some, like the group Combatants for
Peace – a group that grew out of the Commando’s Letter – focus on engagement with Palestinian
combatants to reduce stereotypes and othering (Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010). The movie Disturbing the
Peace is a powerful depiction of how the group formed and shows Palestinian and Israeli combatants
meeting each other, expressing their distrust for each other, sharing personal experiences and
eventually joining forces to promote a peaceful solution and an end to the occupation in both societies.
A sister organization of Combatants for Peace, Breaking the Silence aims to engage the Israeli public in a
debate on whether the military occupation and military action in the OPT is compatible with national
values. The following section introduces Breaking the Silence in detail.
The Case: Breaking the Silence
Breaking the Silence (Shovrim Shtika) is an Israeli not-for-profit organization that aims to inform
and confront the Israeli public about the actions of the IDF and the effects of the ongoing occupation on
everyday life in the OPT. Founded in 2004 by combat veterans, the organization’s goal is to
“expose the Israeli public to the reality of everyday life in the Occupied Territories. We endeavor
to stimulate public debate about the price paid for a reality in which young soldiers face a civilian
population on a daily basis, and are engaged in the control of that population’s everyday life”
(Breaking the Silence, n.d.).
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The backbone of their work is a collection of testimonies by former and current IDF soldiers, of which
Breaking the Silence has collected roughly 1,000 to date. The testimonies are firsthand accounts from
soldiers’ perspectives of their experiences during military service. Painting a grim picture of a chaotic
and at times unethical military, the testimonies confront the notion of the “most moral army in the
world” and question whether the occupation is compatible with Israeli national values.
While a number of testimonies are available as brief videos, the majority of the testifiers choose
to remain anonymous. As a result, the vast majority of testimonies are only available in textual form on
the website www.breakingthesilence.org.il. Testimonies are published in Hebrew and English, and
Breaking the Silence uses a two-step review process to ensure only truthful testimonies are published.
First, Breaking the Silence verifies the identity of the testifier, including the accuracy of the dates and
locations of the testifier’s claimed military service. Second, it cross-checks the described events with the
help of additional sources, including other military members, police officers, journalists and Palestinian
residents present at the event and reports by international organizations, press releases by the IDF
spokesperson and other publications. Further, the Military Censor reviews all testimonies before
publication to ensure no sensitive information is released. Although its textual testimonies are published
anonymously, Breaking the Silence provides a number of identifiers, including the rank and unit of the
testifier and year and location of the described incident. Breaking the Silence has established 27
categories to classify testimonies; testimonies can appear in more than one category. Categories include
abuse, arrest, humiliation, targeted killing and loss of livelihood among others. A detailed description of
the database and categorization of testimonies is provided in Chapter 4: Research Design & Methods.
The organization also offers walking tours in Hebron and the South Hebron Hills. Veteran
combatants take interested civilians on tours to share their experiences, show them where they served
and answer questions. Lectures, open letters to Israeli officials, photo exhibitions, booklets and books
with specific foci complement the testimonies. Publications include “Women Soldiers’ testimonies”
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(2009), “Our Harsh Logic” (2012), “This is how we fought in Gaza” (2014) and “Why I broke my Silence?”
(2016) and increase Breaking the Silence’s reach. The organization explicitly does not call for a refusal to
serve in the military, nor do they advocate for selective refusal.
Examining Breaking the Silence in the larger context of Israeli opposition groups, a unique
feature of the group stands out: Breaking the Silence focuses on addressing their own in-group, Israeli
society. While some (Grassiani, 2009) have identified the absence of Palestinian voices as a weakness of
the groups’ approach, others (Helman, 2015) see this as a strength and claim that the exclusive focus on
Israeli testimonies makes it harder for the Israeli collective to ignore them.
Breaking the Silence as an organization, as board members and as individual testifiers who have
made their identity public have repeatedly been labeled as traitors by members of the Israeli public and
representatives of the Israeli government and the IDF (Katriel, 2018; Katriel & Shavit, 2013). Israeli
politician and former Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman stated in an interview in early 2016 that the
organizations B’Tselem – an Israeli human rights organizations that focuses on human rights violations in
the OPT – and Breaking the Silence are “complete traitors.” He equated their work to the actions of
Israeli citizens Mordechai Vanunu and Ehud Aviv, who were found guilty of treason in the 1970s and
1980s (Staff, 2016) – Vanunu for revealing details of the Israeli nuclear program to the British press and
Aviv for being a member of a hostile group and planning attacks on Israeli targets on behalf of Syria. The
contentious nature of Breaking the Silence’s activities is further illustrated by the fact that in April 2017
Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu canceled a meeting with then-German Foreign Minister
Sigmar Gabriel because he had also set up meetings with Israeli human rights organizations, among
them Breaking the Silence. After not adhering to an ultimatum Netanyahu had set to either meet with
him or the NGOs, the meeting was canceled, and Gabriel met with the NGOs in Jerusalem (Beaumont,
2017). In 2015, a law supported by then-Education Minister Naftali Bennett was passed that prevents
groups critical of the IDF from giving lectures in public schools (Livnat & Kohn, 2018). It is noteworthy
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here that while Netanyahu’s right-wing cabinet had been in power since 2009 and thus clearly
represents a significant part of the Israeli population, they also struggled to stay in power, resulting in
the fourth election in two years in March 2021. While Netanyahu’s Likud party received the most votes,
he was unable to form a coalition government. Instead, two other parties, Yesh Atid and Yamina, formed
a rotation government in June 2021. The law has been named the “Breaking the Silence law” in public
discourse and its introduction started heated debate in the Knesset and the public sphere (Lis, 2018a;
2018b). In 2019, U.S. Congresswomen Ilhan Omar (D, MN) and Rashida Tlaib (D, MI) were initially barred
from entering Israel after their support for the Boycott, Divestment and Sanction movement received
significant press (Margalit, 2019). Both were scheduled to visit the OPT and meet with Israeli and
Palestinian representatives during their visits, among them several human rights groups. A tour to
Hebron with Breaking the Silence was part of the schedule (Sales, 2019).
Like many other opposition groups, Breaking the Silence receives consistent and forceful
backlash from influential politicians and segments of Israeli society. Breaking the Silence rejects claims
that they focus on a few rotten apples” or an “alleged insignificant group of ‘bad soldiers’” (Even-Tzur,
2014, p. 3) and isolated cases of extreme violence. Instead, they point to underlying systemic issues
that, in their view, contradict collective national values.
The former military service of the activists and testifiers increases their legitimacy because they
can draw from their personal experience and knowledge and because, through their military service,
they have proven their loyalty to the State of Israel and the Jewish people. Their approach of witnessing
to spark debate and appeal to national values and a national conscience is unique (Grassiani, 2009) and
the large collection of testimonies that spans many units, years, ranks and locations makes it harder to
discredit the organization. Located at the “nexus between activism and memory work” (Katriel & Shavit,
2011, p. 78), Breaking the Silence is part of a subcategory of opposition movements that subscribe to the
anti-denial movement in Israel. These groups demand “through confession and testimony […] that Israeli
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society acknowledge its ‘problematic present’, which includes human rights violations in the OPT in a
situation of ongoing ethno-national conflict and insist that it take responsibility for this reality and act
against it” (Helman, 2015, p. 377). The concept of rebuilding community through witnessing and
testimony has been employed in various contexts, for example by reconciliation and truth committees’
collective acknowledgement of past violations and regret (Motsemme, 2004). In South Africa, Germany
and Japan this has led to public expressions of regret and is largely seen as having contributed to
rebuilding society after atrocious human rights violations (Helman, 2015). However, in these cases
efforts have been employed in the aftermath of, not “during an ongoing ethno-national conflict”
(Helman, 2015, p. 378). Through confession and witnessing, another concept emerges: the large
collection of testimonies reveals systemic ethical violations and challenges the notion of isolated
incidents of misconduct by pointing to more universal problems. Other groups that utilize witnessing
include Machsom Watch and B’Tselem, yet none uses soldiers’ firsthand experiences during military
service as the vehicle for their work.
It may be that Breaking the Silence is such a contested group due to the combination of
individuals who have proven their loyalty to the state and nation by serving in the IDF who make their
military service the key to their opposition and specific personal accounts of a reality incongruent with
national values. Their motivation for criticizing military action cannot be discounted or ignored as easily
because testifiers have served in the IDF and thus cannot be simply dismissed as ‘refuseniks’. Whether
or not they expose military misconduct or appeal to a national conscience will be examined in this
research.
Summary
This chapter provided an overview of how the anti-Semitic climate in Europe and Russia sparked
the rise of Zionism and stimulated waves of Jewish immigration into Israel/Palestine in the late 19th and
early 20th century. Jewish militias were formed to withstand conflict with the Arab population and to
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protect the newly forming Jewish Israeli society. These pre-statehood militias were the precursors to
what is today known as the Israel Defense Forces. Beyond traditional military tasks of security and
defense, the IDF has also been deliberately used as a tool for nation-building and until today serves to
create a common experience that helps in the assimilation of immigrants to their new country and
nation.
Though the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict has resulted in traumatized societies on
both sides, this chapter focused on the dynamics and trauma on the Israeli side. Complex conflict
narratives and a variety of state and non-state actors with at times contradicting behaviors have created
victim and perpetrator narratives for both sides. The close connection between civilian and military
sectors in Israel is important to consider. While the military sector has significant influence and reach in
civilian life, due to conscription and the constructed identity of military personnel there is also
considerable civilian reach into military affairs, ranging from the large number of reservists who
continue to bring civilian perspectives into military service to parents who demand to engage with their
children’s commander and voice their concerns.
Lastly, this chapter discussed peace and opposition movements in Israel, focusing on opposition
from within the military: those activists who intentionally use their status and knowledge as current or
former military members to attempt to change political, military and societal opinions and decisions.
Breaking the Silence leverages the military service of its members and testifiers, allowing the group to
confront the Israeli public on issues related to national values and military service, a key component in
national identity construction.
The next chapter describes the methods for this research project in detail, offering further
insight into the data collection from among Breaking the Silence testimonies and introducing the code
book for this research. Chapter 4: Research Design & Methods examines the variables used for this
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research and discusses the dataset of 900 Breaking the Silence testimonies; ethical questions and
limitations regarding this study are discussed.
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Chapter 4: Research Design & Methods
Using content analysis and a mixed methods approach, this research project aims to detect
which of the Breaking the Silence testifiers’ actions and value violation or confirmation inform and
motivate their criticism and perceptions of wrongdoing. What type of incident prompts the perception
of a certain value violation? Which values are expressed more frequently under what circumstances?
Using insights from social identity construction, military ethics and nonviolent resistance theories, this
research aims to examine perceived value violations and confirmations during military service.
This chapter describes the methodological framework for this dissertation research. First, it
presents the research questions and hypotheses derived from the literature, followed by a description
of the research design including a justification and introduction to content analysis and then discusses
how quantitative and qualitative methods are employed to examine the data. Next, the chapter
discusses the development of the code book, approach to coding and approach to analysis of coded
data in detail. Lastly, the chapter discusses some limitations and ethical considerations of this research
project.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Using insights from Social Identity Theory, military ethics and nonviolence theories, this
dissertation seeks to answer the following two research questions:
1. What relationship exists between perceived confirmation of values and incidents witnessed
during military service in the Occupied Palestinian Territories?
and
2. What relationship exists between perceived violation of values and incidents witnessed during
military service in the Occupied Palestinian Territories?
To answer these questions, the following hypotheses guide the analysis of the data:
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1. Hypothesis 1: The majority of testimonies do not describe incidents of extreme physical violence
or clear conduct violations.
2. Hypothesis 2: Soldiers deployed in the West Bank are more likely to display national and political
values than those deployed to Gaza.
3. Hypothesis 3: Unit cohesion is higher in Gaza than in the West Bank.
4. Hypothesis 4: Soldiers who report settler violence against Palestinian civilians are more likely to
express a negative sense of Representation – as described in the Spirit of the IDF values –
compared to soldiers who report other issues.
5. Hypothesis 5: National identity and political values are more salient in testimonies that describe
violations of Purity of Arms than in testimonies that describe other violations of Spirit of the IDF
values.
Research Design
This research uses content analysis design and both qualitative and quantitative methods; the
unit of analysis is the individual testimony (N=900). The next section introduces the main advantages
and disadvantages of content analysis and the usage of secondary data. Then, a discussion on mixed
methods describes how qualitative and quantitative techniques contribute to testing the five
hypotheses specified above.
Content Analysis
Content analysis is the “systematic analysis [that] examines the content of artifacts of human
society and parses them into explicit, distinct categories. Content analysis enables researchers to
relatively quickly and easily reduce large amounts of information into quantifiable data that can be
meaningfully analyzed” (Wienclaw, 2019, para. 1). Content analysis can use both quantitative and
qualitative methods, but most often uses quantitative methods for organizing and comparing large
amounts of data (Bryman, 2012). Computer-assisted software programs such as NVivo, which was used
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for this project, aid in the organization, coding and analysis of documents and are particularly helpful for
large quantities of documents. A detailed description of how qualitative and quantitative methods were
used for the analysis is included below.
Secondary Data
Using secondary data, broadly defined as data that the researcher was not involved in collecting
(Tantawi, 2019) can be suitable for multiple reasons that apply to this research project: accessibility,
time and cost constraints and ethical issues. First, data used for this study would likely be difficult to
obtain. The quantity of testimonies and the fact that the majority of testifiers chose to remain
anonymous present access barriers to collecting similar data. Secondary data presents a good
alternative (Bryman, 2012). The time and cost constraints of collecting similar data also apply to this
project. Secondary data often offers an opportunity to access data that is larger in scope than a single
researcher could realistically collect (Tantawi, 2019). Breaking the Silence’s collection of testimonies
spans more than 20 years and to date represents more than 1,000 testimonies. The earliest testimonies
stem from experiences in 1999 and cover a large range of rank, unit and location of service. In July 2019,
900 testimonies were available in English on their website. This body of testimonies represents the data
for this research project. Using secondary data is also beneficial when data collection poses risks to
participants. In this case, asking former and current military members to recall and relive their
experiences again might trigger traumatic memories and cause psychological stress. Further, since the
majority of testifiers choose to remain anonymous, attempting to collect additional data might be met
with hesitation and concern about the potential risk of unveiling their identity. Further, secondary data
analysis is an unobtrusive research technique that avoids so-called reactivity. When study participants
know that they are part of a study, their behavior or answers are likely to be influenced by that
knowledge. Unobtrusive research techniques, such as using secondary data, avoid this issue (Bryman,
2012).
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Notwithstanding all its benefits, using secondary data has its limitations. Most important, the
researcher has no control over the quality of the data (Bryman, 2012). This specific concern is mitigated
by Breaking the Silence’s transparent and vigorous quality control process; the group verifies the
identity of testifiers and confirms evidence related to the described incident by triangulating and crosschecking with other sources. Another downside of using secondary data is that the researcher has no
opportunity to ask follow-up or clarifying questions. Weighing the positive and negative aspects of
secondary data, the benefits of access to such a large data set outweigh its potential shortcomings.
Mixed Methods
A mixed methods approach uses both qualitative and quantitative methods in a single research
design. This combined approach is particularly useful for social sciences (Creswell, 2009) and enhances
the understanding of the data, resulting in more a nuanced discussion of findings. Bryman (2012)
identified eighteen points in favor of using a mixed methods approach, and several apply to this project.
First, “completeness” – Bryman suggests that combining qualitative and quantitative methods offers a
more complete picture compared to the use of only one of the methods. Second, “process” – whereas
quantitative methods reveal structures in the research context, qualitative methods allow for the
examination of the processes that take place within this context. Third, results from one method may
provide explanations for results from the other. Fourth, qualitative data provide context, often needed
for the accurate interpretation of results. Fifth, qualitative data can be used to illustrate the findings of
quantitative data.
Textual data, like this collection of testimonies, lend themselves to qualitative analysis and offer
situational context through the personal experiences of testifiers. However, by the use of coding,
quantitative techniques become suitable for analyzing textual data, particularly in such large quantities.
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Quantitative Methods
Due to the substantial number of testimonies (900), quantitative analysis is particularly helpful
in detecting themes, patterns and relationships in the data. To ensure consistency and suppress biases
in the processing of raw data, content analysis requires that “rules are clearly specified in advance for
the assignment of the raw material to categories” (Bryman, 2012, p. 289). This is the primary reason for
developing a codebook in advance of the coding process (see description of code book design below).
The majority of codes come from two sources: the Spirit of the IDF and the keywords Breaking
the Silence’s uses to organize described incidents. These keywords, grouped into broader categories, are
so-called parent nodes of predetermined codes in NVivo. During the coding process, specific words,
sentences or sections are assigned to one or multiple codes. Frequency counts, crosstab queries and
matrix coding queries can then be performed to analyze the coded data. Figure 4.1 shows the
organization of codes into parent and child nodes. The first main category of codes is “Action describes,”
which is divided into five sub-categories, or child nodes. Each of these child nodes represent a broad
category of different actions, such as “Action against property.” A child node may have child nodes of its
own, called grandchild nodes, such as “bribery,” “destruction of property,” “house demolitions, razing”
and “looting.” The column “files” in Figure 4.1 shows the number of testimonies that correspond to each
node. The column “references” on the far right in the figure indicates the number of total references for
each node in the data set; a single testimony may have more than one reference to a given code.
Table 4.2 in the data analysis section shows a frequency count of testimonies coming from different
geographic locations. Frequency tables provide a quick and systematic way to get an overview of the
value distribution of any given variable in a data set and point the researcher to areas in the data that
require closer examination, in this case of the texts themselves.
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Figure 4.1
Screenshot of parent and child nodes in NVivo

Crosstab queries are “a quick way to check the spread of coding across cases and demographic
variables” (QSR International, n.d. a, para. 1). In NVivo, crosstab queries put either individual cases or a
classifier and a node in relation to one another. Displayed in a table, this tool offers a quick way to
identify patterns or dominant themes. For example, Table 6.1shows the relationship between the
location, a classifier, and expressions of unit cohesion.
Matrix coding queries in NVivo “enable you to see coding intersections between two lists of
items” (QSR International, n.d. b, para. 1). While matrix coding queries are similar to crosstab queries in
that they place two variables in relation to each other, matrix coding queries differ from crosstab
queries in that they show the relationship between themes. For example, when using matrix coding to
look at the intersections of the five different categories of actions and perceived violations of all the ten
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Spirit of the IDF values, NVivo provides a chart indicating the number of testimonies that show both
codes. Matrix coding queries are used to identify patterns of relationships among codes, such as
between types of incidents and perceived value violations. Table 6.3, for example, shows the
relationship between categories of incidents and perceived violations of the sense of Representation.
Four identifiers that were provided with each testimony make up the so-called case
classification sheet in NVivo. Within the case classification sheet, each testimony represents a single
case and identifiers are assigned to each case. The case classification sheet allows for quick and simple
frequency counts of these classifiers, i.e., to show how many testimonies stem from a specific rank or
location. This provides context and additionally allows for crosstabulation queries to analyze each of
these classifiers in relationship to codes. For example, one could easily determine whether a certain
type of incident was more frequently reported in a certain location or during a specific timeframe.
Figure 4.2
Case classification sheet example
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Qualitative Methods
Because NVivo was designed with a focus on qualitative research, coding data in NVivo has one
significant benefit: once coded, one can extract all sections that were coded at a specific node with a
single mouse click. A list of all coded sections then appears, allowing for focused analysis of the textual
data – specific quotes – relating to a specific node. Following the frequency, matrix and crosstab queries
tools discussed above, a close review of coded sections assists in illustrating quantitative findings.
Because qualitative data often offer more nuanced detail, additional patterns may emerge during the
review of coded data sections. Using direct quotes from testimonies illustrates the value and role
conflicts and shows how some of the testifiers struggle with their decisions and experiences. In addition
to providing context, quotes highlight the personal nature of the experiences much better than
quantitative results could.
Data Analysis
Establishing the codebook prior to coding is common practice for quantitative projects. The first
category catalogues in this project described actions adapted from Breaking the Silence’s categories as
they appear in the published testimonies. This project adapts these categories, summarizing and
expanding them. The literature and the Spirit of the IDF provide two other categories: military ethics
values and other social identity values. Following qualitative guidelines, additional codes and themes
that emerge during the coding process are added for additional context. The following section briefly
introduces the classifiers and each of the broader coding categories, or parent nodes. The complete
codebook with all available child and grandchild nodes and complete definitions can be found in
Appendix A.
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Classifiers
As mentioned above, Breaking the Silence assigns four classifiers to most testimonies. These
classifiers indicate basic information about the testifier and the incident their testimony describes. The
classifications are as follows:
1. Rank: the rank of the testifier
2. Unit: the unit of the testifier
3. Year: the year of the incident
4. Location: the geographic location of the incident
The section Introduction to the Data below introduces the data by discussing these four classifiers and
their frequency in the data. More information on these four classifiers can be found there.
Categories of Actions described in Testimonies
Breaking the Silence established 27 categories to organize testimonies; categories are not
mutually exclusive, and testimonies can appear in more than one category. Grouping these categories
into five broader categories allows for the comparison of broader themes. As additional sub-categories
emerged, they were added to the codebook. Below, the broad summary categories and newly emerged
categories are printed in italics, while the other categories are adapted from Breaking the Silence:
1. Action against a person, and includes the following sub-categories:
Abuse, arrest, assassination, confirmation of killing, deaths, desecration of bodies, human
shields, violence, humiliation
2. Action against property, and includes the following sub-categories:
Destruction of property, house demolitions/razing, looting, bribery
3. Disrupting Palestinian civilian life, and includes the following sub-categories:
Checkpoint, curfew/closures, restrictions of movement, separation barrier, house
incursions/takeovers, loss of livelihood, separation barrier
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4. Action describing other military routines and topics, and includes the following sub-categories:
Stake out, rules of engagement, routine, patrols, demonstration of presence
5. (In)action pertaining to settlers, and includes the following sub-categories:
Settlements, settler violence, law enforcement, settler children, division between settlers and
IDF soldiers, reports of difficulty interacting with settlers
Military Ethics Codes
The literature identifies three main categories of military values. Detailed descriptions of these
values can be found in Chapter 2: Military Identity and Opposition Movements. Grouping the values
prescribed in the Spirit of the IDF into these three categories results in the following division:
1. Values that increase cohesion: comradeship, honesty, personal example, pursuit of the mission
and drive to victory, representation
2. Values that are goal- and skill-focused: professionalism, discipline, responsibility
3. Values that describe ethical ideals: human life, purity of arms
All testimonies are coded twice for indicators of these three categories: once to capture
expressions of value violations and a second time for expressions of value confirmations.
Other Values Codes
In the event Breaking the Silence testifiers are chiefly motivated by their own personal values
and beliefs, their reasons for testifying or objecting to the action described in their testimony would be
based on values outside of the military value measure. These include:
1. Expression of political values: statements that refer to goals, principles and policies that pertain
to the relationship between the government and the citizen.
2. Expression of national identity values: statements that refer to Jewish-Israeli collective values
that are, for example, informed by shared history, language, religion and traditions.
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3. Expression of ethical values: statements that refer to a personal understanding of right and
wrong, which can be grounded in philosophical, religious or spiritual beliefs.
Emerging Codes
Additional themes emerge naturally during the coding process, and repeated mentions of a
specific theme initiate the creation of additional codes. Some of these new codes are not connected to
one of the four categories above, and others were added to existing categories where appropriate,
particularly for the refinement of the first category (“action describes”). This allows for a more nuanced
distinction between actions that testifiers witnessed and those they participated in. Table 4.1 shows
those codes that emerged during the coding process and the frequency for each respective code.
Some of the emergent codes pertain to personal ethical dilemmas and perceptions, such as the
courage to confront unethical behavior or the lack thereof, perception of supervisors making ethical or
unethical decisions and revenge as the motivation for unethical behavior and military misconduct. Other
themes are directly related to operational procedures and training in the military, including a perceived
lack of training or lack of transparency in guidelines and orders or a general criticism of IDF policies. A
third broad category that emerged reflects the reality that most IDF personnel serving in the West Bank
and to some extent in Gaza regularly interact with Palestinian civilians. Expressions of sympathy with
Palestinian civilians and the presence or involvement of Palestinian children reflect this reality and point
to a shift away from the theory of the denial of the victim discussed in Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the
Silence. While not all additional codes can be analyzed in detail for this dissertation, they provide
additional context and may inform future research projects. These codes are included in the analysis of
the data as appropriate.
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Table 4.1
Codes that emerged during coding procedure
Code

No. of testimonies

Questioning superior’s decision making

179

Palestinian children

129

Expression of sympathy with Palestinian civilians

120

Critical of IDF guidelines

98

Lack of transparency in orders/guidelines

87

Confronted peers about unethical behavior

63

Consider superior’s decision-making ethical

56

Lack of training

47

Revenge

36

Lack of courage to confront unethical behavior

26

Some of these emerging codes describe behavior or observations that can be matched with a
counterpart. For example, “confronted peers about unethical behavior” and “lack of courage to confront
unethical behavior” present an opportunity for comparative study. These codes show the diversity in
recounted experiences and point toward potential future research projects.
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Introduction to the Data
The non-governmental organization Breaking the Silence collected the testimonies representing
the data for this study. The testimonies are available on the organization’s website 16 in Hebrew and
English. This research project uses the English versions of the testimonies.
Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence described in detail how Breaking the Silence collects
testimonies and verifies the identity of the testifier and accuracy of the reported incidents. The sample
for this research consists of the 900 testimonies that were available online 17 in English as of July 2019.
As mentioned above, Breaking the Silence classifies each testimony based on four
characteristics: the rank and unit of the testifier and the year and location of described incidents. Figure
4.2 shows a screenshot of the case classification sheet in NVivo. The left column displays two numbers:
the first is the continuous number each file receives in NVivo for organizational purposes followed by
the name of the file, in this case the testimony number assigned by Breaking the Silence. Column A
indicates the rank of the testifier, column B the year, and column C the location of the described
incident. Column D is an additionally created classifier that uses information from column C to group
testimonies into clusters of broader locations. Column E indicates the unit the testifier belonged to.
Below, a brief discussion of each classifier introduces the data.
Classifier 1: Area
Twenty distinct geographical areas are represented in the sample in addition to the designations
“other” and “unassigned.” Table 4.2 shows the different area codes and their corresponding number of
testimonies; they are organized based on their broader geographical area: West Bank, Gaza or Israel.

16
17

www.breakingthesilence.org.il
https://www.breakingthesilence.org.il/testimonies/database
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Almost two-thirds (594) of all testimonies come from the West Bank, and 202 of these come
from Hebron, the largest city in the West Bank. The broader Hebron area accounts for an additional 56
testimonies; combined, Hebron and the Hebron area represent roughly 29% of the total sample.
Another area in the southern West Bank is the Bethlehem area, accounting for 34 testimonies.
Table 4.2
Location of described incidents in testimonies and corresponding numbers of
testimonies
West Bank
Bethlehem area
East Jerusalem
Hebron
Hebron area
Jenin area
Jericho and the Jordan valley
Nablus area
Qalqilya area
Ramallah and al-Bireh area
Salfit area
Tulkarem area
West Bank

594
34
2
202
56
27
22
125
17
57
3
30
19

Gaza Strip
Deir al-Balah area
Gaza Strip
Gush Katif
Khan Yunis area
Northern Gaza Strip
Rafah area
Southern Gaza Strip
Israel
Other
Unassigned

188
26
84
2
8
61
6
1
18
1
99

Total

900

Ramallah, the de facto administrative capital of the West Bank, is located just six miles north of
Jerusalem in the central West Bank. Fifty-seven testimonies come from Ramallah and the adjacent alBireh area. Other areas in central West Bank include the Salfit area (3), Jericho and the Jordan valley (22)
and East Jerusalem (2). The northern West Bank is represented in the sample with the following areas:
Nablus (125), the Tulkarem area (30), the Jenin area (27) and the Qalqilya area (17).
Out of the 188 testimonies from the Gaza Strip, 84 testimonies are classified as “Gaza Strip”
without listing a more detailed location. Sixty-one testimonies come from the Northern Gaza Strip. The
Deir al-Balah area, located in central Gaza, represents 26 testimonies. In southern Gaza, two areas are
part of the sample: the Khan Yunis area (8) and the Rafah area (6).
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Of the 18 testimonies that are classified as “Israel,” 17 come from the Border Police and one
from the Artillery Corps. The Border Police, often also referred to as the Border Patrol, are not part of
the IDF but rather are a branch of the Israel National Police. Thus, as opposed to the IDF, they can arrest
Israeli citizens. Tasked with securing Israel’s border and responsible for law enforcement operations in
the West Bank, the Border Patrol are the policing authority within the settlements and for all matters
regarding Israeli citizen settlers in the West Bank. Young Israelis can opt to serve in the Border Patrol
instead of the IDF with equal length of service requirements.
Classifier 2: Year
Testimonies in the sample span from 1999 to 2017 (see Figure 4.3). The majority of testimonies
have a single year assigned to them. A small number of testimonies have indications of a specific month
and year, such as July 2014, and in these cases only the year was transferred into the case classification
sheet. A few testimonies also show a range of years, like 2010–2012; in those instances, the median of
those years was used.
Figure 4.3
Year and corresponding numbers of testimonies
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Of the 900 testimonies, the year most are classified with is 2014. One hundred sixty-three
testimonies (18.11%) stem from 2014, a time during which Operation Protective Edge, also known as the
2014 Gaza War, took place. In the aftermath, Breaking the Silence launched a campaign to recruit
testifiers who had served during the 2014 Gaza War and subsequently published a booklet with
testimonies exclusively from this operation, entitled This is how we fought in Gaza: Soldier’s testimonies
and photographs from Operation “Protective Edge” (2014).
The second largest number of testimonies comes from the year 2002 (118), when the reinvasion
of the West Bank during the Second Intifada took place. The earliest testimonies come from 1999, with
just five testimonies in the sample. One hundred twelve testimonies did not have any year indicated by
Breaking the Silence and thus appear as “unclassified” in Figure 4.3.
Classifier 3: Rank
A little over two-thirds (608) of the testimonies come from enlisted ranks, while 146 come from
officer ranks, 40 testimonies are classified by Breaking the Silence as “other,” and 106 are not assigned
any rank. Table 4.3 shows the precise breakdown of the rank distribution in the data. According to the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (2020), in February 2020, 169,500 active personnel served in
the IDF. Approximately 60% (102,500) were conscripts, with the vast majority (approximately 97%)
serving in the army as opposed to other branches of the military. An additional 465,000 reservists
perform annual training. Most reservists serve in the army (400,000 reservists), followed by the air force
(55,000 reservists) and the navy (10,000 reservists).
Of the 608 testimonies from enlisted ranks, the majority (523 testimonies) come from the rank
of Samal Rishon (First Sergeant). This rank is typically achieved after 24–32 months of service, i.e.,
toward the end of the enlistment period for men and after the completion of the mandatory enlistment
period for women. Above the rank of Samal Rishon is the rank of Rav Samal (Sergeant First Class, also
translated as Master Sergeant). This is the lowest of the non-commissioned officer ranks and accounts
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for 28 testimonies in the data. Below the rank of Samal Rishon is the rank Samal (Sergeant), which is
commonly granted after 18–24 months of service. Fifty-six testimonies come from this rank. The lowest
enlisted rank in the data is the rank of Rav Turai (Corporal or Chief Private), the second enlisted rank in
the IDF rank structure; only one testimony comes from this rank.
From the 146 officer testimonies, more than two-thirds (105) come from Lieutenants (Segen).
Second Lieutenants (Segen mishne), the lowest of the officer ranks, account for six testimonies. The rank
of Captain (Seren), that above Lieutenant, is represented by 26 testimonies, and an additional nine
testimonies come from Majors (Rav Seren), the highest rank represented in the data. As opposed to the
mandatory 32 months for men and 24 months for women, officers sign up for a minimum of 48 months
Table 4.3
Ranks of testifiers and corresponding number of testimonies
Rank in Hebrew transliteration
NATO code
Equivalent rank in US

Count

Officer ranks

146

Rav Seren (Rasan)

NATO OF-3

Major

9

Seren

NATO OF-2

Captain

26

Segen

NATO OF-1

First Lieutenant

105

Segen mishne (Sagam)

NATO OF-1

Second Lieutenant

6

Enlisted ranks

608

Rav Samal (Rasal)

NATO OR-7

Sergeant first class

28

Samal Rishon (Samar)

NATO OR-6

Staff Sergeant

523

Samal

NATO OR-5

Sergeant

56

Rav turai (Rabat)

NATO OR-4

Chief Private, Corporal

Miscellaneous

146

Other

40

Unassigned

106

Total

900
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of service (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2020). Additional service time requirements
apply to a number of specialized professions, for example for pilots.
Classifier 4: Unit of Service
Breaking the Silence provides the testifier’s unit with most testimonies. While for some
testimonies detailed information such as the testifier’s brigade or even exact battalion is listed, for other
testimonies only the branch of service is indicated. This inconsistent manner of labeling makes
comparison between different brigades difficult. Of the 900 testimonies, 79 have no unit classification at
all, and 30.8% (277) of all testimonies are labeled as “other,” further limiting the possibility of
comparison between branches of service, brigades and battalions (see Appendix B for a breakdown of
testimonies by branch of service/corps).
Limitations
A major limitation of all content analysis as compared to interviews or focus groups is that no
additional questions can be asked. Instead, this research is limited to the information provided in the
testimonies. There are many instances in the data where additional questions could have clarified
ambiguities and enriched the analysis. Thus, this research can only be seen as a starting point from
which to advance research on perceived violations and confirmations of military ethics values, military
opposition movements in general and other social identity values in the military context.
All testifiers volunteered to share their experiences with Breaking the Silence. There are several
limitations to this approach. First, the sample is self-selected. The results thus cannot be seen as
representative of IDF soldiers in general but need to be understood in the context of IDF soldiers who
chose to speak out against what they witnessed during military service. Breaking the Silence is situated
on the left of the Israeli political spectrum, and this is likely a determining factor for those who choose
to share their experiences with the organization. While the identities of testifiers are unknown to the
public and thus there is no way to confirm testifiers’ political beliefs, it is unlikely that the testimonies
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represent the entire Israeli political spectrum equally. For example, the Kfir brigade, the largest infantry
brigade in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces, n.d. b), has been tasked with providing security in the West
Bank. Many soldiers in this brigade are religious, and their political beliefs are to the right of the Israeli
political spectrum. Allegations of misconduct from soldiers in this brigade have surfaced in the media
(Harel & Haaretz Correspondent, 2008; Manekin, 2016). In the data, 52 testimonies are labeled as
coming from the Kfir brigade or one of its five battalions, making up just 5.8% of the data. Precise
numbers regarding size of IDF brigades and battalions are not available but given that the Kfir brigade is
the largest of all infantry battalions it is likely that this percentage of testimonies is not a representative
sample of the soldiers in the Kfir brigade.
Potential recall bias is also a limitation. While Breaking the Silence cross-checks all described
events, testifiers often share their experiences months or even years after the reported incident has
occurred. Since four of the five hypotheses (2–5) are concerned with perceptions of value confirmations
and violations rather than the precise recollection of events, concerns about recall bias may be of less
importance for the analysis of those hypotheses.
Other than the four identifiers, information on testifiers’ identity is not available. While
examining the data or a similar data set based on other characteristics, including gender and ethnicity,
might provide additional empirical and theoretical implications, they are not the focus of this study.
Several studies examine the dynamic relating to other characteristics in the Israeli military context,
including gender (Ben-Shalom et al., 2018; Rosman, 2020) and ethnicity (Ben-Shalom, 2012; Kachtan,
2012; Peled, 2000; Slobodin, 2011).
Ethical Considerations
One of the most important benefits of content analysis of secondary data is the unobtrusive
nature of the data collection process. This eliminates concerns about informed consent and other
ethical dilemmas that some other research methods face (Neuendorf, 2017). For example, because

91

testimonies were already collected prior to the beginning of this research, testifiers were not asked to
share their stories for the sake of this research, removing the potential for physical and psychological
harm that participants may experience when recalling stressful or traumatic events (Denscombe, 2014).
Another important ethical concern in many research projects is the preservation of the
confidentiality and/or anonymity of participants (Bryman, 2012). Confidentiality and anonymity are
critical for Breaking the Silence’s the work since most testifiers choose to remain anonymous. Testifiers
share personal information with the group and trust that their identities will not be revealed. Unless
(research) participants believe that “their data will be kept from falling into the wrong hands, such as
those who would gossip, blackmail, take adverse personnel action against the subjects, or subpoena the
data” (Sieber, 2009, p. 123), participants may be hesitant to share their experiences and opinions
truthfully and completely or at all. Several attempts by the Israeli State Attorney and others to compel
Breaking the Silence to reveal the identities of testifiers in their publicly accessible testimonies (Harel &
Cohen, 2016; Perper, 2016) have so far been unsuccessful but indicate the importance of safeguarding
the confidentiality and anonymity of testifiers. No testimony analyzed for this research project contains
any personally identifiable information beyond the four classifiers assigned by Breaking the Silence, and
identities are not known to the researcher.
Some scholars have pointed to ethical concerns regarding the analysis of secondary data when
participants are unable to consent to further analysis beyond the original research (Bryman, 2012).
However, since testifiers shared their experiences with the knowledge that their testimony would be
shared publicly, this concern does not apply to this research project.
The next chapter, Chapter 5: Rotten Apples or a Culture of Denial?, introduces the first part of
the research findings. First, the chapter presents a general overview of themes and patterns that
emerged during the coding process before discussing the results of the first two hypotheses in detail.
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Chapter 5: Rotten Apples or a Culture of Denial?
This research examines the extent to which value violations and confirmations are exhibited in
Breaking the Silence testimonies. This and the next chapter present the findings of an analysis of 900
Breaking the Silence testimonies. This chapter first introduces some general themes that emerged
during the coding and analysis stages to give an overview of the content and to provide context for the
subsequent discussion. The second part discusses the first two hypotheses. The first hypothesis
examines the content of the testimonies in light of accusations leveled against Breaking the Silence as
introduced in Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence; the second hypothesis takes a closer look at the
extent of testifiers’ expressions of political and national values. Direct quotes from testifiers accompany
the discussion of findings for illustrative purposes and to share testifiers’ experiences in their own
words.
General Themes
As outlined in Chapter 4: Research Design & Methods, coding of testimonies was largely
facilitated with the help of a predetermined codebook (see Appendix A) derived from the literature and
Breaking the Silence’s categorization of testimonies. A few additional themes emerged during the coding
process; those are incorporated where appropriate. All testimonies were entered into the coding
software NVivo that helped to organize, code and analyze the data. Within NVivo, simple frequency
counts, matrix coding queries and crosstabs queries were used to analyze results, detect patterns and
find correlations.
An initial analysis of the coding results revealed several themes. The word cloud (Figure 5.1,
Word Cloud Based On Data) illustrates the one hundred most frequently used words across all
testimonies; the font size of each word mirrors the number of occurrences in the sample – the larger the
font size, the more frequently word occurred in the data. Common and irrelevant words such as “you,”
“they” and “testimony number” were excluded. Similarly, the word count in Table 5.1, Top Fifteen
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Relevant Words in Sample, shows the most recurrent words in the sample but combines terms when
appropriate. For example, singular and plural forms of nouns and different tenses of the same verb are
represented by a single term. Together, Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 provide a first impression of the data’s
content. The frequency of the verbs “know,” “remember,” “see” and “think” in the sample point to the
personal nature of the experiences shared in the testimonies. Testimonies are “an account about the
past on the basis of first-hand experience and the epistemic authority such experience conveys” (Mahr
& Csibra, 2020, p. 429) and the frequency of the verbs mentioned above confirms this definition from
the literature.
Figure 5.1
Word Cloud Based on Data
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Throughout history, testimonies have challenged collective memory to address unfavorable
histories. Groups create and promote collective memory by recounting of shared experiences, including
both ancient tales and legends and more recent collective experiences that promote social identity
bonds (Dresler-Hawke, 2005). Social Identity Theory holds that individuals aim to have a positive ingroup identity view, known as “positive distinctiveness” (Turner et al., 1979). To uphold this favorable
in-group image, collective memory is often distorted through the omission, fabrication and exaggeration
of past events (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997).
Table 5.1
Top Fifteen Relevant Words in Sample
Term

Number of Appearances in sample

House(s)

1,930

Know

1,677

Soldier(s)

1,351

People

1,335

Commander

1,245

See/saw

1,225

Palestinian(s)

1,201

Tell/told

904

Remember

879

Think

836

Company

733

Sergeant

658

Hebron

645

Checkpoint

612

Settler(s)

558
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Firsthand accounts that disclose social norm violations may serve as a tool to transmit
accountability and punishment for the norm violation from the individual to the collective (Mahr &
Csibra, 2020), but those voices are often silenced when they counter a collectively desired narrative
(Ben-Ze’ev, 2010). Testimonies “produce and circulate knowledge” (Helman, 2015, p. 378) and attempt
to confront the target audience with an uncomfortable past or present. They may also challenge
elements of the culture of collective denial that may develop during or in the aftermath of collective
atrocities: denial of the victim, inverse victimization and the use of euphemisms, legalisms and
advantageous comparisons (Cohen, 2001).
In different cultural and conflict contexts, testimony and confession have traditionally been used
to disclose human rights violation, bring to light an “ugly past” and demand recognition of collective
responsibility for past atrocities (Helman, 2015). Prominent examples of societies that used witnessing
and confession in an attempt to make amends and reconcile their pasts include post-apartheid South
Africa and post-World War II Germany. Individual testimony is a powerful tool in challenging the
denialism that may be present or develop in the aftermath of war and other atrocities. It has been used
for legal trials, by truth and reconciliation commissions and in countless educational and artistic projects
aiming to keep the memory of an event alive by sharing individuals’ firsthand accounts. Immediately
following the end of World War II in Germany, for example, public discourse focused on German
suffering during and after the war rather than on the millions of victims from the Jewish, Sinti, Roma and
other ethnic minority communities. Highly publicized and partly televised trials including the Adolf
Eichmann trial in Israel and the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial in the early and mid 1960s helped to shift the
narrative from “‘Germans as victims’ to ‘Germans as perpetrators’” (Sharples, 2016, p. 30), prompting
the beginning of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“coming to terms with the past”) (Frie, 2019; Sharples,
2016). As tools of nonviolent resistance intended to direct attention to a current struggle and ongoing
social norm violations, witnessing and confession have been used to a lesser extent; they are often seen
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as contentious, particularly in cultures of collective denial (Helmann, 2015; Katriel & Shavrit, 2013).
Breaking the Silence is a prime example of the strategic use of testimonies to “stimulate a public debate”
(Breaking the Silence, n.d.) that, in their view, is presently either missing or ignored.
The frequent use of the terms “commander,” “soldier(s),” “company” and “sergeant” in the
sample speak to the military context of testimonies, and “commander” emphasizes the importance of
leadership in the military setting. Roughly a quarter (25.8%) of all testimonies discuss the ethical or
unethical conduct of supervisors. In 56 testimonies (6.2%), testifiers express an appreciation for what
they perceived to be ethical behavior by a superior. Conversely, in 179 testimonies statements
describing decision-making by a superior the testifier perceived to be unethical are shared, and only
three of those testimonies present both positive and negative accounts of superiors’ ethical decisionmaking. Given the fact that only those that participated in or witnessed perceived conduct violations or
other unethical behavior are part of Breaking the Silence’s testimonial project, the frequent reference to
leadership was expected. Commanders are the immediate authority on the ground, leading missions,
issuing directives and maintaining good conduct among their subordinates. Repeated conduct violations
and perceived unethical behavior or confusion about directives are often attributed to poor or
unengaged leadership.
Experiences in and around Hebron, a major Palestinian city in the southern West Bank (see
Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence for more details on the OPT), make up almost a third (28.6%)
of the sample, which explains the recurrent use of the term “Hebron.” One hundred twenty-nine
testimonies specifically discuss incidents that occurred at checkpoints, making this the second most
discussed category of action in the sample, second only to rules of engagement. The data include the
term “Palestinian(s)” 1,201 times. Given that the majority of Israeli military operations occur in the OPT,
this was expected, as interactions with the Palestinian population are an everyday reality for many IDF
troops. That the term “settlers” appears in the top fifteen word count list points to the regular
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interactions IDF soldiers have with settlers and their duty to protect settlements in the West Bank,
which is explored in detail below. Additionally, since one of Breaking the Silence’s declared goals is to
“end the occupation” (Breaking the Silence, n.d.), it is not surprising that the broader topics of settlers
and settlements come up frequently in testimonies. This word frequency count (Table 5.1) offers a first,
very broad impression of the content of the testimonies. There follows a closer look at the data to
explore the hypotheses.
Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1: The Majority of Testimonies Do Not Describe Incidents of Extreme Physical Violence or
Clear Conduct Violations
Critics of Breaking the Silence claim that the group’s efforts focus on unusual cases of extreme
conduct violations that display highly unethical, at times illegal behavior and hold that these published
incidents are isolated and rare cases which neither reflect the conduct of the majority of the force nor
point to systemic issues of unethical policies or practices. Breaking the Silence rejects the narrative that
the alleged problems in the IDF are the result of “a few rotten apples” or an “alleged insignificant group
of ‘bad soldiers’” (Even-Tzur, 2014, p. 3). The group contends that their testimonies show systemic
incongruences between collective Jewish-Israeli national values and the actual actions soldiers are
involved in on behalf of the Israeli military and the State of Israel while serving in the OPT. Specifically,
Breaking the Silence asserts that the testimonies show “the deterioration of moral standards” (Breaking
the Silence, n.d.) and “a reality in which young soldiers face a civilian population on a daily basis, and are
engaged in the control of that population’s everyday life” (Breaking the Silence, n.d.). Perhaps most
important, the group claims that their collection of testimonies does not expose unique and extreme
cases of violence and misconduct of individual soldiers but rather records routine actions that result in a
pervasive pattern of fading moral standards. If Breaking the Silence’s claims are true and their
testimonies show systemic violations of collective values, it would point to a culture of collective denial
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in at least part of the Israeli population. As discussed above, groups seek to uphold a positive self-image
and following Cohen (2001). In a culture of collective denial, unfavorable behavior of in-group members
is often explained as rare and not representing the collective.
The hypothesis that the majority of testimonies do not show cases of extreme physical violence
and clear conduct violations is confirmed. Table 5.2 shows the five categories and respective
subcategories of actions depicted in the data.18 Of the testimonies, 20.89% describe some type of
violence perpetrated by the IDF against Palestinian civilians and enemy combatants. Testifiers
referenced rules of engagement, checkpoints, settler violence, destruction of property and arrests as
the most prevalent actions. Indisputable misconduct of military personnel is evident in a small
percentage of the sample only and includes bribery (1.78%), desecration of bodies (1.22%), the practice
of using “human shields” (1.78%) as defined in Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence and looting
(5.22%). These actions show a violation of basic human dignity with respect to desecration of bodies and
more broadly a disregard for the life and property of the civilian enemy population; all of these actions
are forbidden by professional and military codes of conduct. These and other actions that are “relatively
more brutal” (Even-Tzur, 2014, p. 3) represent the “rotten apples” – those soldiers that violate
professional, legal and moral norms. The following subsection discusses specific themes and dilemmas
that emerged from the data.

18

Note: all subcategories are aggregated in the total number of the overarching category, the so-called parent node. Each
parent node also serves as a code and was used when the description of an action did fit the broader category but not any
specific subcategory. Individual testimonies can be coded at more than one category. Consequently, the aggregate numbers for
the parent node might exceed the cumulative number for subcategories displayed in the table and the cumulative number of
testimonies is larger than the number (n) of testimonies in this study.
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Table 5.2
Types of Actions Reported in Sample
Type of Action

n

%

Type of Action

n

%

Action against a
person
Assassination

279

31

201

22.33

11

1.22

144

12.67

Arrest
Confirmation of
Killing
Deaths
Desecration of
bodies
Human shields
Humiliation

93
8

10.33
0.89

16
75

1.78
8.33

26
11

2.89
1.22

Action against
property
Destruction of
property
Bribery
House demolitions &
razing
Looting

47

5.22

16
60

1.78
6.67

Disrupting
Palestinian civilian
life
Checkpoints

333

37

Other military
routines

350

38.89

129

14.33

80

8.89

Curfews & closures
Separation Barrier
Loss of Livelihood
House incursions &
takeovers

14
14
55
89

1.56
1.56
6.11
9.89

Demonstration of
Presence
Patrols
Rules of Engagement
Stake out

63
153
9

7
17
1

Action involves
settlers
Settler violence
Settlements
Settler children
Reported difficulty
interacting with
settlers
Indication of division
between settlers and
IDF
Law enforcement

209

23.22

98
72
41
74

10.89
8
4.56
8.22

84

9.33

61

6.78
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Subtheme 1: Controlling a Civilian Population – “…a situation that corrupted me to such a degree
which after some time Palestinians didn’t really have human faces”
Distress about systematic disruptions to Palestinian civilian life, a perceived lack of empathy on
behalf of peers and superiors when interacting with the enemy civilian population and criticism of
endorsing or tolerating the violent behavior of settlers toward Palestinians are the main categories in
the sample. The testimonies paint a picture of frequent disruption and oppression of Palestinian civilian
life by the various means available to an ever-present military force. The majority of the testimonies
describe – and at times decry – actions, policies and routines that do not constitute illegal conduct per
se, but which testifiers find morally or ethically challenging. While the vast majority of these reported
actions do not violate legal standards, they are often in conflict with testifiers’ personal ethics and at
times with military ethics as perceived by the testifiers. Many of the described actions put soldiers in
direct contact with and positions of authority over the Palestinian civilian population, including during
stops at checkpoints (14.33%), arrests (10.33%) and house incursions (9.89%). This, some testifiers hold,
eventually leads to a desensitization toward and dehumanization of Palestinian civilians and, in some
instances, a shift in ethical judgement and conduct. Measures such as checkpoints, curfews and house
incursions are part of standard IDF operations in the OPT and are legal under military law, but some
testifiers hold that these procedures violate basic morals, are ineffective and are poorly implemented.
The following excerpt from a testimony illustrates this sentiment:
Seeing an old woman come up to me on all fours to say: ‘I know there’s a curfew, that's why I'm
not walking, but I just have to get there, my child is just there with the neighbor and I have to
bring him home.’ And she comes back with a baby. She says to me: ‘Should I go on my knees?’ I
say: ‘Of course not, stand up, walk.’ A second later, a soldier cocks his weapon at her because she
walks past his post, and she goes down on her knees again so he won't... ‘I'm just bringing my
baby, I'm just.’ Like that. I say: Why does she even have to explain it to me? She’s walking in her
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neighborhood. It's her neighborhood, and she has to explain to me that she's just going to pick up
her baby. That’s bad. (#513635)
This quote illustrates a situation in which the testifier struggles with implementing and observing others
executing directives that are contrary to their own value system and how they would expect to treat
another human being. For many testifiers, a situation like the one described above might have been the
beginning of a process of internal reflection on values and morality, which eventually may manifest in
identity tensions (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Kreiner et al., 2006; Mansbach, 2011). Questioning the effect,
legitimacy and humanity of the policies they are enforcing, testifiers found themselves caught between
different roles, value systems and expectations; on one hand, the testifier is an IDF soldier who is
supposed to follow directives and enforce the rules and regulations that serve to protect their home
country and people. On the other, the testifier has their own personal values and expectations – about
what their experience in the military was going to be like, what tasks they would be assigned and how
they and their peers would perform these tasks. When those roles and value systems collide and suggest
divergent courses of action or behavior, identity tensions arise.
No testifier in the sample objected to missions that targeted terrorist suspects; the systemic yet
random obstruction of civilian life was portrayed as much more morally challenging than missions
involving lethal force. The following excerpt illustrates this seeming contradiction:
[Testifier:] I want to point out that actually for me the worst times are the routine times, the
things I have the privilege of doing on a daily basis and becoming immune to them. And it is these
things, the ones we do every day, that affect me the most. [Interviewer:] Give me an example.
[Testifier:] I can tell you that targeted, complicated, difficult assignments involving killing, I can tell
you they seem much more reasonable because you know who the people are. (#3066)
This account and similar ones found throughout the sample indicate a general acceptance of military
action that testifiers understand as aiding their mission of protecting their state, nation and fellow
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soldiers. No testimony in the sample asserted that targeted, well planned missions to arrest or even
assassinate terrorist suspects were inherently problematic or that the testifier was unsupportive of
those missions. As indicated in the quote above, the notion that targeted missions require a
considerable amount of preparation, including gathering information on the targeted individual, is
comforting to the testifier. Those targeted in these missions can be presumed to have violated rules and
to pose a security risk to the testifier’s home country and nation. This assumption may be the reason
these clearly more violent and at times lethal missions are seen as less emotionally challenging than
those that involve presumably innocent civilians. The quote above also exemplifies a general theme in
the data. While few testifiers explicitly juxtapose targeted killings and the routine action involved in
controlling a civilian population and no testimony discusses or criticizes the lawful execution of a
targeted mission, the majority of the data reveals criticism and concerns over the treatment of and
military actions involving the civilian Palestinian population.
A smaller number of testimonies focus on IDF interactions with and the behavior of settlers and
the larger issue of the settlements. This is reflected in the word count (Table 5.1). Palestinians were
mentioned much more frequently than settlers; 23.22% of testimonies involve settlers in some way,
while three categories describe situations involving Palestinians: disrupting Palestinian civilian life (37%),
action against a person (31%) and action against property (22.33%).
A related recurring theme in the sample is the change in views and attitudes toward Palestinian
civilians that testifiers experienced during their military service. The following three excerpts reflect on
this shift. The first excerpt reads:
I went through a process of dehumanization. I don’t know, maybe when a stone hit near me, a
guy would curse at me or get on my nerves, then I would allow myself to raise the scope to the
stomach area. […] And that’s some sort of gray area that the soldiers allow themselves to be in. I,
too, allowed myself to be in that gray area many times, like shooting above the knee. (#68480)
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The rules of engagement dictate that soldiers aim at the legs first in an attempt to immobilize the target
without lethal consequences. Therefore, “raise the scope” may be interpreted in two ways: First, the
testifier raised the scope literally, i.e., the scope of their gun. Second, they “raised the scope” in terms of
potentially lethally wounding the target and violating the rules of engagement. A second testimony
reads:
[T]he very fact that I was in such a situation that corrupted me to such a degree which after some
time Palestinians didn’t really have human faces. They were Arabs, and as far as I was concerned,
[they] lost all human form. (#28059)
An excerpt from a third testimony reads:
It’s some sort of process in which Palestinians lose their humanity in certain situations, as far as
I’m concerned. It really hurts me to say these things because I do see myself as a humane person
and all, but I think that this situation and the place I was in there, [is] something that corrupts,
really corrupts the soul. (#35213)
This increasing difficulty of seeing the enemy population as individuals and even as human beings has
been described as a collective “wartime tradition” (Brough, 2007, p. 151). Looking back, testifiers clearly
identify this change in point of view as a problem because it allowed them to react more violently. While
dehumanization is a strategy of propaganda commonly employed to alienate specific population groups
(French & Jack, 2015; Steuter & Wills, 2009), it can also serve as a mechanism for individual soldiers to
face and fight the enemy combatant and enemy civilian population (Brough, 2007; Grossman, 2014). A
more thorough examination placing testimonies in the context of the broader literature on
dehumanization would certainly be a worthwhile research project, but it is beyond the scope of this
dissertation.
The excerpts above also point to the concept of moral injury, which is defined as the response to
“potentially morally injurious experiences: Perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or
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learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” (Litz et al., 2009, p. 700;
see also Shay, 2012; 2014). Moral injury has been studied mostly in the military context and has gained
increasing attention in the last decade or so. Critically, the concept of moral injury can be applied to the
victim, the perpetrator and the witness of an act that violates moral norms. In their conceptualization of
moral injury, Litz et al. (2009) further explain that “moral injury requires an act of transgression that
severely and abruptly contradicts an individual’s personal or shared expectation about the rules or the
code of conduct, either during the event or at some point afterwards” (p. 700). Testimonies in the
sample are rife with situations that surprised the soldier and resulted in dissonance between their own
or presumed collective values and those they and others displayed during their military service in the
Occupied Territories.
Summary of Findings
Contrary to what critics of Breaking the Silence allege, the majority of the testimonies do not
focus on cases of extreme violence but rather demonstrate severe criticism and concern over policies
and procedures that place IDF soldiers in contact with Palestinian civilians and Israeli settlers. Raising
questions of morality, responsibility and personal and collective values, testimonies highlight the tension
between fulfilling one’s duty with the goal to safeguard one’s nation and state and interacting with an
enemy civilian population that some empathize with. The testimonies the group collects largely focus on
one aspect of this issue: the impact the occupation has on Palestinian civilians. Only a handful of
testimonies in the sample question the legitimacy of the occupation altogether. More prominently
discussed themes are the testifiers’ concerns about how the occupation is carried out and what role
they, as IDF soldiers and representatives of their state and people, are asked to play. The testimonies
largely recognize that settler and IDF presence in the Occupied Territories disproportionately affects
and, in many ways, limits Palestinian civilian life. Given that Breaking the Silence proclaims it “wants to
end the occupation” (Breaking the Silence, n.d.), this may be surprising: one might expect an emphasis
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on the settlements in the West Bank. However, focusing on the impact the occupation has on regular
Palestinian civilians may make it easier to elicit empathy. Testifiers may also consider their interactions
with Palestinian civilians to be more noteworthy because their interactions or observations surprised
them in some way.
As shown in Table 5.2, only a small number of testimonies report severe violations of conduct
and legal standards. Those incidents represent deviant behavior that is outside of socially accepted
norms and exemplify cases in which individuals violated legal and ethical boundaries. The bulk of the
sample, however, puts the perceived ethics violations in context of the larger system of the military
occupation and places the culpability and the need for change on the system of military occupation and
related politics rather than on the individual soldier.
Hypothesis 2: Soldiers Deployed in the West Bank are More Likely to Display National and Political
Values Than Those Deployed to Gaza
While large parts of the West Bank are under Israeli control, Israel officially disengaged from
Gaza in 2005, and, although the IDF regularly conducts military missions there, the Gaza Strip is not
considered occupied by Israel. No regular IDF presence is located in Gaza. Military service in the West
Bank is comprised of a large variety of missions and tasks, including regular contact with two civilian
groups: Palestinian civilians and Israeli settlers. On the other hand, soldiers do not spend prolonged
amounts of time in Gaza, nor do they find themselves confronted with enemy civilians very often, if at
all.
An occupying power, as Israel is in the West Bank, finds itself confronted with civilians living in
the area. The West Bank has been contested space since before Israeli statehood, and repeated
proposals by Israeli politicians to formally annex the territory adds to the tension. Soldiers performing
their military duty as part of an occupying force might reflect on their national and political values to a
larger extent than those who perform more traditional military missions in non-contested space. The
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hypothesis that soldiers serving in the West Bank are more likely to display different political and
national values than those in Gaza is confirmed. Below, a detailed explanation and illustration of the
findings through two sub-themes is presented.
Subtheme 1: Settler-Soldier Dynamics – “The same people who bring us cookies on Friday before
the Sabbath, are suddenly throwing stones at us and calling us Nazis.”
Table 5.3 shows that of the 782 testimonies in the sample that come from either the West Bank
(594) or Gaza (188), 76 testimonies or 9.7% discuss national identity values. Testimonies from the West
Bank express national identity values almost twice as much as testimonies from Gaza (11.11% compared
to 5.32%). In terms of political values, the difference is even more pronounced: 3.72% of testimonies
from Gaza discuss political values, whereas 9.09% of testimonies from the West Bank discuss them.
Table 5.3
Expression of National and Political values by area of service

National
identity
values
Political
values

West Bank (n=594)
No.
%
66
11.11

Gaza (n=188)
No.
10

%
5.32

Total (N=782)
No.
%
76
9.7

54

7

3.72

61

9.09

7.80

Actions that involve settlers represent the lowest percentage of the five broad categories of
action with 23.22%, but they bring to light serious concerns and implications. Settler violence toward
Palestinians is described in 10.89% of all testimonies, interactions that point to a perceived division
between IDF soldiers and settlers are found in 9.33%, and frustrations stemming from interactions with
settlers were present in 8.22% of the responses. One dilemma testifiers expressed repeatedly was not
knowing how or being authorized to respond to instances of unprovoked settler violence against
Palestinian civilians, particularly when perpetrated by settler children, as the following excerpt shows:
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That simply means commanding that post on Saturday, that’s what I note to myself: Your mission
is to protect Palestinian homes from terrible little Jewish kids. Period. That’s your mission on
Saturday. That’s the day they come by in a group of ten, straight away you’re like their
responsible adult. The kids are horrible, really. (#804722)
IDF soldiers have no jurisdiction over Israeli citizens and no authority to arrest settlers. They are thus left
with few means to intervene in or investigate settler violence. Waiting for the Israeli Border Police to
arrive while suspects leave the scene was a frequent source of frustration for testifiers. They describe
feelings of helplessness, frustration over their lack of authority over settlers and anger over unprovoked
attacks on Palestinian civilians and property. For some testifiers, this resulted in an increase in sympathy
with Palestinian civilians as well as animosity toward settlers. In another testimony, this frustration
becomes even more evident and indicates a sharp divide that emerges between some IDF soldiers and
settlers in the West Bank:
Again, as I said before, and it’s important to say it—the soldiers in Hebron are the greatest
victims. No, the Palestinians are the greatest victims, but the soldiers are next. They’re in this
place where they have to go against their will and support the settlers, who can do whatever they
want, abuse Palestinians as much as they want. Soldiers try to stop the settlers, but they don’t
have the power to do it. (#102843)
Some testimonies reveal that the complicated relationship between settlers and IDF troops goes even
further. The IDF protects the settlements, and settlers often invite IDF soldiers for dinners or bring them
food and drinks during their shift. Some testifiers regard accepting these offerings as unprofessional, as
they can influence the soldiers’ behavior in favor of settlers while on guard duty at a settlement.
Complicating this relationship further are reported incidents of settlers verbally assaulting and even
physically attacking IDF soldiers when they step in to prevent violence against Palestinian civilians or
their property. One testifier remembers:
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[Testifier:] Meanwhile the settlers are calling us Nazis and ‘aren’t you ashamed? You’re not doing
your job, you’re confused’ and throwing stones. [Interviewer:] They threw stones at soldiers?
[Testifier:] Yes, on us as well. It’s like, the same people who bring us cookies on Friday before the
Sabbath, are suddenly throwing stones at us and calling us Nazis. (#314162)
Since settlements are located in the West Bank only, the sample size for actions involving settlers
decreased compared to the overall sample, which might offer one explanation for the relatively low
percentage compared to the other categories of actions.
Subtheme 2: Reflections on National and Political Values – “My country has lost its way
completely”
Testimonies show the complex situation in the West Bank that soldiers have to navigate on the
ground. For some, their experiences with settlers provoke internal reflection on ethical, political and
identity issues. The following excerpt illustrates one critical reflection on the state’s policy and national
identity:
And here we have a system, sponsored by the state, sponsored by all of us, we all take part, a
system of repression of people, by force and violence in order to achieve this anachronistic
biblical fantasy of a Jewish kingdom in Judea and Samaria or in Israel. People with values and
ideology, who really come to serve and defend, are being exploited to enforce this ideology,
enforce this system. My country has lost its way completely. We're just going around in cycles of
bloodshed and violence and it won't end until people understand that they're responsible for
what their state is doing, and what the implications are, what the real face of the Israeli
settlements in Judea and Samaria is, and the general system of repression in East Jerusalem,
which happens five minutes from their homes, people don't have rights. We're very good at
waving around our democracy, and [being a] villa in the jungle, and the most moral army in the
world, but nobody really enters the thick of things, and the mere panic it creates in people, to
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hear people speak about their service in a way that isn't ideologically motivated, proves how we
can't handle our actions as a state. (#390438)
This critical reflection on the state’s policies and, by extension, on the military points to the internal
identity dilemma this testifier experienced. The alleged refusal of the public to hear of the negative
impact military service has not only on Palestinian civilians but also on the IDF soldier is just as
problematic for this testifier as the refusal to proactively break the cycle of violence. This critical
reflection decries the discrepancies between national values and collective action. Another testimony
focuses more on the testifier’s internal process of reflecting on national values as prompted by actions
witnessed during their military service:
I went through a process in the army. I came from a place, thinking that we couldn’t be doing
anything wrong. Like, what, we're the state of Israel, we're doing something bad? It doesn't make
sense. And then I arrived to the territories, and saw what’s actually being done there. I asked
myself if what we're actually doing here is defending civilians, defending the state of Israel. And it
didn't feel that way, it simply felt like there are settlers there, and we're defending them, [but] it
feels like a completely different entity. They behave differently, they don't feel any belonging to
the government and the law, they feel that they belong to this thing called greater Israel and stuff
like that, and that's what interests them, and it simply feels wrong. (#871289)
The reflections shared in the excerpts above and other responses again point to the concept of moral
injury. Experiences for these testifiers were vastly different from what they expected, and moral
boundaries were transgressed.
Summary of Findings
Testimonies from the West Bank discuss national and political values to a larger extent than
testimonies from the Gaza Strip. Being physically present in a contested area, interacting with the
enemy civilian population and interacting with settlers from one’s own nation all seem to contribute to
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an increased reflection on national and political values, highlighting the perceived discrepancies
between those values and the actual occurrences they witnessed. This hypothesis is confirmed.
Conclusion
This chapter introduced the general themes that emerged during coding and discussed the first
two hypotheses based on the analysis of 900 Breaking the Silence testimonies. Both hypotheses are
confirmed. The following patterns and key conclusions emerged: testimonies showed few cases of illegal
behavior; the majority of reported incidents focus on ethical violations and raise questions of
desensitization toward the Palestinian civilian population and the impact of the military occupation on
civilian life.
Overall, the data show that those actions that involve controlling the civilian Palestinian
population receive the most criticism by testifiers. Witnessing and being involved in disturbing aspects
of civilian life, including restricting free movement, entering houses and confiscating property weighs
heavily on testifiers. While some testifiers describe their sense of the dehumanization of Palestinian
civilians during their military service, others developed empathy toward the struggle of regular civilians
and found the level of restrictions placed on them disproportionate. In contrast, missions that involved
targeted arrests and even targeted killings were met with less testimonial criticism and doubt about
justification. Stand-alone missions that testifiers perceive as clearly aiding in fulfilling the overall mission
of fighting terrorism and safeguarding their country are not criticized or questioned in the data, pointing
to a need for the IDF to more clearly define and reinforce for individual soldiers how other tasks are part
of the overall mission.
The data, in combination with the examination of the severe backlash Breaking the Silence has
been met with, also reinforce the notion of a culture of denial on part of the Israeli public. Breaking the
Silence testimonies rarely expose physically violent actions or behavior that can clearly be identified as
misconduct, yet the group is accused of focusing on extreme and unique cases of violence – “rotten
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apples.” These claims have been disproven by analyzing the content of the data, which indicates an
unwillingness by Breaking the Silence’s critics to engage in an examination and reflection on the
revelations in the testimonies. The call for a public discussion on whether the actions taken on behalf of
the nation in the OPT contradict or are compatible with collective national and Jewish values is not well
received in parts of Israeli society. Public debates on how potentially unfavorable collective action, past
or present, violate collective values are often difficult to start due to resistance by some parts of the
population, particularly in a society shaped by characteristics of a culture of denial. Implications of these
findings and the ones discussed in Chapter 6: Military Virtues in a Civilianized Force are reviewed in
detail in Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion. The next chapter, Chapter 6: Military Virtues in a
Civilianized Force, examines three hypotheses that are related to military ethics.
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Chapter 6: Military Virtues in a Civilianized Force
The previous chapter provided a general overview of the content of the data and examined two
hypotheses related to Israeli civilian life, including the public backlash to published testimonies and the
display of national identity and political values among testifiers. This chapter focuses on aspects of
military ethics and identity values and thus discusses the findings of those three hypotheses that
examine the occurrence of some of these values in the data. Building on the literature on military ethics
and military identity and the Spirit of the IDF, the IDF’s code of ethics, confirmations and violations of
these values are examined in relation to location and type of reported incident. Again, direct quotes
from the testimonies accompany the discussion of the findings to allow testifiers to share their
experiences in their own words.
Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 3: Unit Cohesion is Higher in the Gaza Strip Than in the West Bank
The literature identifies cohesion as a crucial element of functioning military units because it
increases military members’ identification with their peers and the armed forces in general (see for
example Castillo, 2014; Shils & Janowitz, 1948). Following Eastwood (2017), cohesion represents the
combination of five Spirit of the IDF values: Comradeship, Honesty, Personal Example, Representation
and Pursuit of the Mission, and Drive to Victory (see Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence). Each of
these five values represents a separate code in this study that together make up unit cohesion.
As outlined in detail in Chapter 2: Military Identity and Opposition Movements, cohesion is a key
factor for military identification and can be crucial for troops’ motivation to fulfill their mission in the
face of danger. Since the Gaza Strip is arguably more dangerous than the West Bank, as outlined in
detail in Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence, cohesion was expected to be more pronounced in
testimonies sharing experiences from Gaza.
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This hypothesis is confirmed. There are 594 testimonies from the West Bank and 188 from Gaza
in the sample. The area of Israel accounts for 18 testimonies, one testimony is categorized as “other”
and 99 are “unassigned.” The combined number of testimonies from Gaza and the West Bank is 782. Of
those, 76% come from the West Bank and 24% from Gaza.
Table 6.1, Expressions of Unit Cohesion Based on Area, shows that signs of unit cohesion were
found in 12.3% of testimonies from the West Bank, compared to 20.7% of testimonies from Gaza –an
8.4% difference.
Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence discussed the differences between the two areas in
detail, and those differences will be outlined here briefly when relevant.
Table 6.1
Expressions of Unit Cohesion Based on Area

Code
Confirmation
of Unit
Cohesion
Violation of
Unit Cohesion

West Bank (n=594)
n
%
73
12.3

Gaza (n=188)
n
%
39
20.7

Total (N=782)
n
%
112
14.3

197

47

244

33.16

25

31.2

Overall, testimonies that discuss unit cohesion span the time period from 2000 to 2016, with
notable differences between the two geographic areas: testimonies from the West Bank cover the
whole time period with some variation in frequency. The highest number of West Bank testimonies
discussing unit cohesion come from 2001 to 2003, with 17 testimonies showing confirmation and 62
testimonies violation of unit cohesion. Falling during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), this time period
was marked by violent clashes from both sides, and included suicide attacks on Israeli civilians from
Palestinians and targeted killings of Palestinians by the IDF. In the span of the years 2012–2014, only 5
West Bank testimonies show signs of confirmation, and 46 testimonies of violation of unit cohesion. A
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number of crucial events took place during this time, including Israeli approval of additional Israeli
settlements in the West Bank, renewed peace talks, and Operation Brother’s Keeper. Following the
kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank in June 2014, Israel launched
Operation Brother’s Keeper to search for the teenagers and arrest suspects. The bodies of the three
teenagers were found and more than 300 Palestinians arrested within three weeks; the search for
suspects with assumed ties to Hamas and increased rocket fire from Gaza in response to the arrests led
to the 2014 Gaza War.
The number of testimonies from the Gaza Strip reflect a different political and military context:
discussion of unit cohesion is prevalent in testimonies from 2000–2009 and again in 2014. In the years
2000–2009, which includes the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005, 18 testimonies discuss
confirmation, and 28 testimonies discuss violation of unit cohesion. The year 2014 accounts for almost
as many testimonies that discuss unit cohesion in some way as all previous years combined: 21
testimonies discuss confirmation, and 19 testimonies discuss violation of unit cohesion. 2014 was
shaped by Operation Protective Edge, also known as the 2014 Gaza War, a seven-week episode marked
by rocket fire on Israeli territory from Gaza and aggressive Israeli air strikes. The report of the
independent commission of inquiry on the 2014 Gaza conflict (United Nations Human Rights council,
2015) concluded that the IDF flew more than 6,000 air strikes and fired about 50,000 tank and artillery
shells in the three-week period. Per UN estimates, 1,462 Palestinian civilians were killed and
approximately 100,000 residents were left homeless as a result of the destruction of much of the civilian
infrastructure. In the same time frame, “Palestinian militants had also fired 4,881 rockets and 1,753
mortars toward Israel” (UN News, 2015, para. 6), resulting in 6 Israeli civilian fatalities.
A heightened sense of unit cohesion in Gaza may be explained by a higher threat perception,
which according to the literature increases unit cohesion (Käihkö, 2018). Importantly, the nature of
military presence and thus military service is vastly different in the two areas. The West Bank is under
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military occupation and the IDF’s Kfir brigade has a permanent presence in the West Bank, which is
shaped by regular contact with civilians. This results in regular friction between Palestinian civilians and
IDF soldiers. In Gaza, however, there is no permanent IDF presence. Instead, the IDF enters Gaza for
short, targeted missions and controls the border to Israel. In contrast to service in the West Bank, the
troops entering Gaza rotate. Contact with civilians in Gaza is either nonexistent or very minimal. IDF
fatality rates in Gaza are higher than in the West Bank, and the rate of civilian casualties on the
Palestinian side add to the perception of increased risk in Gaza. Of the 4,994 Palestinian casualties from
2008 to February 2020, 89.63% occurred in Gaza (OCHA, n.d.). Palestinian injuries are also higher in
Gaza, with 60,013 reported cases compared to 52,959 in the West Bank during the same time frame
(OCHA, n.d.).
The fact that Hamas, a political party classified as a terrorist organization by many countries, has
been ruling Gaza since 2007 whereas the internationally recognized Fatah/PLO are ruling the West Bank
may also add to the amplified threat perception for military service in the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ frequent,
albeit rarely effective, firing of rockets into Israeli territory and their claimed responsibility for many
suicide attacks on Israeli civilians likely bolster this perception. While suicide attacks have become
increasingly rare since 2005, they were prevalent during the Second Intifada and likely influence
testifiers’ views in both those years and the aftermath. However, while the death rate of IDF troops and
injury and casualty rates of Palestinian civilians are higher in Gaza than in the West Bank, the number of
injuries on the side of the IDF is much higher in the West Bank: 933 compared to 94 in Gaza during the
same 2008 to February 2020 timeframe (OCHA, n.d.). Based on Breaking the Silence testimonies,
however, it is not possible to draw conclusions about whether this injury rate affects unit cohesion in
the West Bank, i.e., whether unit cohesion for testifiers deployed in the West Bank would be lower if
injury rates in the West Bank were lower. That said, a higher injury rate for IDF troops in the West Bank
does not seem to translate to similar threat perceptions for military service in the West Bank as in Gaza.
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Findings indicate a higher correlation between lethal incidents among military members and increased
levels of unit cohesion. However, higher levels of injuries may also influence unit cohesion in the West
Bank. Due to the lack of a control group, no concluding assessment can be made in this regard. While
lethal incidents among IDF members show a higher correlation with unit cohesion than higher levels of
injuries, other factors likely affect unit cohesion as well, including type of military operations,
permanency of military presence and contact with civilians. These and other factors should be
investigated in future research.
Subtheme 1: Comradeship – “We were thinking of the soldiers, not the people”
Analyzing the separate aspects of unit cohesion (comradeship, honesty, personal example,
representation, and pursuit of the mission and drive to victory), the only value that generated a
substantial difference in the two areas was comradeship. A sense of comradeship was confirmed in
13.83% of Gaza testimonies compared to only 3.03% of West Bank testimonies. Testimonies from Gaza
emphasize keeping soldiers safe. This is often illustrated by comparing the need to protect soldiers and
the enemy population. One testifier illustrates this disparity with the following anecdote:
There was a bumper sticker during the operation that said, ‘The lives of our soldiers come before
the lives of our enemy civilians.’ This was sort of the policy because all these things really help
protect the lives of IDF soldiers […]. (#332028)
Leadership emphasized this asymmetry as well, as exemplified by this excerpt from Gaza: “The
commander worries about the safety of his troops and he doesn’t care about anything professional. […]
The commander’s logic being that we don’t want this thing threatening us.” (#189886). Another
testimony from Gaza records a similar experience:
One of the senior officers in my unit talked about how we had fired [at targets] that were in very
close proximity to our forces, how we had really saved them. He said it was an important mission
and that apparently during it we had also killed a number of civilians. They said that tragically,
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some uninvolved civilians were apparently hit, but that it was a situation where it would either be
our troops or civilians [being harmed]. He said that it wasn’t even a question, that it was obvious
that our troops [came first]. (#733615)
Yet, also from Gaza, another testimony highlights the focus on the well-being of peers:
[Interviewer:] How do you feel when you complete the operation? [Testifier:] It’s complicated. It’s
not a happy feeling – but it does feel good, mostly thanks to the fact that no one in my battalion
was hurt in a serious way. (#601861)
Other testimonies describe the bond formed between IDF personnel and show how they
emotionally supported each other: “We'd stay up – some junior officers of the manpower section, let's
say – every night until 3–4 a.m. just to be together, after the soldiers were gone, to vent and cry on each
other's shoulders.” (#59249). Offering emotional support to each other and the assurance that
leadership does whatever it can to protect them are crucial elements of cohesion.
Testimonies from soldiers in Gaza largely focus on the mission before them, the loyalty and
bond that developed between peers and the sense their superiors cared about them. Many of the
testimonies from the West Bank, however, place frustration over interactions with settlers at their core,
as this excerpt illustrates:
We didn’t stop the settlers because the IDF became humane all of a sudden, it was just so that
there wouldn’t be a huge mess, so that some terrorist group wouldn’t come along or something—
we were thinking of the soldiers, not the people. (#905279)
This excerpt exemplifies the heightened sense of comradeship among military members when they or
fellow soldiers are at risk of being harmed and also shows the different context in which soldiers in the
West Bank and Gaza operate.
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Summary of Findings
As proposed in the literature, unit cohesion is higher in a high threat environment. With higher
levels of fatalities among IDF troops and Palestinian injuries and casualties, Gaza can be seen as more
dangerous than the West Bank. However, there are more IDF injuries in the West Bank than in Gaza,
leaving room for debate about what constitutes a “more dangerous” area. Additionally, the difference in
military operations and thus tasks completed by soldiers and the high level of military–civilian friction in
the West Bank highlight the need for a more complex examination of factors that influence unit
cohesion. Missions performed in the two territories differ vastly: while military service in the West Bank
covers a range of different tasks and missions that are often repetitive in nature, ranging from
checkpoint duty to the protection of settlements and patrolling areas, missions in Gaza are much shorter
and often meticulously planned. While the West Bank is under Israeli military occupation and thus the
IDF holds a permanent presence there, the IDF secures the border to Gaza and operates short missions
into the territory but does not have a permanent presence in Gaza. Whether higher levels of IDF injuries
and (violent) clashes with civilians affect the perception of threat level in the West Bank and thus
influenced unit cohesion in the responses is beyond the scope of this study. Overall, the notion that unit
cohesion is higher among testifiers that share their experiences from military missions in Gaza than for
those that describe incidents from the West Bank holds up and thus, this hypothesis is confirmed.
Hypothesis 4: Soldiers Who Report Settler Violence Against Palestinian Civilians are More Likely to
Express a Negative Sense of Representation – as described in the Spirit of the IDF values – Compared
to Those Who Report Other Issues
Incidents of settler violence in the West Bank are frequent; data from the OCHA (2020) show
2,480 incidents of settler violence from January 1, 2017, until July 27, 2020. These incidents resulted in
six Palestinian fatalities, 396 Palestinian injuries, 26,398 vandalized trees and 1,538 vandalized vehicles.
Following the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005, Israeli settlements are located only in the West
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Bank. Protecting those settlements and settlers in the West Bank is an integral part of the IDF’s mission.
Because settlers are almost exclusively Israeli citizens, they are part of the soldiers’ national in-group.
Individuals derive their social identity from membership in numerous social groups (Tajfel & Turner,
1979) and strive for a positive image of those groups (Pinto et al., 2010). When in-group members
display attitudes or behaviors contrary to the values of the group, other group members generally react
in one of two ways: through positive in-group bias, which means that the norm-violating in-group
member receives more lenient evaluation and justifications for the norm-violating behavior are made;
or with the so-called “Black Sheep Effect,” which results in harsher evaluation of the in-group member’s
conduct. Even though these mechanisms occupy opposite sides of the same spectrum, they serve to
accomplish the same goal: to preserve the positive image of the in-group (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988;
Otten & Gordijn, 2014). Based on these assumptions, it is possible that testifiers either try to justify a
norm-violating behavior – in this case violence of an in-group member toward a civilian – or that they
judge the behavior harshly. Otten and Gordijn’s (2014) model on coping with in-group deviance
identified three key moderators that determine whether positive in-group bias or the Black Sheep Effect
are triggered by deviant in-group behavior: characteristics of the misconduct, characteristics of the
group member and characteristics of the violator. Most importantly for this research, ambiguity of
intent, i.e., whether effects of the norm-violating behavior were actually intended, plays a major role.
When observers are unsure of the intent of the norm-violating in-group member, they are likely to give
the in-group member the benefit of the doubt. When observers are certain the norm-violating behavior
and its effects are intentional, they are likely to judge the in-group member more harshly. Testifiers
share their personal accounts of witnessed interactions and observations of settler violence, and it is
expected that their firsthand experience remove the ambiguity of the intention of the settlers’ behavior
and thus trigger the Black Sheep Effect. Following the literature, it was expected that testifiers try to
distance themselves from the settlers to maintain a positive in-group identity, which in turn may
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negatively affect their sense of representation. The hypothesis that soldiers who witness settler violence
against Palestinian civilians express a heightened negative sense of Representation than those that
report other incidents is rejected.
Ninety-eight testimonies, more than 10% of the responses, describe settler violence against
Palestinian civilians, which manifests either in physical attacks against Palestinian civilians or targeted
destruction of Palestinian property including olive trees, a symbolic tree and a vital source of income for
some Palestinians. Ninety-two of these testimonies stem from the West Bank, five do not have an area
identified and only one is categorized as being from Gaza. Reports on settler violence are fairly evenly
spread between the years 2000 and 2017 in the West Bank, with the two highest numbers stemming
from 2002 (19) and 2014 (25).
Table 6.2 shows the reported violations of the sense of representation by area of service. A
violation was reported in 145 testimonies. Of these testimonies, 110 came from the West Bank, 15 from
Gaza and 20 testimonies did not have a location specified. Examining individual areas in the West Bank,
Hebron and the Hebron area account for 53 testimonies (48.18%) of all West Bank testimonies that
reported a violation of their sense of representation.
Table 6.2
Reported Violations of Sense of Representation by Area

Location

n

Column %

Row %

Gaza

15

7.98

10.34

West Bank total

110

18.52

75.86

Unassigned
Total

20
145

20.2
16.11

13.79
100

Table 6.3 shows the five broad categories of actions described in the testimonies that reported a
violation of sense of representation: disrupting Palestinian civilian life had the largest overlap with 37
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testimonies, followed by actions including settlers (24 testimonies), military routines (18 testimonies),
action against property (13 testimonies) and action against a person (10 testimonies).

Table 6.3
Top Five Categories of Action that Correlate with Reported Violations of Representation

Category of described incident

n

%

Disrupting Palestinian civilian life

37

37.79

Actions including settlers

24

24.79

Other military routines

18

20.65

Actions against Property

13

7.79

Actions against a Person

10

8.98

Total

102

100

Subtheme 1: Being Unprepared – “As a commander I'm telling you, as the person responsible for
the situation, I had no idea what I was doing”
Within the category “disrupting Palestinian civilian life,” the subcategory “checkpoint” has the
highest correlation with a perceived violation of the representation value. From the 129 testimonies
that share experiences regarding checkpoints, 19 testimonies, or 14.73% (2.11% of the total sample)
reported their sense of representation was negatively affected. For some testifiers, the tasks they were
supposed to perform were not clear, eventually leading to frustration and a decreased sense of
representation: “You just don’t understand what you’re doing there. At least I didn’t.” (#56815).
Another testifier shared a similar sentiment:
[Interviewer:] So what do you check? [Testifier:] Nothing. I don't know what I'm checking at all. As
a commander I'm telling you, as the person responsible for the situation, I had no idea what I was
doing. [Interviewer:] What were you told was the purpose of the mission? [Testifier:] Security
check. [Interviewer:] The purpose of which, was? [Testifier:] I don't know, and also on this
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particular matter I asked for clarifications, I asked to understand what I'm doing. What for?
What’s the goal? Am I looking for someone? Am I looking for some terrorist? (#515845)
Similarly, another testimony points to a lack of clarity on the purpose of tasks soldiers were performing:
I did what I was told. ‘Take the vehicle apart, don't worry about it.’ The problem with this
checkpoint is, that even God – if he exists – doesn't know what it's there for. No one knows what
it's there for. You can't really stop hostile terrorist activities because you don't actually check all
the cars. (#840255)
Unclear instructions and explanations led to questioning the effectiveness of the checkpoint, resulting in
frustration and a lack of sense of representation for some testifiers. Obvious routes to avoid some
checkpoints further increased the sense of pointlessness of the checkpoint and, consequently, their
work:
It's a stupid checkpoint. Whoever really wants to pass through but doesn't have a permit, just
goes through the nearby wadi. Sometimes we would try to preempt and would go to the wadi to
try and catch them, but it was senseless. (#570182)
Some categories of action showed a higher correlation than witnessing settler violence are
demonstration of presence (10), house incursion (7), destruction of property (7), house demolitions (6)
and division between IDF soldiers and settlers (6).
Subtheme 2: Witnessing In-group Norm Violations – “Enough, I don’t want to serve here, I don’t
want to protect them”
Taking a closer look into the categories of actions, only five testimonies that reported witnessing
settler violence against Palestinian civilians also shared a negative sense of representation. The
following excerpt describes how the sense of representation among soldiers was altered through
interactions with settlers:
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After all the events at Shaharabati house [a Palestinian family who lived next to the Avraham
Avinu settlement was chased out of their home by settlers], our soldiers feel very hurt each time,
and they don’t understand what they’re actually doing there, in Hebron. We even have rightwingers – the extreme right-wingers stayed on – but the right-wingers say: Enough, I don’t want
to serve here, I don’t want to protect them. (#739396)
Roughly 5% of those testimonies that shared incidents of settler violence also reported a negative sense
of representation, making up only 0.55% of the total number of testimonies. A dissonance between the
work and effectiveness of the tasks led to frustration and questions about policies in general among
responses. Testimonies that share experiences with settlements in general yielded the second highest
number for a decrease in sense of representation. Fourteen testimonies, or 19.44% of those testimonies
that discussed their experiences in settlements, also reported a decrease in sense of representation,
representing 1.56% of the overall number of responses.
Summary of Findings
Witnessing settler violence against Palestinian civilians did not correlate to a lower sense of
representation on part of the testifiers in this study. Of the five broad categories of action (see Table
5.2), those actions that are described as disrupting Palestinian civilian life had the highest correlation
with a negative sense of representation, and checkpoints represent the highest correlation of individual
types of action, followed by general duty in settlements. Duty at checkpoints was portrayed as chaotic
and testifiers did not feel prepared or adequately briefed on what they were supposed to do, potentially
resulting in a negative sense of representation. Witnessing settler violence toward Palestinian civilians,
however, did not correlate with a noteworthy decrease of sense of Representation.
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Hypothesis 5: National Identity and Political Values are More Salient in Testimonies That Describe
Violations of Purity of Arms Than in Testimonies That Describe Other Violations of Spirit of the IDF
Purity of Arms (tohar ha-neshek) is arguably the most prominent of the eleven Spirit of the IDF
values. Dating back to pre-statehood times, purity of arms describes the notion of a noble warrior who
fights only in self-defense and avoids harm to enemy civilians and the enemy forces as much as possible
(Chazan, 2009; Eastwood, 2017). While the concept of purity of arms is rooted in the commandments of
the Torah and the Talmud, it was first explicitly expressed in a manifesto drafted by Ben-Gurion and
published on behalf of the Jewish Agency Executive in 1937 in the Yishuv, the Jewish community in preIsraeli statehood Palestine. As part of an internal struggle over who was authorized to use the various
types of violence, the concept of purity of arms was mainly a strategic attempt by the Haganah to set
itself apart from the splinter group Irgun Zvai Leumi, whose methods were more brutal (see Chapter 3:
Israel and Breaking the Silence for a more detailed description of the various pre-statehood militias)
(Chazan, 2009). The Haganah coined the term “Purity of Arms” in an attempt to establish moral high
ground by stressing the morality of their military actions (Chazan, 2009). Given the pre-statehood
context, purity of arms can also be seen as a key notion underscoring the distinction between the
oppressed Jew in the diaspora and the self-determined Jew in his biblical homeland. The introduction of
the Spirit of the IDF in 1994 gave the principle new attention, and purity of arms is still frequently cited
in concert with the notion of the “most moral army in the world,” a source of pride for many Israelis.
Consequently, purity of arms is “deeply rooted in the Israeli ideological and political consciousness”
(Chazan, 2009, p. 91) and it is thus expected that reported violations of the purity of arms principle
invoke reflection on national identity or political values. Those who reported violations of purity of arms
were not more likely to discuss national or political values than those who reported violations of other
Spirit of the IDF values. The hypothesis is thus rejected.
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Of the eleven Spirit of the IDF values, Purity of Arms is the most frequently reported violated
value; 137 testimonies reported violations. Table 6.4 shows the reported category of action in
conjunction with reported violations of purity of arms. Almost half (47.19 %) of all reported purity of
arms violations took place in conjunction with “action against a person.” “Other military routines”
ranked second (34.94 %), followed by reports of “disruptions to Palestinian civilian life” (9.21 %) and
“actions against property” (8.31 %). Actions that include settlers had the lowest number of reported
violations of purity of arms, with just one testimony falling into that category.
Table 6.4
Frequency Table Violations of Purity of Arms and Reported Category of Action
Category of Action
Action includes settlers
Action against a person
Action against property
Disrupting Palestinian civilian life
Military Routines
Total

n
1
65
10
13
48
137

%
0.34
47.19
8.31
9.21
34.94
100

Subtheme 1: Purity of Arms Violations – “You kill someone and hope it counted as a targeted
killing”
Reported violations of the purity of arms principle can take many different forms, including
perceived violations of upholding the dignity of civilians and their homes. One testifier expressed
concerns over entering homes of Palestinian civilians and shares how some of their peers had reacted:
Some would also say, it’s good to do it even if they’re innocent, the sanctity of the mission is
everything, ok? Meaning, there’s no problem here, they’ll tell you there’s no ethical problem with
what you’re doing. You’re not tainting the purity of arms, you’re not beating them up […] it’s for
the good of the mission, it justifies the means, and that’s it. (#82294).
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Instances of physical and even lethal force are also evident in the data, including violations of
international law:
[Interviewer:] I’m trying to understand, you implicate people [Palestinians] partly by gut-feeling,
so that our forces won’t encounter anyone? [Testifier:] Yes, and I’d say it’s done by intuition that
builds up during the operation itself and the context you see in the moment. Shooting isn’t
arbitrary, but on the other hand, it’s not according to the Geneva Convention, because you’re not
supposed to fire at an unarmed person. You kill someone and hope it counted as a targeted
killing. You have no idea whether he’s going to be laying an explosive or not. (#12006)
Another testimony conveyed a similar experience of misconduct:
All of the sudden our staff officer comes from some two-minute briefing, says, “Listen, this is the
briefing…we’re doing…it’s a revenge operation. We’re going to eliminate six Palestinian
policemen at a checkpoint. It’s revenge for the six they took from us.” (#125637)
The excerpts above show clear violations of the Purity of Arms value, and some represent clear
violations of international law. These violations are, however, represent a minority in the data.
Subtheme 2: Reflections on National Identity – Purity of Arms vs. Representation
Ninety-two testimonies discuss national identity values, representing 10.22% of the total
number of responses. None of these testimonies reported a violation of purity of arms. National identity
values were mostly discussed in conjunction with violations of their sense of representation (25). In 78
testimonies (8.7%), testifiers expressed political values, yet none of the testimonies that reported a
violation of purity of arms discuss political values. Echoing national identity values, political values were
most frequently discussed in those testimonies that shared a violation of sense of representation (19) –
the sense that IDF soldiers see their military service as a mission and as representing the state and its
citizens. Thus, representation is closely related to national identity values and a critical element of
military identity for any force.
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Purity of arms is a uniquely Jewish-Israeli concept closely connected to the realization of Israeli
statehood and the struggles involved in achieving it. It is also an ethical principle that highlights the
value of all life and expresses the desire for “ethical war,” if there is such a thing. Thus, while as an
ethical code purity of arms is part of collective national values, a decreased sense of representation may
reveal a different, albeit related, issue. The sense of representation is highly personal, yet also highly
important for the collective. A decreased sense of representation can negatively affect morality across a
whole unit. Representation also is a broader term than purity of arms, and can be influenced by a variety
of witnessed actions. Further, while violations of purity of arms must include an action taken by a soldier
of the IDF, the sense of representation can be negatively affected by a variety of factors. Witnessing
settlers mistreating Palestinian civilians or fellow IDF soldiers, peers who make inappropriate comments
or a general sense that some military procedures are unjust can all contribute to questions about the
purpose of the individual’s service and even the mission as a whole. Due to the nature of IDF missions in
the Occupied Territories, subsequent reflection on national and political values goes hand in hand with
questioning the mission or one’s place within it. Further research is needed to dissect the underlying
reasons for and mechanisms behind a decrease in the sense of representation in this regard, but results
from Hypotheses 3 provide a first indication that those duties that individuals do not feel sufficiently
prepared for or do not see as aiding the larger mission negatively affect their sense of representation.
Summary of Findings
Because purity of arms has a long tradition in the Jewish quest for Israeli statehood, it was
expected that reports of violation of purity of arms would prompt discussion of national identity values.
However, this did not materialize in the data and thus, this hypothesis is rejected.
Conclusion
This chapter presented the findings of three hypotheses related to military identity values and
military ethics. Hypothesis 3, proposing that those reporting incidents from Gaza showed higher unit
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cohesion than those from the West Bank, was confirmed. According to the literature, unit cohesion
increases with an increased perception of threat to the unit. A comparative analysis of testimonies from
Gaza and the West Bank supported this claim. Gaza is perceived to be more dangerous, and the data
revealed frequent instances of an increased bond between unit members.
Although some testifiers shared frustration over witnessing incidents of settler violence and
being unable to hold anyone accountable, reports of settler violence against Palestinian civilians did not
correlate significantly with a decreasing sense of representation in the data. The highest correlation in
the data between a decrease in sense of representation and a category of action was found in
disruptions to Palestinian civilian life. This indicates that a decrease in sense of mission is more likely to
occur when the actor, in this case the soldier-testifier, is actively participating in an action that causes a
negative impact on their sense of representation. Contrary to actions involving settlers, where soldiertestifiers often are witnesses and thus have a more passive role, soldier-testifiers are more active in
those actions that disrupt civilian life in the OPT. Hypothesis 4, contending that witnessing settler
violence against Palestinian civilians correlates to a negative sense of representation, is rejected.
Surprisingly, violations of purity of arms did not correlate with an increased discussion or
mentioning of national identity values. Arguably the most prominent Spirit of the IDF value, it is linked to
pre-statehood finding of identity and the common notion of the “most moral army in the world.” It was
expected that reported violations of purity of arms would trigger more discussion about national
identity and political values than testimonies that describe other issues. Testimonies did not show a
correlation between reported violations of purity of arms and mentions of national identity or political
values. Violations of the value of representation materialized as having a correlation with reflections on
national values and may be worth investigating in a future study. However, Hypothesis 5 is rejected.
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The next and final chapter summarizes the findings of this study, discusses research implications
and situates them in the broader literature on military ethics, collective values and nonviolent theory.
The concluding Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion also identifies potential areas for future research.
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion
This dissertation explores the relationship between perceived violations and confirmations of
military ethics values and incidents witnessed during service in the IDF. Most militaries have a formal
code of ethics that broadly outlines expected behavior. These codes provide general guidelines for
situations not clearly covered in other documents, like the rules of engagement, and aim to increase
morale among military members by identifying common goals and communicating expected behavior.
These ethics codes also reflect the values the military aims to embody and, because state militaries are
an extension of the state, collective national values. The Spirit of the IDF is the IDF’s formal statement of
military ethics. The code outlines ten values, describing aspirations of moral conduct, camaraderie
among soldiers and motivation to fulfill the mission and protect the country. But to what extent is the
code followed? To what extent do soldiers perceive those values being violated during military service
and under what circumstances?
Since 2004, the nongovernmental group Breaking the Silence has collected and published more
than 1,000 testimonies in which current and former soldiers recount their experiences during military
service. The group’s work has drawn criticism from various parts of Israeli society for reasons outlined
below, but has also received support and financial contributions from international actors including the
European Union (Breaking the Silence, 2020). The collection of testimonies offers a unique opportunity
to analyze a large number of soldiers’ experiences and perspectives in order to learn more about the
relationship between perceived value confirmations and violations, the context in which they occur, and
the individual dilemmas and internal struggles related to military service. While all testimonies stem
from soldiers who served in the Occupied Territories, the findings of this research need to be viewed in
the context of an opposition group rather as being representative of Israeli society or all military
members.
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Experiences shared in these testimonies are defined by the protracted Israeli-Palestinian
conflict; violent clashes with events continuing to unfold are happening once more in the spring of 2021
as this project finalizes. This highlights not only the seemingly indefinite nature of the conflict –
indefinite both in time and suffering on both sides – but also the need to study different aspect of the
conflict. While a true resolution is as desirable as it seems improbable, finding ways to mitigate tensions
might be the most realistic approach to help to lay a foundation for a peaceful coexistence in the future.
Identifying structural value violations and the circumstances in which they occur is a first step to
addressing and preventing these violations in the future.
Using insights from the literature on military ethics and military identity, social identity more
broadly and theories on nonviolent action, this dissertation asked:
What relationship exists between perceived confirmation of values and incidents witnessed during
military service in the Occupied Palestinian Territories?
and
What relationship exists between perceived violation of values and incidents witnessed during military
service in the Occupied Palestinian Territories?
To answer these questions, this dissertation examined the following five hypotheses that aim to explore
a variety of topics connected to these two questions:
1. The majority of testimonies do not describe incidents of extreme physical violence or clear
conduct violations.
2. Soldiers deployed in the West Bank are more likely to display stronger national and political
values than those deployed to Gaza.
3. Unit cohesion is higher in Gaza than in the West Bank.
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4. Soldiers who report settler violence against Palestinian civilians are more likely to express a
negative sense of Representation – as described in the Spirit of the IDF values – compared to
soldiers who report other issues.
5. National identity and political values are more salient in testimonies that describe violations
of Purity of Arms than in testimonies that describe other violations of Spirit of the IDF
values.
This chapter first summarizes the findings presented in Chapter 5: Rotten Apples or a Culture of Denial?
and Chapter 6: Military Virtues in a Civilianized Force and situates them in the broader literature that
informed this research before reviewing the limitations of the study and offering a number of
recommendations. The chapter then proposes potential avenues for future research, followed by a final
conclusion.
Key Findings and Discussion
Findings of this study relate to the case itself, theories of social identity and military identity
more specifically, military ethics and nonviolent theory. The following sections summarize key findings
and discuss them in the context of the existing literature.
Theme 1: Clashing Conceptions of Identity and Values
Claims by Breaking the Silence’s critics that the group focuses on unusual cases of extreme
violence were disproven. Only 4.56% of testimonies include descriptions of the use of lethal violence
against a Palestinian (combatant or civilian). An additional 16.33% of testimonies include other nonlethal use of force by IDF personnel against a Palestinian person. Combined, this translates to one in five
(20.89%) testimonies containing incidents of varying degrees of physical violence perpetrated by the IDF
against Palestinians. While the existence of violence in the context of a military occupation is certainly a
reality and frequently covered in the news, these incidents are not the focus in the majority of
testimonies. Thus, the claim that Breaking the Silence focuses on violent, extreme and unique cases is
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false. But why do critics of Breaking the Silence so adamantly insist on the narrative that the group’s
reports focus on unusual and extreme cases of violent behavior by IDF soldiers?
One explanation might be the integration of military service into the notion of good citizenship
in Israel and consequently the strong overlap of national and military identities. Because of this close
relationship, criticism of one identity, and its associated values and key narratives, is often equated with
criticism of the other. Generally, unfavorable claims or information perceived as shining a negative light
on a group and the connected identity may be treated as a threat to that identity (see Chapter 2:
Military Identity and Opposition Movements). Goldenberg (2015) argues that “Breaking the Silence
presents a unique threat because its members were devoted soldiers before coming out with their
claims” (p. 2). Since their “calling out” is done from within the core in-group, claims are harder to ignore.
In the case of Breaking the Silence, claims of moral deterioration come from a group that is trusted to
embody collective values and is assumed to have the well-being of the in-group in mind: IDF soldiers.
Two of the identity protection responses proposed by Identity Threat Theory (Petriglieri, 2011)
can be observed: derogation and positive distinctiveness. Breaking the Silence faces repeated attempts
to discredit their legitimacy and the validity of their claims, including rumors about the group’s publicly
known members, pressure to reveal individual testifiers’ identities and the dissemination of accounts
that contradict the occurrences recounted in testimonies. Claims in the past ranged from the “rotten
apples” accusation to affiliates of a right-wing settler group infiltrating Breaking the Silence in an
attempt to get false testimony published (see Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence). These efforts
to discredit the claims and character of a whistleblower are common strategies in response to perceived
identity threats (Scheuerman, 2014). Since most of the testifiers elect to remain anonymous, efforts
have been largely made to discredit Breaking the Silence as a whole and those testifiers whose identities
are publicly known. For example, right-wing politician Avigdor Liberman alleged in 2016 that “those
same foundations that fund Hamas, they also fund B’Tselem and Breaking the Silence” (Staff, 2016). A
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different approach by some critics relies on the concept of positive distinctiveness. By highlighting the
positive accomplishments of the IDF that seem to contradict the incidents recounted in testimonies, an
attempt is made to shift the narrative away from the claims in the testimonies. One example is the work
of the NGO My Truth,19 founded in response to Breaking the Silence’s claims and activities. Founded in
2015, many of the group’s activities mirror those of Breaking the Silence: they use testimonies to share
individual experiences and offer guided tours. According to their website, the group also engages in
“educational” and “diplomatic activities” but offers no further explanation of what those entail. As of
May 2021, about 90 testimonies are featured on the website, spanning from 2000 to 2018. Like
Breaking the Silence, My Truth publishes testimonies in Hebrew and English and includes information
like the year, location and unit of the described incident. In addition, however, testimonies collected by
My Truth feature a picture and the name of the testifier. Testifiers share their personal experiences, but
focus on situations in which IDF soldiers upheld the rule of law and moral standards amid challenging
moral dilemmas and complex circumstances. In ignoring the fact that both types of claims can be true
simultaneously, My Truth misses its opportunity for critical engagement with, reflection on and
response to Breaking the Silence’s more negative claims.
Another possible explanation for these competing claims is the civilianization of the IDF.
Because of compulsory military service, not everyone who serves in the military elects to be there.
While conscripts receive basic training, they are not professionals and may lack the motivation,
specialized training and time to become professional military personnel (Downes, 1985). In addition, the
majority of today’s IDF personnel are reserve soldiers who live a civilian life most of the time. This
increases the likelihood that they assess situations through a civilian lens informed by personal
experience, personal ethics and political values. Consequently, neither the large collection of Breaking
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the Silence’s testimonies nor the content of the accounts should be surprising, particularly in the context
of an occupation where direct contact with a civilian population poses challenges not only from a
military strategy standpoint but also because of the distinct set of emotional and ethical challenges
inherent in urban warfare. As mentioned above, Breaking the Silence likely elicits strong responses
because testifiers are seen as being part of the national core in-group. Their claims are harder to dismiss
than accusations of wrongdoing by outsiders because claims by outsiders do not have the same validity
and do not criticize collective values as effectively. Accusations of systemic, routine and pervasive
behavior that contradict collective values by members of the in-group, however, threaten the collective
identity and therefore require action to either investigate and address these claims in some way or
refute them.
Theme 2: Issues of Nonviolent Activism
The significant backlash Breaking the Silence experiences is also consistent with the literature on
nonviolent action. Ben-Ze’ev (2010) shows that those voices that counter a collectively desired narrative
are often silenced. Popovic et al. (2006) explain that “the opponent’s propaganda attack […] is
increasingly likely as the movement becomes perceived as a growing threat” (p. 63). However, Breaking
the Silence also receives support from within Israeli society. Maybe the most notable support comes
from a group of security officials, most of them retired, who see the testimonies as “an important mirror
to our actions” (Staff, 2015a, para. 9). Retired IDF major general Amiram Levin even took out a half-page
advertisement in Ha’aretz, a daily newspaper located on the left of the political spectrum, voicing his
support for Breaking the Silence and emphasizing that “the instructions to silence Breaking the Silence
harm and weaken the IDF” (Staff, 2015b, para. 3). The division on the Breaking the Silence’s activities
may be symbolic of a divide within Israeli society and symptomatic of the larger political crisis Israel is
currently facing. As of May 2021, there have been four national elections in two years. After the
incumbent Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu failed to form a coalition government, Yair Lapid of the
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centrist Yesh Atid party was given four weeks in early May to form a new government and succeeded to
do so in June 2021. The frequency of elections, inconclusive election results and the struggle of political
leaders to rally the support in the Knesset to govern all point to a political crisis and a deep divide along
political lines. As discussed in Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the Silence, the question of settlements in
the West Bank and the military occupation are linked to left and right on the Israeli political spectrum.
Breaking the Silence focuses on the occupation, IDF conduct in the Occupied Territories and the negative
impact this has not just on the Palestinian civilian population but also on Israel’s young soldiers and, by
extension, on Israeli society more generally. The response to their activism may be just one
representation of the divided political climate.
Another aspect worth discussing is whether or not Breaking the Silence fits the categories and
definitions of a nonviolent movement. All group members and testifiers served in the IDF – many likely
still do as reservists – and the group does not oppose military action or military service per se. For an
action to be considered a nonviolent action, it needs to be outside of regular, institutionalized politics
(to challenge existing power structures and use nonviolent tools in its quest for change) (Kurlansky,
2006; Schock, 2015). All of these characteristics apply to Breaking the Silence, but given the members’
involvement in military action, can Breaking the Silence be a nonviolent movement? Breaking the
Silence’s main activities are the collection and publication of testimonies, tours to the West Bank and
presentations at lectures and house meeting. All these activities focus on the sharing of former soldiers’
experiences and are primarily aimed at awareness raising. Nonviolent theory identifies four mechanisms
of change (Lakey, 1968; Sharp 1973): conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion and
disintegration. Conversion aims at changing the opponent’s view and “may occur through reason,
argumentation or persuasion, or as a result of changes in the emotions, beliefs, attitudes, or morality of
the opponent” (Schock, 2015, p. 159-60). Through their testimonies, tours, lectures and exhibitions
Breaking the Silence always shares experiences from the soldier’s point of view. Their target audiences
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include not just the Israeli public and tourists in Israel, but also international audiences in the US and
Europe. Members of the group have given speeches to the lawmakers of various countries and even had
one of their photo exhibitions displayed at the European Parliament in Brussels (Chernik, 2019). All of
these activities, regardless of audience, aim at raising awareness and appealing to morality. Other Israeli
groups have managed to have some of their demands accommodated, often unofficially – recall those
opposing to perform military duty in the occupied territories (see Chapter 3: Israel and Breaking the
Silence). Breaking the Silence’s goals are to “stimulate a public debate about the price paid for a reality
in which young soldiers face a civilian population on a daily basis” and “to bring an end to the
occupation” (Breaking the Silence, n.d., para. 1). The first goal is not tangible, and thus more difficult to
accommodate than granting a few soldiers permission to serve in a specific, preferred area, which did
not require major political change or public statements. The second goal, an end to the occupation,
clearly would require major political change and cannot be unofficially accommodated. The third
mechanism of change, nonviolent coercion, takes place when opponents either lose their power or
legitimacy or when the nonviolent campaign creates situations that are too disruptive to control. None
of this applies to the activities of Breaking the Silence. The fourth category, disintegration, occurs when
“the structure of authority being challenged breaks down and allies defect” (Schock, 2015, p. 162). This
is not the case here either. To sum up, Breaking the Silence challenges the lack of alignment between
Israel and the IDF’s stated ethical goals and the actions taken on behalf of the state. Questioning a
desired narrative like “the most moral army in the world” constitutes protest and attempts conversion
as discussed above. Whether this will bring about the desired change of a more critical reflection within
Israeli society in regard to proposed value alignment and military action remains to be seen.
Breaking the Silence uses testimonies as their main. Truth and confession have been used in the
past in court cases, reconciliation efforts and nonviolent activism. The public response to Breaking the
Silence’s collection of testimonies showcases the power of making personal experiences public. Sharing
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experiences in participants’ own words, regardless of whether the participant is a victim, a perpetrator
or a witness holds power because it highlights the lived experiences and internal dilemmas that often
communicate emotional truths. This makes it easier for outsiders to connect to complex or foreign
conflicts and situations and elicits the empathy needed to increase understanding of differing
perspectives.
Further, Breaking the Silence’s decision to translate and publish testimonies in English and offer
lectures and speeches abroad can be seen in two ways. First, it increases opposition from Israeli critics
claiming the group gives the country and the IDF a bad name abroad instead of focusing on bringing
about change at home. On the other hand, it has increased their audience and ensured support from
abroad. In 2019, for example, Breaking the Silence received donations from multiple international
organizations, including the United Nations Development Program, the Swiss Foreign Ministry, and the
Delegation of the European Union to Israel (Breaking the Silence, n.d.). This indicates a strategic choice
that helped build international awareness and support, including donations, which are at once crucial to
continuing the work of activism with full-time employees and feed into critics’ claims that the group
itself or its sponsors have an “anti-Israel” agenda. Using testimonies to stimulate a public debate about a
current conflict or ongoing injustice, Breaking the Silence attempts to use these firsthand accounts that
disclose social norm violations to transmit accountability for the norm violations from the individual to
the collective (Mahr & Csibra, 2020). Through the large number of testimonies, Breaking the Silence
convincingly shows that these value violations are not unique and isolated cases. Rather, testimonies
show that soldiers are put in difficult situations that they are not prepared for and that actions they
participate in are not aligned with proposed collective values like those outlined in the Spirit of the IDF.
Theme 3: Dehumanization and Moral Injury
As shown above, the majority of testimonies do not focus on depictions of physical violence.
Instead, most testifiers recount participating in disruptions to civilian life, for example by manning
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checkpoints and roadblocks, and descriptions of other military routines including discussions of rules of
engagement. These two broad categories are covered in almost two-thirds (62.4 %) of testimonies.
Actions that restrict and limit Palestinian civilian life, rules and routine action are core aspects that
testifiers point out as personally challenging and prompting reflections about their own involvement in
the occupation. These experiences have deeply affected some of the testifiers. Their disclosure that they
continue to struggle with their experiences sometimes years later points to the concept of moral injury,
defined as “the response to potentially morally injurious experiences: perpetrating, failing to prevent,
bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations”
(Litz et al., 2009, p. 700). As the data show, these transgressions do not necessarily occur through
physical violence against a person but are instead largely shaped by dehumanizing the enemy civilian
population and curtailing civilian life (see also Shay, 2012; 2014). These are the incidents that concerned
testifiers deem worthy of sharing. Connected to the concept of moral injury is the dehumanization of
the enemy population (Brough, 2007, p. 151). While dehumanization is a strategy of propaganda
commonly employed to alienate specific population groups (French & Jack, 2015; Steuter & Wills, 2009),
it can also serve as a mechanism for individual soldiers to face and fight the enemy combatant and
enemy civilian population (Brough, 2007; Grossman, 2014). This is the case in the present study and
highlights that dehumanization of enemies, including enemy civilians, along with restricting civilian life
are experiences that impact the offender – in this case the soldier-testifier – more than actions of
physical violence. A more thorough examination analyzing testimonies specifically in the context of the
literature on dehumanization would certainly be a worthwhile research project as it appears that these
experiences contribute to their moral injury and weigh on testifiers’ minds enduringly. A closer
examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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Theme 4: Location, Location, Location
Another crucial factor that emerged in the analysis is the location of reported incidents. Those
testifiers who shared their experiences from Gaza were less likely to discuss political or national values
than those who discussed experiences from the West Bank. Second, signs of unit cohesion were
detected to a larger extent in testimonies from Gaza than the West Bank. This offers multiple insights: a
permanent military presence like the one in the West Bank, where soldiers have regular contact with the
enemy civilian population and are engaged in the civilian populations’ daily life, seems to prompt a
reflection on national and political values. On the other hand, traditional clear-cut military missions that
have clearly defined short-term goals and timeframe and involve minimal contact with civilians do not
stimulate a reflection on political and national values to the same extent. This result is seemingly
counterintuitive, because major military flare-ups regularly happen in Gaza and images of large-scale
bombings of houses and civilian infrastructure are distributed around the world. The destruction in Gaza
and the dire situation for civilians is regularly covered in the news, yet this does not seem to translate to
individual soldiers reflecting on political and national values. This indicates that clearly defined missions,
both in time and scope, have less of an impact on political and national identity reflections. Conversely,
regular contact with the enemy civilian population as soldiers experience in the West Bank may
contribute to a deeper reflection on collective action and values. No testifier stated that lethal action
against a confirmed enemy combatant weighed on their conscience. Being directly confronted with the
impact on civilian life and civilian individuals, however, makes testifiers reflect on their own actions and
those taken on behalf of their in-group: the IDF and, by extension, the State of Israel. The presence of
Israeli settlers in the West Bank also needs to be considered as a contributing factor, and is discussed in
more detail below.
Location of service is an important factor not just in the examination of displays of national and
political values, but also in regard to unit cohesion. Based on the analyzed data, testimonies in Gaza
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showed stronger signs of unit cohesion than those from the West Bank. This indicates that unit cohesion
increases as the fatality rate of soldiers increases. Previous studies have concluded that unit cohesion is
enhanced in high-threat environments (Käihkö, 2018; Wong, 2005). Correspondingly, the data show
more expressions of cohesion in testimonies from Gaza than the West Bank and IDF deaths in Gaza are
higher than in the West Bank. However, the rate of IDF injuries is higher in the West Bank than in Gaza.
One explanation for the difference in cohesion may be in the differences of military mission in these two
areas. Whereas the IDF maintains a permanent presence in the West Bank and routinely interacts with
enemy civilians, Gaza is largely characterized by brief missions into the territory and securing the border
to Israel. While IDF injuries in the West Bank likely influence the perceptions of unit cohesion, the data
only provides a limited scope for analysis and thus whether or not injuries increase unit cohesion cannot
be determined by this research project. However, based on previous findings in the literature, it is likely
that injuries of IDF members contribute to the threat perception and thus increase unit cohesion, just
not to the same extent as peer fatalities. Several implications can be derived from this finding. Strong
unit cohesion in a high-risk setting is important for unit members to perform their duties and have a
sense of security that their peers and leaders will have their back. If military leaders aim to create a
strong bond between unit members in low threat environments, including training exercises and
peacetime missions, they need to intentionally create unit cohesion by other means, for example
through field exercises and dependable and supportive leadership.
Theme 5: Representing the State?
The most prominent Spirit of the IDF value in the data is Representation. Analysis of testimonies
revealed that a violation of testifiers’ sense of representation correlated mostly with two tasks:
checkpoint duty and duty in and around settlements. Not feeling adequately trained or perceiving their
tasks as not contributing to the larger mission of keeping their state and nation safe are sentiments
commonly cited. A violation of the sense of representation also prompted a reflection on collective
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national and political values more than any other Spirit of the IDF value violation. A possible explanation
relates back to social identity theory (see for example Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Tasks and missions that are
perceived as being consistent with a particular social identity, in this case military identity, affirm the
particular identity. However, when soldiers are assigned tasks that they do not perceive as being
consistent with their military identity, they may experience cognitive dissonance and identity tensions
that can decrease mission performance (Applewhite & Segal, 1990; Franke, 2003). This points to a need
for military and political leaders to ensure tasks on the ground line up with the overall training
requirements and communication on mission goals and proposed values.
Reports of violations of sense of representation correlated with both reflections of national
identity and political values in the testimonies more than violations of any other Spirit of the IDF value.
Soldiers deployed in the West Bank, where contact with the enemy civilian population is regular and
common, reflected on national and political values to a larger extent than those reporting their
experiences from Gaza. The category of observed or participated action that showed the highest
correlation with violations of sense of representation is disrupting Palestinian civilian life, and the
respective subcategory with the highest correlation is checkpoints. Reported violations of sense of
representation correlate with checkpoint duty and general guard duty in settlements. A closer textual
analysis revealed two main points: a (perceived) lack of training and a disconnect between testifiers’
activities and the larger mission of safeguarding their country. These findings highlight the need for
restructuring some of these duties, an overhaul of required training and increased
accountability/oversight for duty that requires interaction with civilian populations. Particularly for tasks
that are repetitive and boring, frequent rotation to other duties when possible, or retraining with an
emphasis on the value and importance of the task to the overall mission is crucial.
Witnessing settler violence against Palestinian civilians does not correlate with violations of
sense of representation. However, those that shared experiences in settlements and with settlers in
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general show the second highest correlation with violations of sense of representation. This points to
what is called “vicarious cognitive dissonance” (Jaubert et al., 2020; Norton et. al, 2003). Witnessing ingroup members violate perceived collective values can lead to vicarious cognitive dissonance.
Individuals will try to lessen the impact of any experienced cognitive dissonance, whether they are
directly involved or witness such behavior. Norton et al. (2003) found that in response to witnessing ingroup members behaving inconsistently with expected group norms, individuals change their attitudes
toward the witnessed norm violation and respective in-group member. The more the norm violator is
perceived as being a representative of the in-group, the stronger the need to adjust the attitude or
perception to make sense of the observed action (Gaffney et al., 2012; Norton et al., 2003). Settlers in
the West Bank are part of the national in-group of IDF soldiers, and part of their duty is to protect the
settlers. While they may not be considered the most prototypical Israeli for all IDF soldiers, the
confusion, disappointment and anger at settlers’ behavior is apparent in some of the testimonies.
Considering that some of the norm violations are perpetuated by fellow soldiers results in the possibility
of observing behavior incoherent with one’s expectations arising from two in-groups – settlers and
soldiers – both of whom are part of the national in-group and in addition to the military in-group
represented by fellow soldiers.
Study Limitations
This research project has a number of limitations. First, testimonies were given voluntarily to the
group Breaking the Silence. Therefore, these testimonies are not representative of every Israeli’s
experience during military service. Instead, they are likely more representative of current and former
military members who engage in social activism and those who oppose the occupation. This points to
politically more left-leaning testifiers, but since almost all testifiers choose to remain anonymous, this
cannot be determined for certain.
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Second, while the pre-verification of testimonies is a great benefit due to time, cost and
accessibility constraints, this research remains dependent on the accuracy of Breaking the Silence’s
verification of testimony content and testifier identity. As a result, I was neither able to verify the
content of the testimonies nor the testifiers’ identity.
Third, Israel’s national identity is intimately linked to military service. As such, findings need to
be seen in light of this dynamic. Findings and recommendations for nonviolent activism are only
generalizable to other conflict contexts that are shaped by a host of complex and overlapping collective
identities mirroring the Israeli case. While nonviolent strategies and tactics are always tailored to the
specific conflict context, the lessons learned are likely most valuable for situations with similar identity
dynamics.
Fourth, due to the IDF’s rank structure being different than many other Western-style militaries
in that the boundaries between officers and enlisted are more permeable (see Chapter 3: Israel and
Breaking the Silence), a comparison between officer and enlisted ranks was not useful in this study.
Much of the literature on military identity focuses on differences between officers and enlisted soldiers,
highlighting the common conception that officers and the enlisted are on separate tracks and develop
distinct identities. These conceptual frameworks do not apply to the rank structure in the IDF and thus
were not applicable to this case.
Recommendations Based on Findings
A number of recommendations follow from the findings outlined above. First, unit cohesion is
amplified in high-risk situations like combat. For its benefits to manifest in training and peacetime
mission, military leaders need to intentionally foster and promote unit cohesion. Research has revealed
that identification with leaders and group goals are crucial to creating cohesion (see for example
Bartone & Adler, 1999; Bartone & Kirkland, 1991; Garcia-Guiu et al., 2016; Walter Reed Army Institute of
Research, 1983). This identification can be promoted through field exercises, time spent together
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outside of formal training including supervisors, stable group membership and communication by
leaders that shows concern for the group’s wellbeing and readiness.
Second, assigned tasks need to align with the overall mission to not be detrimental to morale
and motivation. This can be achieved by clearly outlining how individual tasks aid the larger mission and
by incorporating these notions strategically in trainings that highlight how the task at hand aligns with
the overall mission. Additionally, values of the moral code should be discussed in the context of the
specific task. Questions like “what does behavior look like that aligns with these values?” can exemplify
expected behavior and decision-making. These notions should be repeatedly reinforced through written
guidelines and refresher trainings.
Third, and related to the previous point but specific to those tasks that are perceived as being
boring, repeated tasks in particular need clear alignment with the overall mission. Frequent rotation to
other tasks where permissible is recommended, as well as frequent refresher trainings that focus on
how the tasks support the overall mission and goals and highlights the most critical aspects soldiers
should focus on.
Fourth, soldier–civilian interactions are often stressful for both sides. A cultural education
component that prepares soldiers for interactions with civilians could provide clearer guidelines for
expected behavior and train soldiers to communicate more effectively with civilians, potentially defuse
situations on the ground and make interactions between soldiers and enemy civilians safer. Preparing
not only for the specific task at hand, for example the requirements for civilians to pass a checkpoint
and the soldiers, but also for how to engage with civilians is a crucial aspect often not sufficiently
included in trainings. In these awareness trainings, soldiers ought to increase their understanding of the
situation and the perspective of Palestinian civilians and learn tools to manage situations at checkpoints
and in similar regular encounters more peacefully and thus more efficiently.
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Fourth, all recommendations above encourage behavior and action aligned with the code of
conduct, humanitarian law and rules of engagement and aim to equip soldiers on the ground with the
right training and tools to behave in ways that align with these values. Ideally, this would result in a
reduction of violations of values. Crucially though, soldiers also need to be trained to respond and
possibly prevent conduct violations in the field without fear of retaliation. Leadership plays a key role in
that and needs to emphasize these expectations repeatedly and clearly communicate a commitment to
ethical behavior.
Fifth, misconduct and illegal action need to be sanctioned. Leadership needs to foster a culture
that encourages reporting of misconduct and illegal behavior, that protects the reporting individual and
ensures that reported incidents are properly investigated and, if applicable, sanctioned.
Recommendations for Future Research
As discussed above, this study detected a number of patterns that contribute to the literature
and understanding of dynamics of value violations during military service. The data is rich and offers
ample opportunities for further investigation that could not be addressed due to time, space and
funding constraints. A number of limitations in the data also offer avenues for future research. Further,
this research project revealed a number of related issues and questions that are worth exploring.
Recommendations for future research appear below.
Most testimonies show the date or at least a date range for the reported incident. While some
general observations about temporal changes were made in Chapter 4: Research Design & Methods, a
focused analysis of the extent to which reported actions and perceived violations changed over time
would be useful. This would explain if and how actions and missions have changed over time, clarify how
military responses have changed based on political context and might also indicate shifts in focus on
specific values.
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Additionally, an investigation into changes in cohesion over time taking statistics on injuries and
fatalities into account would provide insight into the extent to which non-lethal injuries contribute to a
heightened sense of cohesion.
Regarding cohesion, a future study could examine the degree of personal commitment of
objectors to their small unit. Following the literature, one assumption is that some objectors in uniform
engage in their activism because they are poorly integrated into their small unit, have been poorly
socialized into the military or did not receive the appropriate training. Thus, measuring personal
commitment, socialization, and level of training might serve as a predictor for military activism.
The literature indicates differences in identity development between officers and enlisted
military members and, more broadly, between those in conscript and non-conscript militaries (see
Chapter 2: Military Identity and Opposition Movements). A comparative study between officer and
enlisted military members and between conscript and career military members and their involvement in
criticism or activism may provide additional information on the perception of value violations, and the
nature of dissent and nonviolent activism from within the military. Based on the literature, one might
expect that officers develop a stronger professional identity compared to enlisted members.
Similarly, a study exploring the differences between reserve and full-time volunteer military
members could offer additional findings that speak to the impact of reserve soldiers, who are “outside
yet inside the military system” (Lomsky-Feder et al., 2008, p. 593). This could shine a light on the
understudied civilian influence on militaries, not just in Israel but also in other countries that rely on
reservists and volunteers more generally. For example, the notions “citizen airmen” in the United States
Air Force Reserves and “Bürger in uniform” (citizen in uniform) in the German military exemplify the role
reservists play in some militaries and also point to the two worlds these individuals navigate: the civilian
and military realms. Their views and influence over their respective military systems and decisionmaking could further the understanding of military-decision making and reservists’ influence.
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A number of testifiers self-identified as women in their testimonies. For most testimonies,
however, it was not possible to identify the testifier’s gender. A study that explores gendered
differences in military members who engage in dissent and opposition movements would give insight
into whether a gender divide is present in the nature of reported incidents, perceived value violations
and overall experience during military service and nonviolent activism.
Similarly, a study taking into account the ethnic divide within Israeli society would also be a
worthwhile undertaking. Ashkenazi Jews dominate many of the dissent, opposition and nonviolent
movements more broadly in Israel (Weiss, 2014). Focusing on giving a voice to those who are
underrepresented, namely Mizrahi and Sephardi Jews and Bedouin, Druze and Israeli-Arab minorities
would give further insight into their experiences and value perceptions that could offer additional
insights into dynamics in nonviolent movements, the concerns and perceptions of these minorities in
regard to cultural issues and the unique experiences of these minorities and add to the growing
literature on minority experiences in various cultural settings, including the military and social and
political activism.
A study comparing Breaking the Silence’s and My Truth’s testimonies alongside other
publications would show where accounts and experiences overlap. This could highlight the opportunity
to expand the spectrum of awareness for individuals on both side of the political spectrum and would
give further insight into the conception and public display of Israeliness. Understanding these dynamics
is crucial to begin a dialogue designed for both sides to learn about each other’s’ experiences with the
goal of combating the increasing societal and political polarization.
A study that explores the other side of the occupation and gives a voice to Palestinian civilians
would provide the opportunity to juxtapose the experiences on both sides of the conflict. The Israeli
organization Yesh Din: Volunteers for Human Rights has collected testimonies of Palestinians since
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2005.20 While the number of testimonies currently available is much smaller than the collection of
Breaking the Silence testimonies – around 135 as of April 2021 – Yesh Din also organizes the testimonies
by year, location, type of incident and gender. Analyzing testimonies of Palestinian’s and studying the
Palestinian experience in its own right and would add to the literature on civilian life under occupation
and resilience more generally. Providing insight into what Palestinians perceive as the most difficult
struggles, how they see themselves and IDF soldiers and the interactions they had with the IDF might
inspire unique strategies designed to overcome difficult circumstances. Combined with the analysis of
Breaking the Silence testimonies, this might reveal additional points for understanding the power
differentials and structural flaws that permit violations of moral values.
Conclusion
How can there be such vastly differing perceptions and interpretations of IDF actions in the
OPT? Is the narrative of the “most moral army in the world” true, or is the notion of an occupying power
that oppresses civilian life more accurate? Can both be true at the same time? The answers to these
questions are complicated and based on layers of competing narratives and a protracted conflict history.
This research offers some insights and findings that help to explain the host of underlying and complex
dynamics at play but can only be seen as a starting point.
Regarding military ethics values, this research highlighted two core aspects. First, unit cohesion
increases as the threat level of the location increases. More research needs to be done to more clearly
define and dissect different components of threat levels. Next, as expected based on previous studies,
sense of representation is negatively affected when soldiers are assigned boring and repetitive tasks,
particularly when they begin to question their contribution to the larger mission. This can result in role
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https://testimonies.yesh-din.org/en/?filter=s&wo_gender%5B%5D=1409&wo_gender%5B%5D=1411
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conflicts and identity tensions and highlights the need for military leaders to clearly connect these tasks
to the larger mission and ensure training and retraining material support this claim. Further, sense of
representation is also negatively affected when a member of the in-group violates collective norms, in
this study when settlers perpetrate violent attacks against Palestinian civilians.
In testimonies, former and current IDF soldiers share experiences in their own words. This
highlights the deeply personal nature of the experiences and allowed for an analysis of individual
perspectives. This is particularly interesting because these testimonies contradict a number of
commonly held beliefs and notions about military service in general and IDF presence in the Occupied
Territories more specifically. The data revealed that it was not witnessing or participating in a singular
violent or even lethal act that testifiers struggle with. Instead, what many testifiers found most
challenging were seemingly low-key actions that were repetitive and restricted aspects of civilian life.
Those actions include limiting freedom of movement through checkpoints and roadblocks, the sense of
safety that nobody will enter someone’s house uninvited and the predictability of being able to attend
doctor’s appointments and make it to work or school on time – or at all. Some testifiers were
uncomfortable with exerting their power over civilians and perceived some of the sanctions they helped
to uphold as arbitrary. The impact on the occupied population is undeniable; this research shows that
there is also a significant price to pay on the other side. Many of the testimonies share experiences that
raise a host of questions about morals, ethics and conscience and at times leave the reader hopeless.
However, the mere fact that testifiers share their experiences and reflect on their own and their peers’
involvement starts a debate which, even if heated and contentious, offers a glimmer of hope that
change is possible. To end with the words of Israeli author Amoz Oz,
You know, even when the problem of Israel and Palestine is resolved, and Israel and Palestine
agree to exchange ambassadors and establish diplomatic relations, even when this conflict is
history, there will still be bitter disagreement about who was the victim and who was the
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tormentor. And neither of the parties will ever give up its claim to victimhood. It’s part of the
human comedy, and we can live with it. After all, we don’t have to agree about the past; we only
have to agree about the present and the future. (2006, pp. 88-9)
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Appendix A
Codebook
Name

Description

1. Action describes
1.1 (In)Action includes Settlers

Actions described in testimony involves settlers and/or
took place in a settlement

Division between settlers and soldiers

The described incident shows a division between
settlers and soldiers, most often in the form of settlers
verbally harassing soldiers.

Law Enforcement

The described incident involves the Israeli Border Police
who have authority over Israeli settlers in the West
Bank

Settlements

The described incident took place in a settlement

Settler children

The described incident involves settler children

Settler Violence against Palestinian individual

The described incident includes settler violence against
a Palestinian individual

Difficulty dealing with settlers, lack of authority

The testifier describes difficulty interacting with settlers,
including the soldiers’ lack of authority over settlers

1.2 Action against a person
Abuse

The described incident includes a description of an IDF
soldier abusing a Palestinian

Arrest

The testimony describes the arrest of a Palestinian

Assassination

The testimony describes the assassination of a
Palestinian

Confirmation of killing

The testimony discusses a concrete incident of
‘confirmation of killing’

Deaths

The testimony includes description of the death of a
Palestinian
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Name

Description

Desecration of bodies

The testimony describes the desecration of a Palestinian
body by IDF soldiers

Human shields

The testimont describes the practice of human shield,
the usage of a Palestinian civilian to knock on a door or
approach in some other way another Palestinian in
order to minimize potential harm to IDF soldiers. This
practice was officially banned in 2005.

Humiliation

The testimony describes an or multiple IDF soldiers
humiliating a Palestinian

Violence

The testimony describes acts of violence committed by
IDF soldiers against Palestinian civilians

1.3 Action against property
Bribery

The testimony describes an IDF soldier accepting bribes
from a Palestinian in exchange for something else, for
example easier passage at a checkpoint.

Destruction of property

The testimony describes an IDF soldier or group of
soldiers destroying property of a Palestinian

House demolitions, Razing

The testimony describes the IDF destroying or severely
damaging a Palestinian house

Looting

The testimony includes descriptions of an IDF soldier
stealing goods from a Palestinian, most often from a
Palestinian home.

1.4 Disrupting Palestinian civilian life
Checkpoint

The described incident took place at a checkpoint or
includes a discussion of practices at checkpoints

Curfew, Closures

The testimony includes an incident that took place
during a curfew

House incursions, Takeovers

The testimony describes the incursion/temporary
takeover of a Palestinian home by Israeli soldiers. Often,
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Name

Description
the Palestinian family either moves into one room or
leaves their house for the duration of the incursion.

Loss of Livelihood

The testimony describes an incident that results in the
loss of livelihood for a Palestinian. This includes for
example the destruction of Olive trees

Restrictions of Movement

The testimony discusses restrictions of movements
enforced on Palestinian civilians

Separation Barrier

The testimony describes incidents at the Separation
Barrier between the West Bank and Israel

1.5 Other Military Routines and topics
Demonstration of Presence

The testimony includes a description of a demonstration
of presence by Israeli soldiers. This can take various
forms but is always characterized by highlighting the
power asymmetry between Israeli soldiers and
Palestinians. Examples include gun fire in direction of a
Palestinian or a Palestinian home without cause and
waking up a Palestinian family without reason.

Patrols

The testimony describes the IDF patrolling a certain
area

Routine

This category summarizes other military routines not
captured by other codes

Rules of Engagement

The testimony specifically discusses rules of
engagement

Stake out

The testimony describes the act of an IDF soldier
secretively watching a Palestinian or a specific place in
the OPT

2. Individual Values

Display of individual Values/cited as reason for
criticizing described behavior
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Name

Description

Personal ethical values, citing conscience

statements that refer to a personal understanding of
right and wrong, these can be grounded in
philosophical, religious or spiritual beliefs

National Identity Values

statements that refer to Jewish-Israeli collective values
that are, for example, informed by shared history,
language, religion and traditions.

Political Values

statements that refer to goals, principles and policies
that pertain to the relationship between the
government and the citizen

3. Military Values

Spirit of the IDF values

3.1 Confirmation of Military Value

Confirmation of aspects of military culture (testifier
highlights that certain aspects are upheld), IDF Code of
Ethics values

Comradeship

The IDF servicemen and women will act out of fraternity
and devotion to their comrades, and will always go to
their assistance when they need their help or depend
on them, despite any danger or difficulty, even to the
point of risking their lives.

Personal example

The IDF servicemen and women will comport
themselves as required of them, and will demand of
themselves as they demand of others, out of
recognition of their ability and responsibility within the
military and without to serve as a deserving role-model.

Honesty

The IDF servicemen and women shall present things
objectively, completely, and precisely, in planning,
performing and in reporting. They will act in such a
manner that their peers and commanders can rely upon
them in performing their tasks.

Pursuit of the mission and drive to victory

IDF servicemen and women will fight and conduct
themselves with courage in the face of all dangers and
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Name

Description
obstacles. They will persevere in their mission resolutely
and thoughtfully even to the point of endangering their
lives.

Representation

The IDF soldiers view their service in the IDF as a
mission. They will be ready to give their all in order to
defend the state, its citizens and residents. This is due
to the fact that they are representatives of the IDF who
act on the basis and the framework of authority given to
them in accordance with IDF orders.

Human Life

The IDF servicemen and women will act in a judicious
and safe manner in all they do, out of recognition of the
supreme value of human life. During combat they will
endanger themselves and their comrades only to the
extent required to carry out their mission.

Purity of Arms

The IDF servicemen and women will use their weapons
and force only for the purpose of their mission, only to
the necessary extent and will maintain his human image
even during combat. IDF soldiers will not use their
weapons and force to harm beings who are notcombatants or prisoners of war, and they will do all in
their power to avoid harm to their lives, bodies, dignity
and property.

Discipline

The IDF servicemen and women will strive to the best of
their ability to fully and successfully complete all that is
required of them according to the orders and their
spirit. IDF soldiers will be meticulous in giving only
lawful orders, and shall refrain from obeying manifestly
illegal orders.

Professionalism

The IDF servicemen and women will acquire the
professional knowledge and skills required to perform
their tasks, and will implement them while striving
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Name

Description
continuously to perfect their personal and collective
achievements.

Responsibility

The IDF serviceman or woman will see themselves as an
active participant in the defence of the state, its citizens
and residents. They will carry out their duties at all
times with initiative, involvement, and diligence with
common sense and within the framework of their
authority, while prepared to bear responsibility for their
conduct.

3.2 Violations of Military Values

Violations of specific Spirit of the IDF values

Comradeship

The IDF servicemen and women will act out of fraternity
and devotion to their comrades, and will always go to
their assistance when they need their help or depend
on them, despite any danger or difficulty, even to the
point of risking their lives.

Honesty

The IDF servicemen and women shall present things
objectively, completely, and precisely, in planning,
performing and in reporting. They will act in such a
manner that their peers and commanders can rely upon
them in performing their tasks.

Personal example

The IDF servicemen and women will comport
themselves as required of them, and will demand of
themselves as they demand of others, out of
recognition of their ability and responsibility within the
military and without to serve as a deserving role-model.

Representation

The IDF soldiers view their service in the IDF as a
mission. They will be ready to give their all in order to
defend the state, its citizens and residents. This is due
to the fact that they are representatives of the IDF who
act on the basis and the framework of authority given to
them in accordance with IDF orders.
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Name

Description

Pursuit of the mission and drive to victory

IDF servicemen and women will fight and conduct
themselves with courage in the face of all dangers and
obstacles. They will persevere in their mission resolutely
and thoughtfully even to the point of endangering their
lives.

Human Life

The IDF servicemen and women will act in a judicious
and safe manner in all they do, out of recognition of the
supreme value of human life. During combat they will
endanger themselves and their comrades only to the
extent required to carry out their mission.

Purity of Arms

The IDF servicemen and women will use their weapons
and force only for the purpose of their mission, only to
the necessary extent and will maintain his human image
even during combat. IDF soldiers will not use their
weapons and force to harm beings who are notcombatants or prisoners of war, and they will do all in
their power to avoid harm to their lives, bodies, dignity
and property.

Discipline

The IDF servicemen and women will strive to the best of
their ability to fully and successfully complete all that is
required of them according to the orders and their
spirit. IDF soldiers will be meticulous in giving only
lawful orders, and shall refrain from obeying manifestly
illegal orders.

Professionalism

The IDF servicemen and women will acquire the
professional knowledge and skills required to perform
their tasks, and will implement them while striving
continuously to perfect their personal and collective
achievements.

Responsibility

The IDF serviceman or woman will see themselves as an
active participant in the defence of the state, its citizens
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Name

Description
and residents. They will carry out their duties at all
times with initiative, involvement, and diligence with
common sense and within the framework of their
authority, while prepared to bear responsibility for their
conduct.

4. Additional Codes
Courage to confront fellow soldiers

The testifier describes that they or a peer confronted
unethical behavior of fellow soldiers

Critical of IDF policies, guidelines

The testifier voices criticism of concrete policies or
guidelines

Lack of courage to confront unethical behavior

The testifier expresses that they did not have the
courage to confront unethical behavior of fellow
soldiers

Lack of transparency of orders/guidelines

The testifier states a perceived lack of transparency in
orders and/or official guidelines

Lack of Training

The testifier expresses that they did not feel adequately
trained for the assigned tasks

Palestinian children

The described incident involves Palestinian children

Questioning superior's decision-making

The testifier questioned the decision of a supervisor,
either on ethical, legal or logical grounds

Revenge

The testifiers states that a fellow soldier or supervisor
acted out of revenge

Superior displayed ethical behavior

The testifier perceived their supervisor to display ethical
behavior

Expression of sympathy with Palestinian civilians

The testifier expresses sympathy with Palestinian
civilians
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Appendix B
Summary of Military branch representation in data
This table summarizes the unit affiliations of testifiers as disclosed in the testimonies. Battalions
within one brigade are summarized, except for reconnaissance units21 and those battalions that have no
clear brigade affiliation, or an explanation/note is needed.
Cumulative numbers of testimonies for different Corps are shown in bold in the right column.
Corresponding numbers of testimonies for brigades are listed in the right column as well, and numbers
for those battalions separately listed are shown in parentheses immediately following the battalion.
Note: due to the inconsistent labeling of unit affiliation in testimonies, cumulative numbers in one
category might not add up to the numbers shown in bold. Example: some testimonies are labeled
‘Infantry’ instead of a more specific unit affiliation. Those are included in the cumulative number for
Infantry but do not show up in a subcategory.
Brigade Level

Battalion Level

Number of
Testimonies in
Sample

1. Ground Forces

1.1. Infantry total
Golani Brigade

473
16
Egoz Reconnaissance Battalion22 (2)

Givati Brigade

42
Givati Reconnaissance Battalion

Paratroopers Brigade

69
Paratroopers Reconnaissance Battalion (12)

Nahal Brigade

225
Nahal Reconnaissance Battalion (20)

Kfir Brigade

60
Netzach Yehuda (Nahal

No Brigade affiliation

21

(3)
10

Caracal
Infantry Commanders Academy

Haredi)23

Battalion24

(10)
2

Recon units are elite units with select manpower, and probably better mean education than regular line battalions.
Egoz is a special-forces counter-guerilla unit
23 Netzach Yehuda: formerly known as Nahal Haredi, the name was changed when the battalion was transferred from Nahal to
Kfir Brigade.
24 Caracal is a mixed-gender battalion and listed without a brigade affiliation on the IDF’s website
22
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1.2. Armored Corps Total
Armored Corps 7th Brigade

88
9
Reconnaissance Unit, 7th Brigade (7)

Armored Corps, 188 Brigade

5

Armored Corps, 401st Brigade

4
Reconnaissance Unit, 401st Brigade (4)

1.3. Artillery25 total

27
Artillery Corps, 402 Battalion (2)
Artillery Corps, 405 Battalion (8)
Artillery Corps, 55 Battalion (1)
Artillery MLRS (1)

1.4. Field Intelligence

2

2. Reserves
Alexandroni Reserve Brigade

28
2

Jerusalem Brigade

1

Civilian Corps Reserves

2

5th Brigade

1

No Brigade affiliation/unclear
affiliation

10
Reserves Battalion 5033 (1)
Armored Corps 8, 455 battalion (Reserves) (8)
Mechanized Infantry 8104 Battalion (1)

3. Engineering Corps

32

4. Civil Administration26

44

5. Educational Corps

5

6. Intelligence

3

25

Subsections in the Artillery Corps are called ‘arrays’ instead of battalions. Breaking the Silence’s translation to ‘battalion’ is
thus incorrect but shown here to reflect the information provided in the data.
26 Civil administration, regular air force, and other non-combat formations are required to provide a quota of soldiers to help
man checkpoints and other security locations for periods of a few weeks each year, to lower the burden on combat troops.
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7. Special Forces

16
Oketz Canine unit (8)
Shaldag Reconnaissance unit (1)
Yahlom (3)
Yael Reconnaissance27 (1)
Moran unit (1)

8. Military Police

28
Sachlav unit (22)
Checkpoint M.P. (5)
Erez Battalion (1)

9. Air Force
10. Navy
11. Border Police28

8
11
24

12. Central Command

9
Judea Regional Brigade (7)
Samaria Regional Brigade (1)
Etzion Regional Command (1)

13. Southern Command

6
Gaza Brigade (4)

14. Other
15. Unassigned

27

28
79

Yael Reconnaissance is a sub-unit of Yahlom.
The Border Police is not a part of the IDF, but a part of the Israeli Police. Conscripts can opt to serve with the Border Police
instead of the IDF for the same amount of time to fulfill their conscription requirement.
28
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Appendix C
Summary timeline of Palestinian Israeli conflict 1999- 2017
This summary provides some context for the period covered in the data, the years 1999 – 2017.
This summary is not exhaustive, nor does it account for the whole complexity of events and conflict
narratives.
Year

Event

2000

Camp David Summit: A meeting at Camp David in the U.S. between U.S.
President Bill Clinton, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian
Authority chairman Yasser Arafat. The 2-week long meeting ended without an
agreement.

2000-2005

Second Intifada, also known as Al-Aqsa Intifada: Palestinian Uprising
characterized by violence on both sides, suicide bombings from Palestinians
and Israeli military responses. Overall, about 3,000 Palestinians and 1,000
Israelis were killed in the Second Intifada.

2002

IDF conducts Operation Defensive Shield, the largest military operation in the
West Bank since 1967. In 2002, Israel begins construction of a separation
barrier between Israel and the West bank. The route is the cause of friction as
it deviates from the pre-1967 ceasefire line and crosses into West Bank
territory in multiple instances.

2003

The U.S., European Union, Russia and United Nations propose a plan to resolve
the conflict, which includes a freeze on all Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
Israel and the Palestinian Authority accept the plan.

2005

Israeli Disengagement from Gaza; all Israeli settlements in Gaza are evacuated,
Israel has no permanent military presence in Gaza anymore.

2006

Hamas wins Palestinian elections and rules the Gaza Strip since then; Fatah
with leader Mahmoud Abbas rules the West Bank.
Israeli soldier Gilat Shalit is kidnapped by Hamas. He is released in 2011 in
exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners.
Second Lebanon War between Israel and the Hezbollah lasts 34 days.
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2008

The IDF conduct the three-weeks long Operation Cast Lead in Gaza following
rocket attacks from Gaza into Israeli territory. More than 1,100 Palestinians
and 13 Israelis are killed.

2012

The IDF conducts Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza, sparked by Israel’s killing
of Hamas military chief Ahmad Jabari. During the operation, rocket fire into
Israeli territory from Gaza and Israeli airstrikes kill more than 150 Palestinians
and at least six Israelis.

2014

Hamas kidnaps three Israeli teenagers. Israel conducts Operation Protective
Edge, which include seven weeks of Israeli military strikes on Gaza and rocket
attacks into Israeli territory from Gaza. More than 2,200 Palestinians and more
than 70 Israelis are killed.

2017

For the first time in 25 years, new Israeli settlement constructions begin in the
West Bank
Under President Trump, the U.S. recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and,
later that year, also recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights which
Israel annexed from Syria in 1967. Both moves draw criticism from the Arab
world and some European nations.

